1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Lucas Lee Gritts, No. CV 16-01233-PHX-GMS 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Martinez, et al.,
13 Defendants.
14 15
16 Pending before the Court are Defendants Martinez et al.s’ (“Defendants”) Motion 17 for Summary Judgment (Doc. 148) and Plaintiff Lucas Lee Gritt’s (“Plaintiff”) Cross- 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 153.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ 19 Motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.1 20 BACKGROUND 21 The facts and procedural history are known to the parties and have been discussed 22 in detail in the Court’s orders addressing prior motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 66; 23 Doc. 75.) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants arises out of several disciplinary hearings. 24 The parties agree about the core facts surrounding these events. In October 2015, Plaintiff 25 was convicted of conspiring to assault a correctional officer at a disciplinary hearing he 26 27 1 Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. 28 The Court already resolved this claim at the parties’ December 2019 Status Conference. (Doc. 150 at 4.) Defendants’ motion is therefore only granted as to the claims that have not already been addressed. 1 was not allowed to attend. As a result of that conviction, he lost 200 early release credits 2 (“ERCs”). In a separate hearing, Plaintiff was also removed from the step-down program, 3 which allows inmates to earn access to lower-security housing, because of his disciplinary 4 conviction. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging due process violations for denial of 5 his rights to attend and present evidence at the October 2015 hearing. In May 2019 a second 6 disciplinary hearing was held, reconsidering the earlier charge of conspiracy to assault an 7 officer. Plaintiff was again convicted of the charge, but his punishment was modified to 8 deduct only 120 ERCs. Plaintiff was never returned to the step-down program. Plaintiff 9 amended his complaint to include allegations that he was not permitted to present evidence 10 at this hearing as well. He seeks damages for these alleged due process violations and the 11 resulting change of conditions. Plaintiff was released from custody in August 2019. 12 DISCUSSION 13 1. Legal Standard 14 The purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually 15 unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary 16 judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 17 nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 18 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only disputes 19 over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary 20 judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a 21 verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 22 (1986). 23 “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 24 informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the 25 record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 26 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Parties opposing summary judgment are required to “cit[e] to 27 particular parts of materials in the record” establishing a genuine dispute or “show[ ] that 28 the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 56(c)(1). A district court has no independent duty “to scour the record in search of a 2 genuine issue of triable fact[.]” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 “[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before 4 the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and 5 submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on 6 each of them.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 7 1134 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 2. The Favorable Termination Rule 9 The favorable termination rule, articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, states that a 10 prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 suit for damages where a judgment in their favor would 11 necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence; if it would, the 12 complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 13 sentence has already been invalidated. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In Edwards v. 14 Balisok, the Supreme Court applied Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings. 520 U.S. 641, 15 643 (1997). The inmate’s principal claims were that he was denied the opportunity to 16 present a defense and that the hearing officer was partial. Id. at 646–47. Heck barred the 17 claim because “a criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have his 18 convictions set aside, no matter how strong the evidence against him.” Id. at 647. A 19 judgment in the inmate’s favor would therefore necessarily imply the invalidity of the 20 underlying conviction. Id. Balisok thus “extended the favorable termination rule to prison 21 disciplinary actions that implicated the prisoner’s term of confinement.” Ramirez v. 22 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the prisoner did not seek 23 reinstatement of his good time credits, he could not circumvent application of Heck because 24 the alleged due process defect implied the invalidity of the deprivation of the credits. Id. 25 Ninth Circuit precedent has interpreted Balisok both broadly and narrowly,2 but 26 27 2 Compare Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated because false information was 28 considered when denying his parole necessarily implicated the validity of the denial of parole, despite the fact that the plaintiff sought only damages), and Gotcher v. Wood, 122 1 using either analysis, Heck’s application is driven by the nature of the due process violation 2 an inmate claims. See Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In 3 determining whether a judgment in favor of a section 1983 plaintiff necessarily implies the 4 invalidity of his underlying conviction, we take into account the particular facts of the 5 criminal trial or other proceeding leading to the allegedly improper detention.”). The 6 Court’s conclusion in Balisok, for example, was predicated on the specific due process 7 violation of a partial arbiter, which would necessarily invalidate the underlying conviction. 8 Balisok, 520 U.S. at 647. It does not follow, as Defendants claim, that all procedural due 9 process errors necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction from a prison 10 disciplinary board. The nature of Plaintiff’s specific claim, however, does imply the 11 invalidity of his underlying conviction.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Lucas Lee Gritts, No. CV 16-01233-PHX-GMS 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown Martinez, et al.,
13 Defendants.
14 15
16 Pending before the Court are Defendants Martinez et al.s’ (“Defendants”) Motion 17 for Summary Judgment (Doc. 148) and Plaintiff Lucas Lee Gritt’s (“Plaintiff”) Cross- 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 153.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ 19 Motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.1 20 BACKGROUND 21 The facts and procedural history are known to the parties and have been discussed 22 in detail in the Court’s orders addressing prior motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 66; 23 Doc. 75.) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants arises out of several disciplinary hearings. 24 The parties agree about the core facts surrounding these events. In October 2015, Plaintiff 25 was convicted of conspiring to assault a correctional officer at a disciplinary hearing he 26 27 1 Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. 28 The Court already resolved this claim at the parties’ December 2019 Status Conference. (Doc. 150 at 4.) Defendants’ motion is therefore only granted as to the claims that have not already been addressed. 1 was not allowed to attend. As a result of that conviction, he lost 200 early release credits 2 (“ERCs”). In a separate hearing, Plaintiff was also removed from the step-down program, 3 which allows inmates to earn access to lower-security housing, because of his disciplinary 4 conviction. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging due process violations for denial of 5 his rights to attend and present evidence at the October 2015 hearing. In May 2019 a second 6 disciplinary hearing was held, reconsidering the earlier charge of conspiracy to assault an 7 officer. Plaintiff was again convicted of the charge, but his punishment was modified to 8 deduct only 120 ERCs. Plaintiff was never returned to the step-down program. Plaintiff 9 amended his complaint to include allegations that he was not permitted to present evidence 10 at this hearing as well. He seeks damages for these alleged due process violations and the 11 resulting change of conditions. Plaintiff was released from custody in August 2019. 12 DISCUSSION 13 1. Legal Standard 14 The purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually 15 unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary 16 judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 17 nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 18 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only disputes 19 over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary 20 judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a 21 verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 22 (1986). 23 “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 24 informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the 25 record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 26 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Parties opposing summary judgment are required to “cit[e] to 27 particular parts of materials in the record” establishing a genuine dispute or “show[ ] that 28 the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 56(c)(1). A district court has no independent duty “to scour the record in search of a 2 genuine issue of triable fact[.]” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 “[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before 4 the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and 5 submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on 6 each of them.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 7 1134 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 2. The Favorable Termination Rule 9 The favorable termination rule, articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, states that a 10 prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 suit for damages where a judgment in their favor would 11 necessarily imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence; if it would, the 12 complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 13 sentence has already been invalidated. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). In Edwards v. 14 Balisok, the Supreme Court applied Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings. 520 U.S. 641, 15 643 (1997). The inmate’s principal claims were that he was denied the opportunity to 16 present a defense and that the hearing officer was partial. Id. at 646–47. Heck barred the 17 claim because “a criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have his 18 convictions set aside, no matter how strong the evidence against him.” Id. at 647. A 19 judgment in the inmate’s favor would therefore necessarily imply the invalidity of the 20 underlying conviction. Id. Balisok thus “extended the favorable termination rule to prison 21 disciplinary actions that implicated the prisoner’s term of confinement.” Ramirez v. 22 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the prisoner did not seek 23 reinstatement of his good time credits, he could not circumvent application of Heck because 24 