Griswold v. Kelly

102 A.2d 349, 140 Conn. 582, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 136
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJanuary 19, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 102 A.2d 349 (Griswold v. Kelly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griswold v. Kelly, 102 A.2d 349, 140 Conn. 582, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 136 (Colo. 1954).

Opinions

WTirnB, J.

The facts in this case are set forth in the stipulation. The plaintiff is a man whose character and reputation are beyond reproach. He is a suitable person within the meaning of the Liquor Control Act. For over thirty years he has owned and conducted a grocery store on Main Street in the town of Old Lyme. Since April, 1934, he has owned a package store in the same building and has been the licensed permittee thereof. His practice has been to keep the package store locked and to open it only when a customer approached it. He would leave the grocery, unlock the front door of the package store, complete his transaction there, then lock that store and return to the grocery.

The plaintiff’s permit was revoked by the liquor control commission, after a hearing, for claimed violation of §204-9 of its regulations. This reads as follows: “Every permittee shall be expected to devote his entire time to the conduct of his permit business, and every retail permittee shall be required to be on the permit premises daily a substantial number of hours during which the business is being conducted, and no permittee shall be employed for hire or otherwise in any other business or occupation. (Exceptions to the above will be considered [584]*584only upon written application to and approval by the Commission.)”

The commission’s action was based on the ground (1) that the plaintiff failed to devote his entire time to the conduct of the permit business and (2) that he failed to be on the permit premises daily a substantial number of hours during which the business was being conducted. It was for the commission to determine as a fact whether the plaintiff had complied with its regulations. Loglisci v. Liquor Control Commission, 123 Conn. 31, 38, 192 A. 260. Admittedly, he did not devote his entire time to his liquor business.

The appeal presents these questions: (1) Is § 204-9 of the regulations of the liquor control commission valid? (2) Did the commission abuse its discretion in refusing to make an exception in this case to the operation of the regulation, if it is valid? Section 4228 of the General Statutes provides: “The commission shall have power to enforce the provisions of this chapter, and may make all necessary rules . . . for carrying out, enforcing and preventing violation of, all or any of the provisions of this chapter, for the inspection of permit premises and the method of carrying on the business of any permittee ....” The regulation in question clearly is designed to prescribe the method of carrying on a permittee’s business. It is, therefore, valid if it is reasonably necessary “for carrying out, enforcing and preventing violation of” any of the provisions of the Liquor Control Act. Loglisci v. Liquor Control Commission, supra, 37; see Beckanstin v. Liquor Control Commission, 140 Conn. 185, 191, 99 A.2d 119.

As applied to the present case, the regulation requiring that a permittee devote his entire time to the permit business has a very direct relevancy to the [585]*585enforcement of the Liquor Control Act. One provision of the act is that “ [n] o store operating under a package store permit shall sell any commodity other than alcoholic and non-alcoholic liquor.” General Statutes §4242 (as amended, Cum. Sup. 1953, § 1634c). By not devoting his entire time to the conduct of his permit business the plaintiff was able to carry on a grocery business in what, for all practical purposes, was the same store as that used as a package store.

That aside, in adopting the regulation the liquor control commission might reasonably have reasoned that to avoid ruinous competition among liquor outlets and thereby encourage violations of the act it is necessary to prevent the opening of outlets which would be operated on only a part-time basis because the permittees were engaged for the most part in other businesses. With that in mind, it is clear that the regulation was one which was within the power of enactment given to the commission by the statute.

We next consider the question whether the commission in denying the plaintiff’s application for an exception abused its discretion. The justification for the commission’s action appears in an illuminating portion of a letter written by the plaintiff’s counsel to the commission. In this letter counsel gives the key to the whole controversy. Speaking of the economic trends with which the plaintiff was faced, he wrote that the plaintiff “has operated this package store as a logical corollary to his grocery business.” This is the very thing that the regulation in question was designed to prevent.

Our conclusion is that the action of the liquor control commission was legal and that the court below was justified in dismissing the appeal.

There is no error.

[586]*586In this opinion Inglis, C. J., O’Sullivan and Quinlan, Js., concurred.

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Griswold v. Kelly
102 A.2d 349 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
102 A.2d 349, 140 Conn. 582, 1954 Conn. LEXIS 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griswold-v-kelly-conn-1954.