Grubb v. Turner

102 N.E. 810, 259 Ill. 436
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJune 18, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 102 N.E. 810 (Grubb v. Turner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grubb v. Turner, 102 N.E. 810, 259 Ill. 436 (Ill. 1913).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant and the appellee were candidates for the office of clerk in the circuit court: of Wayne county at the election on November 5, 1912. This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court rendered in a proceeding to contest the election, and its decision depends upon the counting of 58 ballots, 11 of which were counted for the appellant, 39 for the appellee and 8 were not counted. The canvassing board found that the appellant received 2529 votes and the appellee 2520. The ballots were counted on the hearing, and there were counted, without objection, 2510 votes for the appellant and 2487 for the appellee. Seventy-five ballots were objected to, but subsequently appellee withdrew his objections to 10 of the ballots and the appellant withdrew his objections to 7, thus making the uncontested vote of the appellant 2520 and of the appellee 2494. The addition of the contested votes as they were counted by the court made the appellant’s total 2531 and the appellee’s 2533. The court ordered one vote deducted from the appellant’s total for reasons which will be stated hereafter, thus reducing his total vote to 2530. The appellant now insists that 7 ballots should have been counted for him which were not, and that 39 ballots were wrongly counted for the appellee. The appellee has assigned cross-errors on the action of the court in refusing tO' count one ballot for him and in counting 10 ballots for the appellant. The appellant was the democratic candidate and the appellee the republican. The original ballots which are in controversy-have been certified to us.

The court refused to counts ballots Nos. 1, 65, 72, 74, 81, 99 and 114 for the appellant. No. 1 was marked with the word “Yes” in the democratic circle. The statute provides the method for indicating the voter’s choice by making a cross in the circle .or squares on the ballot, and unless there is an honest attempt on the part of the voter to. comply with this provision of the law his ballot will be rejected. (Slenker v. Engel, 250 Ill. 499.) This ballot was properly rejected.

Nos. 65, 74 and 99 were not indorsed with the initials of a judge of election. They were properly rejected. (Brents v. Smith, 250 Ill. 521; Slenker v. Engel, supra.) We are asked to reconsider the previous decisions of this question, but it has often been considered and determined, and we regard it now as a settled rule, that ballots not having the initials of a judge of election indorsed cannot be counted.

Ballot No. 114 is marked on the face with a purple, indelible pencil. On the back some marks appear made with a black pencil, which probably were the initials of L- H. Weaver, one of the judges of election, though it is impossible to tell, for.they are almost obliterated by heavy marks made with an indelible pencil. These marks could not have been placed there with any intention of indicating the voter’s choice but must have .been for some ulterior purpose. They deface the ballot by obliterating the means of identification and they constitute a distinguishing mark. This ballot was properly rejected.

No. 81 has a cross in the democratic circle and horizontal lines through the circles in each of the other five tickets. These must be regarded as distinguishing marks, and the ballot was properly rejected.

W. Duff Piercy was a candidate for senator in the Forty-sixth district, and immediately above his name appear the words “For senator” and below it the words “For representatives.” Ballot No. 72 is a straight democratic ballot marked in the circle and having no other mark on it except that between the square before Piercy’s name and the initial “W” appears a reversed figure “3” and between the “W” and “Duff” appears the figure “3.” The voter probably intended to cast three votes for Piercy. This ballot should have been counted for appellant.

It is assigned as error that the court erroneously counted for the appellee 39 ballots to which the appellant objected. As to four of these ballots (Nos. 2, 13, 37 and 135,) the argument offers no reason why they should not be counted. The objections to ballots Nos. 8, 11, 14, 24, 29, 30, 31, 35, 45, 49, 52, 56, 98, 102, 115, 117, 122 and 129 are of the same general character. Each was marked with a cross in the circle at the head of one of the tickets or with crosses in the squares in front of the names of candidates. In each case the voter placed a cross in front of the name of a candidate for President or Vice-President, or both,—sometimes on the same ticket which was marked in the circle, sometimes on another ticket, and sometimes in front of the name of a candidate for President on one ticket and for Vice-President on another. In one case lines were drawn through the name of the candidate for President on the ticket which was marked in the circle and a cross placed in front of the name of another candidate for President. The objection is made that these marks, made in plain disregard of the statute, should be regarded as distinguishing marks. They all appear to be ignorant efforts to indicate a choice for President or Vice-President. These marks can all be reasonably explained consistently with the honest effort of the voter to indicate his choice of candidates, and though some of them are useless for that purpose, the ballots should not be rejected as to candidates for whom a choice is expressed in accordance with the statute. Winn v. Blackman, 229 Ill. 198; Rexroth v. Schein, 206 id. 80.

Ballot No. 50 is a straight republican ballot, having no marks upon it except a cross in the republican circle and another cross drawn through the middle of the name of Eugene W. Chapin, prohibition candidate for President. It differs from the case where lines are drawn through the name of a candidate upon a ticket marked in the circle. In such case the evident intention is to indicate that the voter does not vote for the candidate whose name is erased. Here the mark does not indicate any intention on the part of the voter, and the ballot should have been rejected.

Ballots Nos. 28, 51, 58, 59, 61, 91, 130 and 134 are each marked with a cross in each square on the republican ticket. All but three were marke.d with a cross in the circle at the head of the progressive - ticket, and of the three exceptions two were marked with a cross in front of the name of the progressive candidate for President and one with a cross in front of the republican candidate for Vice-President. Three of these ballots were cast in one precinct, and the republican ticket had two blank spaces under the name of the candidate for representative, before which were squares, in which crosses were marked on all these ballots. From these circumstances we are asked to infer that there was a concert of action on the part of the voters for the purpose of identifying and distinguishing these ballots. The circumstances are consistent with honest intention and the ballots were properly counted.

Ballot No. 71 has a cross in the republican circle. It shows through on the back. The appellant contends that the mark on the back is made with carbon. From an examination of the ballot we are not convinced that the mark was made with carbon. It may as well have been caused by the pressure of the pencil on the face of the ballot resting on a soiled support.

Ballots Nos. 75 and S3 are alike. The progressive ticket had no candidates for county offices. These ballots were marked with a cross in the progressive circle.

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Bluebook (online)
102 N.E. 810, 259 Ill. 436, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grubb-v-turner-ill-1913.