Groeber v. Heuring

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Groeber v. Heuring

690 So. 2d 1343, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 2482, 1997 WL 120565

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 19, 1997

DocketNo. 96-1668

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 690 So. 2d 1343 (Groeber v. Heuring) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Groeber v. Heuring, 690 So. 2d 1343, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 2482, 1997 WL 120565 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

On the morning of trial, the trial judge granted an oral motion for summary judgment after a previous regularly set motion for summary judgment had been denied by a predecessor judge.¹ We reverse. See Fruh-morgen v. Watson, 490 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) wherein the following is found.

Appellant contends that the trial court, by refusing to allow a full trial on the merits, denied him his constitutional right of due process. We agree. In the event the trial court thinks that summary final judgment is proper, it is necessary that the party moved against be given the notice required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 and be allowed an opportunity to meet the question of whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Muncey v. Star Brite Distributors, Inc., 378 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Moseley v. Bi-Lo Supermarket, Inc., 341 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Here, as in Muncey and Moseley, there was no motion pending for summary judgment and none was made by appellee. Even if there had been, we have held that a trial court may not grant a party’s oral motion for summary judgment made on the day a case is set for trial because the notice requirements of rule 1.510(c) require that a motion for summary judgment be served at least twenty days before the hearing. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

Therefore, the summary judgment of March 7,1996, is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.²

Reversed and remanded.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

On the morning of trial, the trial judge granted an oral motion for summary judgment after a previous regularly set motion for summary judgment had been denied by a predecessor judge.¹ We reverse. See Fruh-morgen v. Watson, 490 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) wherein the following is found.

Appellant contends that the trial court, by refusing to allow a full trial on the merits, denied him his constitutional right of due process. We agree. In the event the trial court thinks that summary final judgment is proper, it is necessary that the party moved against be given the notice required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 and be allowed an opportunity to meet the question of whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Muncey v. Star Brite Distributors, Inc., 378 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Moseley v. Bi-Lo Supermarket, Inc., 341 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Here, as in Muncey and Moseley, there was no motion pending for summary judgment and none was made by appellee. Even if there had been, we have held that a trial court may not grant a party’s oral motion for summary judgment made on the day a case is set for trial because the notice requirements of rule 1.510(c) require that a motion for summary judgment be served at least twenty days before the hearing. Lazar v. Allen, 347 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

Therefore, the summary judgment of March 7,1996, is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.²

Reversed and remanded.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

690 So. 2d 1343, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 2482, 1997 WL 120565, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/groeber-v-heuring-fladistctapp-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack