PRESENT: All the Justices
GROUNDWORKS OPERATIONS, LLC F/K/A JES OPERATIONS, LLC, ET AL. OPINION BY v. Record No. 241092 JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH December 30, 2025 JOSEPH CAMPBELL, ET AL.
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal we must determine whether the wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, covers
commissions. The language of the statute specifically lists wages and salaries, but it does not
expressly apply to commissions. The trial court held that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply to
commissions. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. We conclude that the language of
the statute and its context do not support an interpretation that extends its protections to
commissions. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
According to the allegations in the complaint, the five plaintiffs are former employees of
JES Construction, L.L.C. JES provides construction services such as foundation repair, water
proofing, and crawl space remediation. Groundworks Operations, L.L.C., formerly JES
Operations L.L.C., is a management company that provides services to affiliated companies,
including JES Construction. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to both defendants as JES.
Four of the plaintiffs would go to prospective customers’ homes to sell construction services.
One plaintiff was responsible for repairing installations and selling additional goods and
services. JES would then perform the construction services pursuant to the contract.
Four of the plaintiffs were paid exclusively on a commission basis. One of the plaintiffs
was paid commissions as well as other compensation. JES initially did not have a written commission policy. The plaintiffs’ commissions were paid as ten percent of the gross price of
the sales they made. JES paid half of the commission once the contract’s three-day rescission
period had expired and the contract had become final. JES paid the remainder once the job was
complete and the customer had made a final payment. The plaintiffs often experienced
significant delays in receiving payment for their full commission. The delays could be caused by
the engineering and permitting phases of the contract. Four of the five plaintiffs later signed an
agreement with JES under which they agreed that the commissions would be paid up to 14 days
after the employees no longer worked for JES. No further commissions would be paid after 14
days. The plaintiffs alleged that JES refused to pay commissions after they left the company.
The plaintiffs asserted that, when they left the company, they were owed thousands of dollars in
earned but unpaid commissions.
The plaintiffs filed a collective action complaint under the wage theft law, Code § 40.1-
29 et seq. They argued that their commissions were earned after the customer’s three-day
rescission period ended, and that JES’s refusal to pay their commissions constituted wage theft.
The plaintiffs asserted that commissions constituted wages under this statute. Three of the
plaintiffs also alleged that the agreement they signed with JES violated the prohibitions of Code
§ 40.1-29(D) (prohibiting employers from requiring an employee to forfeit “wages for time
worked as a condition of employment”). Two plaintiffs left before signing this agreement.
In response, the employer filed a demurrer, contending that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply
to commissions. The circuit court granted the demurrer, concluding that the statute did not cover
commissions. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. That Court reversed, holding that
the term “wages” as used in the wage theft statute applied to commissions. Campbell v.
Groundworks Operations, LLC, 82 Va. App. 580, 583 (2024). The Court of Appeals rested its
2 conclusion on the remedial purpose of the statute, past decisions interpreting the term “wages” in
other contexts, and an interpretation by an administrative agency contained in a field manual. Id.
at 592. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The issue before us is one of statutory construction. Consequently, we review the
decision below de novo. Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630 (2010).
I. OVERVIEW OF THE WAGE THEFT LAW
The General Assembly has provided statutory protections for employees whose “wages”
or “salaries” are improperly withheld by their employers. Code § 40.1-29(C) (prohibiting
employers from “withhold[ing] any part of the wages or salaries of any employee except for
payroll, wage or withholding taxes or in accordance with law, without the written and signed
authorization of the employee”). Among other provisions, the law requires employers to
establish regular pay periods and rates of pay. Code § 40.1-29(A). Salaried employees must be
paid “at least once each month.” Id. Employees who are paid on an hourly basis must be paid
“at least once every two weeks or twice in each month.” Id. The same paragraph specifies that
“[u]pon termination of employment an employee shall be paid all wages or salaries due him for
work performed prior thereto; such payment shall be made on or before the date on which he
would have been paid for such work had his employment not been terminated.” Id.
In addition, “[n]o employer shall require any employee, except executive personnel, to
sign any contract or agreement which provides for the forfeiture of the employee’s wages for
time worked as a condition of employment or the continuance therein, except as otherwise
provided by law.” Code § 40.1-29(D).
