Brents v. Smith

95 N.E. 484, 250 Ill. 521
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJune 20, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 95 N.E. 484 (Brents v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brents v. Smith, 95 N.E. 484, 250 Ill. 521 (Ill. 1911).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Carter

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Christian county declaring appellee elected to the office of sheriff of said county. At the regular election held on November 8, 1910, for that and other county offices, appellant, Thomas W. Brents, was the regular democratic candidate, and appellee, J. R. Smith, the regular republican candidate, for sheriff. William Hart and James A. Bickerdike were candidates, respectively, on the socialist and prohibition tickets. On the canvass of the returns Brents was given 3293, Smith 3299, Hart 172 and Bickerdike 100, and Smith was declared elected by a plurality of six votes. A contest was instituted in the county court of Christian county and the ballots were opened and re-counted, with the result that Brents was given 3277 votes, Smith 3283, Hart 176 and Bickerdike 119, and a finding made that appellee, Smith, was elected by a plurality of six votes. From that order and decree this appeal was taken to this court.

The contest was started on November 15, 1910. The petition charged incorrect counting of ballots in the various precincts but did not charge fraud. After an answer was filed setting out that some ballots had been incorrectly counted for the appellant in various precincts, the appellant, on January 3, 1911, filed, by leave of court, an amendment to his petition, charging that certain markings had been fraudulently placed upon ballots in district No. 4 of Pana, in said county, which inured to the benefit of appellee, and that said votes either ought to be counted as the ballots showed them to have been cast, or that the entire precinct be thrown out and not counted for either candidate. It is here insisted that this amendment was improperly allowed. Contests of elections under the present act are to all intents and purposes chancery proceedings, subject to all the rules governing the same. (Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170; Rodman v. Wurzburg, 183 id. 395; Weinberg v. Noonan, 193 id. 165.) This court held in Dale v. Irwin, supra, that the contestant could by an amendment add points of contest not contained in his original petition. This is in accord with the general chancery practice, and we see no reason to depart from that ruling.

It is next insisted that under the ruling of this court in Conway v. Sexton, 243 Ill. 59, the petition should be dismissed because the socialist and prohibition candidates were not "made parties to the contest. There are two sufficient answers to this objection: First, we do not find that this point was raised in the trial court; and second, the petition and answer show that it was unnecessary to make any of the other candidates parties, as it would be most unreasonable to believe that one of them could gain enough on a re-count to entitle him to be declared elected. The result of the contest proved that fact. In the Conway-Sexton case the pleadings did not show, and in the light of the facts in that case could not honestly show, that the candidates who were not made parties might not on the re-count have been necessary parties.

On the re-count the uncontested ballots agreed upon by attorneys for both sides gave Brents 3255 votes and Smith 3217 votes, leaving no contested ballots. The original contested ballots have been certified to this court with the record. They were each numbered in the court below for identification, and we shall find it convenient to identify the ballots' by referring to those numbers. Many of the ballots can be divided into groups, according to the nature of the objections, and disposed of together.

Fifty-two ballots are objected to because they have on the front or back a number or numbers, followed by words. From the appearance of the ballots, as well as from the testimony of the judges and clerks, these numbers and words were made by the judges as an aid in counting the ballots and indicate the number of votes credited to various candidates. Judges and clerks should not mark ballots in this manner while counting the votes, but when it appears that the voter has complied with the law in marking his ballot he should not be disfranchised by such marks made by the judges. (Kerr v. Flewelling, 235 Ill. 326; Rexroth v. Schcin, 206 id. 80.) Eleven of these votes were properly counted by the court for Brents and forty-one for Smith.

Seven ballots are objected to because, it is argued, the lines forming the attempted cross do not intersect inside the square or circle or do not form a cross. The rule often stated by this court is, that if an honest attempt was made to follow the law in making the cross in an appropriate circle or square, the fact that the cross was imperfect will not prevent the ballot being counted. (Parker v. Orr, 158 Ill. 609; Kerr v. Flewelling, supra; Winn v. Blackman, 229 Ill. 198; Apple v. Barcroft, 158 id. 649.) If the lines meet but do not cross or intersect they cannot be held a cross under the authorities, but if they intersect and cross, even slightly, within the proper circle or square they should be considered as a cross. Following this rule, ballots 216, 2133 and 2708 should be counted for Brents and ballots 2449, 2779, 3883 and 6875 for Smith. Ballot 4176 has a V-shaped mark in the square before the name of appellee, Smith. At no point in the square is there an intersection of the lines to form a cross. Under the ruling of this court in Winn v. Blackman, 229 Ill. 198, this ballot cannot be counted for Smith. Ballot 5282 has in the republican circle an irregularly-shaped mark similar in form to the letter T. This ballot should be counted for Smith. Parker v. Orr, supra.

Ballots 3014, 3589, 3783 and 6103 are objected to because the respective crosses in the republican circle or square before Smith are dim, or not made, as claimed in some cases, by lead pencil or pen. We believe in all these cases thé voter honestly attempted to make a cross, in some instances by pressing the pencil very lightly on the paper and in other instances by using a pencil when the lead was broken. All these ballots should be counted for Smith. (Rexroth v. Schein, supra.) Ballot 6053, objected to because of dimness of the cross, will be counted for Brents.

Ballot 2604 has a mark in the democratic circle resembling a letter O. There being no attempt at a cross, this ballot cannot be counted for Brents. Parker v. Orr, supra.

Ballot 3450 has a cross in the democratic circle and the names of both Brents and Smith are marked out with a lead pencil line drawn horizontally through each name. This court has held that the voter can erase the name of the candidate and write in another and thus vote for the candidate whose name is written in. (Winn v. Blackman, supra.) While the precise question here raised does not seem to have been decided in any of the cases, we think, under the reasoning of the authorities, this vote cannot be counted for Brents.

, Various ballots are objected to by each party on the ground that they bear distinguishing marks. The law forbids such a mark as will distinguish and separate the particular ballot from the other ballots cast at the election,— a mark put upon the ballot to indicate who cast it and to evade its secrecy. Whether a given mark is or is not distinguishing, is largely, if not wholly, a question of fact. Winn v. Blackman, supra.

It is contended by appellant that ballot 4993 should be counted for him while he contends that ballot 2154 should not be counted for appellee.

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Bluebook (online)
95 N.E. 484, 250 Ill. 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brents-v-smith-ill-1911.