GS Holistic LLC v. Mellow Tobacco & Vape, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-12074
StatusUnknown

This text of GS Holistic LLC v. Mellow Tobacco & Vape, LLC (GS Holistic LLC v. Mellow Tobacco & Vape, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GS Holistic LLC v. Mellow Tobacco & Vape, LLC, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION GS HOLISTIC LLC,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-12074 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson v.

MELLOW TOBACCO & VAPE, LLC d/b/a MELLOW SMOKE, and BASMAN HAKEEM,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [11] GS Holistic, LLC, sells Stündenglass glass infusers—smoking devices “recognized nationally and internationally” for their “high quality,” “unsurpassed innovation,” and “painstaking attention to detail.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) GS says it has “spent substantial time, money, and effort in developing consumer recognition and awareness of the Stündenglass brand”—and in “protecting these Trademarks.” (Id. at PageID.5–6.) But despite GS’ best efforts, the market is “saturated with counterfeit Stündenglass products—just like those Basman Hakeem, through his store Mellow Smoke, is offering for sale.” (Id. at PageID.8.) According to GS, Mellow Smoke and storeowner Hakeem sell “low grade,” “inferior” glass infusers that bear the Stündenglass trademarks. (Id. at PageID.7.) Specifically, says GS, in February of 2023, its investigator went to Mellow Smoke and saw two such counterfeit infusers on sale. (Id. at PageID.10.) The investigator purchased one of them for $318 and later inspected and photographed the product, which contained three counterfeit Stündenglass marks. (Id.; see ECF No. 1-2.) A year and a half later, on August 8, 2024, GS sued Mellow Smoke and storeowner Hakeem for trademark counterfeiting

and infringement and false designation of origin in violation of the Lanham Act. (Id. at PageID.15–18 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a)).) When Defendants failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend against this action, a clerk’s entry of default was entered against them in January 2025. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) GS moved for default judgments against Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). (ECF No. 11.) Defendants again failed to respond or otherwise

appear or attempt to set aside the defaults entered against them. On July 22, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the motion, at which Defendants did not appear. GS’ motion remains unopposed. After oral argument by GS, the Court issued an oral ruling to the following effect, granting in part and denying in part GS’ motion for default judgment.

For starters, GS has carried its burden as to liability—that is, it has shown it

is entitled to default judgments against Defendants for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin under § 1125(a). The Court first finds that Defendants were properly served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Per the certificate of service docketed on January 15, 2025 (ECF No. 7), defendant Hakeem was personally served with a summons and copy of the complaint. That constitutes proper service not only on Hakeem, an individual, under Michigan Court Rule 2.105(A) but also on Mellow Smoke, an LLC, under Michigan Court Rule 2.105(H)(1), because Hakeem is Mellow Smoke’s registered agent according to the Michigan Licensing and Regulatory Affairs database, see Business

Entity Results for Mellow Smoke, Mich. Licensing & Regul. Affs., https://perma.cc/XD4M-B9NK. Next, GS brings two Lanham Act claims, so the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). (ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2, 16–18.) The Court also has personal jurisdiction over the defendants under Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).

Indeed, Hakeem was present and domiciled in Michigan at the time process was served, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.701, and the Court is satisfied that Mellow Smoke was formed under Michigan laws and “carr[ies] on a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state,” id. § 600.731; (see ECF No. 1, PageID.1–3.) Finally, the well-pled allegations in GS’ complaint, taken as true in light of Defendants’ default, see Thomas v. Miller, 489 F.3d 293, 299 (6th Cir. 2007), are

sufficient to state claims of trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and false designation of origin under § 1125(a). In its complaint and unopposed motion, GS has shown that it owns the three trademarks at issue. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.4; ECF No. 1-1.) By defaulting, Defendants admit both that their use of GS’ trademarks has caused and will cause confusion among consumers regarding the origin or quality of the goods offered by Defendants and that they intentionally used the mark knowing it was a counterfeit. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.11– 15; ECF No. 11, PageID.71–75); see also Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that trademark infringement and false designation of origin

claims are both analyzed under the same likelihood of confusion test); Zinganything, LLC v. Import Store, 158 F. Supp. 3d 668, 672–74 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (reasoning similarly and granting default judgments for trademark infringement and counterfeiting); Sream, Inc. v. Kanku Express, Nos. 20-00209, 20-00210, 20-00211, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60621, at *14–15 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2022) (reasoning similarly and granting default judgments for false designation of origin).

For many of the same reasons, GS has shown it is entitled to a permanent injunction. “A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate that it has suffered irreparable injury, that there is no adequate remedy at law, that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted, and that it is in the public's interest to issue the injunction.” Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 550. First, irreparable injury. “The law of [the Sixth] Circuit holds that

no particular finding of likelihood of irreparable harm is necessary for injunctive relief in trademark infringement . . . cases. The Sixth Circuit [has] explained that irreparable injury ordinarily follows when a likelihood of confusion or possible risk to reputation appears from infringement. . . .” Am. Auto. Ass’n v. Dickerson, 995 F. Supp. 2d 753, 757–58 (E.D. Mich. 2014). Because, as already explained, GS’ allegations establish likelihood of confusion, they necessarily show irreparable injury. Second, no adequate remedy at law. “[W]here there is a potential for future harm from continuing infringement, there is no adequate remedy at law.” Id. Here, GS alleges its investigator saw at least one other infringing product for sale at Mellow

Smoke, and a picture of the same is attached to GS’ complaint and motion.

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