3 A plaintiff who establishes a violation of the statute is entitled to recover not only his or
her lost wages, but also “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, plus interest at an
annual rate of eight percent accruing from the date the wages were due” as provided in Code
§ 40.1-29(G), “and reasonable attorney fees and costs.” Code § 40.1-29(J). However, employers
who knowingly fail to pay wages face a penalty “equal to triple the amount of wages due,” as
well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Code § 40.1-29(J).
Code § 40.1-29(E) provides for a criminal prosecution in the event an employer
“willfully and with intent to defraud fails or refuses to pay wages in accordance with this
section.” The classification of the crime depends on the value of the wages. When “the value of
the wages earned and not paid by the employer is less than $10,000,” the crime is a Class 1
misdemeanor. Id. If the value of the wages is $10,000 or more, or if the employer is guilty of a
second or subsequent conviction, the crime is a Class 6 felony. Id.
The Commissioner of Labor and Industry “may institute proceedings on behalf of an
employee to enforce compliance with this section, and to collect any moneys unlawfully
withheld from such employee that shall be paid to the employee entitled thereto.” Code § 40.1-
29(F). Additionally, subsection J of the statute permits an employee to “bring an action” against
the employer “individually, jointly, with other aggrieved employees, or on behalf of similarly
situated employees as a collective action consistent with the collective action procedures of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.” Code § 40.1-29(J).
II. THE WAGE THEFT LAW DOES NOT COVER COMMISSIONS, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether Code § 40.1-29, which expressly addresses
“wages” and “salaries,” also incorporates commissions. “‘[T]he primary objective of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” Conger, 280 Va. at 630
4 (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459 (1983)). Under
basic rules of statutory construction, we determine the General Assembly’s intent from the words
contained in the statute. Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677 (2001). In interpreting a statute,
we are bound by “the plain language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous or applying the
plain language would lead to an absurd result.” Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227(2006)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In common parlance, wages are not synonymous with commissions. 1 Wages are
generally understood to be compensation for hours worked, for a day of work, or for piece work.
Commissions are payments based on a percentage of sales. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“commission” as “[a] fee paid to an agent or employee for a particular transaction, [usually] as a
percentage of the money received from the transaction.” Commission, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 341 (12th ed. 2024). A “wage” is “[p]ayment for labor or services, usu[ally] on
time worked or quantity produced.” Wage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1898 (12th ed. 2024)
(emphasis added). 2 In ordinary usage, the two are conceptually distinct. The word “usually” in
1 The plaintiffs do not contend that the term “wages” is rooted in the common law of England, and as such comes freighted with an established historic meaning. Tvardek v. Powhatan Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, 291 Va. 269, 276 n.4 (2016) (“A statute touching on matters of common law must ‘be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.” (citation omitted)). Consequently, we construe the term according to its plain meaning. 2 Black’s Law Dictionary includes the following after a bullet point that appears at the end of the definition: “Wages include every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an individual for personal services, including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, bonuses, and the reasonable value of board, lodging, payments in kind, tips, and any similar advantage received from the employer. An employer usu[ally] must withhold income taxes from wages.” Wage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1898 (12th ed. 2024). The dictionary specifies that “[b]ullets are used to separate definitional information (before the bullet) from information that is not purely definitional (after the bullet) such as encyclopedic information or usage notes.” Guide to the Dictionary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY xxii (12th ed. 2024). In other words, commissions
5 the definition is significant. With regard to the plain meaning of the term “wages,” therefore,
wages ordinarily are distinct from commissions, but the legislature can employ the word
“wages” to encompass commissions, either expressly or contextually. It did neither here. A
plain language reading of the statute, therefore, suggests that the General Assembly did not
intend to include commissions in the statute, because the word is not in the statute.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the General Assembly often has been quite
specific in employing the term commissions alongside wages. Although the following is not an
exhaustive catalog of statutes, it is certainly illustrative:
• Code § 6.2-1526(A) (regulating consumer finance companies) (“A valid assignment or order for the payment of future salary, wages, commissions, or other compensation for services may be given as security for a loan made by any licensee”) (emphasis added);
• Code § 8.01-512.3 (garnishment summons form) (“Earnings can be salary, hourly wages, commissions, bonuses, or otherwise.”) (emphasis added);
• Code § 20-108.2(C) (guideline for child support) (“For purposes of this section, ‘gross income’ means all income from all sources, and shall include, but not be limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits except as listed below, workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans’ benefits, spousal support, rental income except as listed below, gifts, prizes, or awards.”) (emphasis added);
• Code § 34-4.2(A) (additional homestead exemption for parents of dependent children) (“For purposes of this section, ‘household gross income’ means all income from all sources, and shall include, but not be limited to, salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans’ benefits, child support, spousal support, rental income, gifts, prizes or awards paid to any adult living in the household or to the dependent child.”) (emphasis added);
• Code § 60.2-229(A) (unemployment compensation) (“‘Wages’ means all remuneration paid, or which should have been paid, for personal services, including commissions,
and wages usually are distinct, but there are instances in which the term wages can be interpreted to also cover commissions.