the alleged due process defect implied the invalidity of the deprivation of the credits. Id. 25 Ninth Circuit precedent has interpreted Balisok both broadly and narrowly,2 but 26 27 2 Compare Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated because false information was 28 considered when denying his parole necessarily implicated the validity of the denial of parole, despite the fact that the plaintiff sought only damages), and Gotcher v. Wood, 122 1 using either analysis, Heck’s application is driven by the nature of the due process violation 2 an inmate claims. See Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In 3 determining whether a judgment in favor of a section 1983 plaintiff necessarily implies the 4 invalidity of his underlying conviction, we take into account the particular facts of the 5 criminal trial or other proceeding leading to the allegedly improper detention.”). The 6 Court’s conclusion in Balisok, for example, was predicated on the specific due process 7 violation of a partial arbiter, which would necessarily invalidate the underlying conviction. 8 Balisok, 520 U.S. at 647. It does not follow, as Defendants claim, that all procedural due 9 process errors necessarily call into question the validity of a conviction from a prison 10 disciplinary board. The nature of Plaintiff’s specific claim, however, does imply the 11 invalidity of his underlying conviction. 12 Plaintiff asserts that his changed conditions of confinement resulting from the loss 13 of eligibility for the Step-Down program gave rise to a liberty interest which necessitated 14 process.3 He argues that the procedural violations at his October 2015 hearing led to his 15 conviction for conspiring to assault an officer, and this conviction led directly to his 16 removal from the Step-Down program at a subsequent proceeding. Plaintiff’s argument 17 thus relies on the assumption that, had he been granted process at the October 2015 hearing, 18 he would not have been convicted, and he would not have been subsequently removed from 19 the Step-Down program resulting in a change of his conditions of confinement. Thus, he 20 F.3d 39, 39 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing without discussion a pre-Balisok opinion where the 21 plaintiff claimed he was not given notice of the hearing or permitted to call witnesses or 22 present evidence; the court concluded that Balisok foreclosed the plaintiff’s entire claim although he challenged both the loss of good time credits and disciplinary segregation), 23 with Cox v. Clark, 321 F. App’x 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the failure to provide 24 advance notice to the plaintiff before his prison disciplinary proceeding did not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction), and Hiltunen v. Bayer, 6 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 25 2001) (finding a claim for due process violation at pre-parole hearing did not necessarily 26 imply the invalidity of the conviction because, given the parole board retained discretion, judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would not guarantee his sentence would be shortened). 27
3 Plaintiff concedes he is not challenging the loss of his good time credits in this 28 action, as challenges to the duration of his confinement must be brought pursuant to a habeas corpus proceeding. (Doc. 153 at 9.) 1| asserts his conviction resulted in a change of his conditions of confinement sufficient to 2| deprive him of a liberty interest necessitating different process than he received. This circular claim for damages thus relies on the assertion that the result of the October 2015 4| hearing was invalid. It thus is precluded by Heck and Balisok. 5 Plaintiff asserts that his subsequent, May 2019, hearing on the same charge 6| establishes that his conviction was previously invalidated and thus outside Heck’s 7 | exclusion. But to establish that a conviction has been previously invalidated, “a § 1983 8 | plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 10 | determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 11 | corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Banks v. Clark Cty., Nev., 461 F. App’x 585, 587 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff provides no authority, and the Court is unaware of any, 13 | suggesting that a subsequent disciplinary hearing that affirms a conviction but alters an inmate’s punishment constitutes such an invalidation. Absent a showing that the hearing 15 | was authorized to overturn the previous conviction, the favorable termination rule precludes the Plaintiff's claims. 17 CONCLUSION 18 As described above, the Heck doctrine precludes Plaintiff's § 1983 actions because 19 | a favorable judgment would necessarily invalidate Plaintiff's underlying conviction. 20 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 148) is GRANTED. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary 23 | Judgment (Doc. 153) is DENIED as moot. 24 Dated this 9th day of October, 2020. 25 - 26 A Whacrsay Fotos 7 Chief United States District Judge 28