6 bonuses, tips, back pay, dismissal pay, severance pay and any other payments made by an employer to an employee during his employment and thereafter and the cash value of all remuneration payable in any medium other than cash.”) (emphases added); and
• Code § 63.2-1900 (child support enforcement) (“‘Income’ means any periodic or other form of payment due an individual from any source and shall include, but not be limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans’ benefits, spousal support, net rental income, gifts, prizes or awards.) (emphases added).
Moreover, Code § 40.1-28.7:8, which limits covenants not to compete, provides that
“[f]or the purposes of this section, ‘low-wage employee’ shall not include any employee whose
earnings are derived, in whole or in predominant part, from sales commissions, incentives, or
bonuses paid to the employee by the employer.” (Emphases added). That language is expressly
limited to that Code section.
The treatment of wages and commissions in so many statutes indicates the following: (1)
there is no uniform treatment of the concept of wages throughout the Code; and (2) the General
Assembly often views wages and commissions as distinct concepts and addresses them
specifically in a range of statutes. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the General Assembly knows
how to draft a statute so that it includes the term “commissions.” Against this backdrop, the
omission of the term commissions from Code § 40.1-29 indicates that the General Assembly did
not intend to include them within the scope of the statute. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commonwealth,
301 Va. 476, 482 (2022) (observing that “when the General Assembly has used specific language
in one instance but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar
subject elsewhere in the Code, the Court must presume that the difference in the choice of
language was intentional”; that “under these circumstances, it is evident that the General
Assembly knows how to include such language in a statute to achieve an intended objective”;
7 and concluding that “therefore, [the] omission of such language . . . ‘represents an unambiguous
manifestation of a contrary intention’”) (alterations omitted) (collecting cases).
Even if the General Assembly did not expressly mention commissions in Code § 40.1-29,
the statutory context might signal a legislative intent to employ the term “wages” broadly. Here
too, however, we discern no legislative intent to depart from the usual, commonly understood
distinction between wages and commissions. Code § 40.1-2 defines an “employee” as “any
person who, in consideration of wages, salaries, or commissions, may be permitted[] . . . by any
employer to engage in any employment directly or indirectly.” This definition applies to all
sections within Title 40.1 “unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” Code § 40.1-2.
Therefore, at the outset, the definition of “employee” distinguishes between three types of
compensation: “wages, salaries, or commissions.” Id. And Code § 40.1-29 does not suggest that
wages should be interpreted in its broadest sense. Instead, Code § 40.1-29 employs two distinct
terms, “wages” and “salaries.” If the General Assembly had intended to use “wages” to broadly
incorporate all forms of compensation, it is not clear why it would also mention salaries. We
have long held that courts “ordinarily resist a construction of a statute that would render part of a
statute superfluous.” Davis v. MKR Dev., LLC, 295 Va. 488, 494 (2018); Dilliard v. Tomlinson,
15 Va. (1 Munf.) 183, 205 (1810) (same). Furthermore, Code § 40.1-29 contains detailed
provisions about an employer’s obligations with respect to wages and salaries, such as how and
when wages and salaries should be paid. But the statute contains no such language addressing
commissions, indicating that the General Assembly did not intend to include commissions in its
scope.
Neither the plain meaning of the terms “wages” or “commissions,” nor the use of the
term wages in the context of Code § 40.1-29, suggests that the use of the term “wages” sweeps in
8 the concept of “commissions.” The most plausible reading of Code § 40.1-29, therefore, is that
the General Assembly did not intend for the wage theft statute to apply to commissions.
The plaintiffs contend that this statute is remedial, and therefore it should “be construed
liberally to remedy the mischief to which [it is] directed in accordance with the legislature’s
intended purpose.” Carmel v. Hampton, 241 Va. 457, 460 (1991). Assuming it would be proper
to resort to canons of construction, however, Code § 40.1-29 also contains criminal prohibitions.
A criminal statute “must be strictly construed.” Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 251
(1991). A statute cannot simultaneously be interpreted broadly and narrowly. Under the
circumstances of this particular statute, these canons are offsetting.
The plaintiffs also correctly point out that in past cases Virginia appellate courts have
defined wages broadly. None of those cases, however, construe the statute at issue. Nor do they
purport to fashion a universally applicable broad definition for “wages” that would incorporate
commissions. For example, in an 1889 case, we examined whether an act giving railroad
employees a priority lien on railroad equipment violated the Virginia Constitution’s “single
object” rule, currently found in Article IV, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution. In that
context, we defined wages as “a compensation given to a hired person for his or her services.”
Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah Valley Railroad Co., 86 Va. 1, 8
(1889) (citation and italics omitted). The decision does not address wages versus commissions.
The Court of Appeals mentioned the definition of wages from Fidelity Insurance in
Commonwealth of Virginia/Department of Transportation v. Swiney, 23 Va. App. 467 (1996). In
that case, the Court of Appeals held that “payments made under the Workforce Transition Act
(WTA) are not ‘wages’ for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act” because WTA
payments were not for work or services rendered to the employer.” Id. at 468-69. Again, the
9 Court of Appeals did not purport to address whether commissions are generally encompassed
within the concept of wages, and it did not address the wage theft statute. These cases offer
scant support for the proposition that the use of the term wages throughout the Code generally
includes commissions.
The plaintiffs and amicus present a number of thoughtful policy arguments for why the
wage theft statute should also cover commissions. These arguments are best addressed to the
General Assembly. “Whether an enactment is wise, and matters of policy, are questions for the
legislative branch of government, and not the judicial branch.” Horner v. Dep’t of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation, & Substance Abuse Servs., 268 Va. 187, 193 (2004). “Our proper
role is to interpret law and not to express our opinion on policy.” Howell v. McAuliffe, 292 Va.
320, 326 (2016). As we have previously noted, “our interpretation [of a statute] does not turn on
‘the public policy implications associated with’ the words chosen by the General Assembly
because ‘the legislature is the author of public policy,’ and thus, ‘we may not extend the meaning
of a statute simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies.’” Verizon Va. LLC v.
State Corp. Comm'n, 302 Va. 467, 478 (2023) (some alterations omitted) (quoting Prease v.
Clarke, 302 Va. 376, 385 (2023)). Rather, “‘[w]e can only administer the law as it is written.’”
Id. (quoting Coalter v. Bargamin, 99 Va. 65, 71 (1901)).
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that we should defer to the Virginia Department of Labor and
Industry’s interpretation of the Act as found in a March 2022 Field Operations Manual. That
manual, without elaboration, interprets Code § 40.1-29 as applying to commissions. “[W]e give
deference to the decisions of administrative agencies when those decisions fall within an area of
the agency’s specialized competence.” Virginia Dep’t of Health v. Kepa, Inc., 289 Va. 131, 139
(2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “However, when an issue involves a pure
10 question of statutory interpretation, that issue does not invoke the agency’s specialized
competence but is a question of law to be decided by the courts.” Id. (citations and quotation
marks omitted). This appeal presents a pure question of statutory construction that we review de
novo. The language of Code § 40.1-29 includes “wages” and “salaries” but does not mention
“commissions,” despite the fact that the General Assembly has enacted other statutes that feature
the term in conjunction with wages or salaries, or both. For all the reasons noted above, we are
unpersuaded that a field manual from an administrative agency represents the correct
interpretation of Code § 40.1-29.
To interpolate the word “commission” into the text of Code § 40.1-29 would require us
“to add language to the statute that the General Assembly declined to employ.” Virginian-Pilot
Media Cos., LLC v. Dow Jones & Co., 280 Va. 464, 469 (2010). We have “refused to engage in
that enterprise” because “‘[w]e must determine the legislative intent by what the statute says and
not by what we think it should have said.’” Id. at 469 (quoting Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338,
346 (1963)). We therefore hold that Code § 40.1-29, which addresses wages and salaries, does
not include commissions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons noted above, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Reversed and final judgment.
CHIEF JUSTICE GOODWYN, with whom JUSTICE MANN joins, dissenting.
Because I believe that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “wages” includes
commissions, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
Campbell v. Groundworks Operations, LLC, 82 Va. App. 580 (2024).
11 When a statute does not expressly define a term, we “infer the legislature’s intent from
the plain meaning of the language used.” Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340
(1998) (citations omitted). To determine the plain meaning, we refer to dictionaries. See, e.g.,
id. (referring to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary for the plain meaning of
“invoke”); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d
765, 770 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“Virginia courts customarily turn to dictionaries for help in
deciphering a term’s plain meaning.”) (collecting cases).
This case hinges on the plain meaning of the term “wages.” A host of legal and nonlegal
dictionaries have defined “wages” broadly since the late nineteenth century. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 1230 (1st ed. 1891) (“compensation agreed upon by a master to be paid to a servant,
or any other person hired to do work or business for him”); 3 John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary 3417 (8th ed. 1914) (“compensation given to a hired person for his or her services”) 1
Black’s Law Dictionary 1826 (3d ed. 1944) (compensation for services by those regardless of if
they are “paid by the hour, the day, the week the month, the job, or the piece”); Black’s Law
Dictionary 1750 (4th ed. 1957) (“Every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an
individual for personal services including salaries, [and] commissions . . .”) (emphasis added);
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2568-69 (2002) (“a pledge or payment usu[ally]
of monetary remuneration by an employer esp[ecially] for labor or services usually according to
contract and on an hourly, daily, or piecework basis and often including bonuses, commissions,
and [other amounts and benefits paid by employer]”) (emphasis added); Black’s Law Dictionary
1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary also noted that commissions—at least in the context of the Bankruptcy Act—were “wages.” 3 Bouvier’ Law Dictionary at 3417 (citing In re Dexter, 158 F. 788 (1st Cir. 1907)). 1898 (12th ed. 2024) (“Payment for labor or services usually based on time worked or quantity
produced; specific compensation of an employee based on time worked or output of production.
[bullet point] Wages include every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an
individual for personal services, including salaries, [and] commissions”) (emphasis added).
We approved the term’s broad definition in 1889 when we defined “wages” as
“compensation given to a hired person for his or her services.” Fidelity Ins., Tr. & Safe-Deposit
Co. v. Shenandoah Valley R.R. Co., 86 Va. 1, 8 (1889) (quoting the definition in 2 Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary 796 (1883)) (emphasis omitted).
Notably, we were not alone in our broad definition. Other states—in the absence of
statutory definitions—have determined that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “wages”
is broad enough to include commissions. 2 See Stowell v. Action Moving & Storage, 933 A.2d
1128, 1132 (Vt. 2007) (holding the definition of “wages” included commissions).
A common thread runs through every definition of the term “wages:” wages are
compensation for work done. In this case, the commissions that the appellant paid followed that
common thread. Four of the five employees were paid exclusively by commission. In such
instances, the commission payments are necessarily compensation because they are based on a
particular employee’s ability to secure sales and are the sole payment from the employer to the
employee. 3 When an employee makes a sale, they are producing a type of output and are paid in
accordance with that output—much like how a worker paid an hourly rate is only paid for the
time they work, or how a worker paid by piecework is paid for the quantity they produce. That
2 Commissions are “a fee paid to an agent or employee for transacting a piece of business or performing a service.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 457 (2002) (emphasis added). 3 This may not always be the case. For example, if an employer paid commissions in addition to an hourly rate or salary, it might be a reward rather than compensation.
13 commissions are calculated from a percentage of the final sale price does not alter the payment’s
purpose: to compensate an employee based on work the employee has produced.
“The one canon of construction that precedes all others is that we presume that the
legislature says what it means and means what it says.” Cornell v. Benedict, 301 Va. 342, 349
(2022). In my view, when the legislature used the term “wages” in Code § 40.1-29, it
understood the term as it has been used in dictionaries and by courts since the nineteenth century,
and thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
As the majority disagrees, I respectfully dissent.