1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GRISELDA LAZOROSAS, Case No. 8:24-cv-01161-JWH-DFM
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 12] 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Griselda Lazorosas to remand 2 this case to Orange County Superior Court.1 In broad strokes, Lazorosas argues 3 that Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC has not presented sufficient evidence 4 to establish that the amount in controversy in this action exceeds the statutory 5 threshold for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 6 §§ 1331 or 1332.2 The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for 7 resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After 8 considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,3 the Court orders that 9 the Motion to Remand is DENIED, for the reasons set forth herein. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 Lazorosas commenced this action in Orange County Superior Court in 12 April 2024.4 In her Complaint, Lazorosas asserted three claims for relief against 13 Mercedes-Benz based upon violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty 14 15 16 17 1 Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 12]. 18 2 See generally id. 19 3 The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including 20 the following papers: (1) Notice of Removal (including its attachments) [ECF No. 1]; (2) Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]; (3) Motion; (4) Def.’s 21 Opp’n to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 16]; (5) Pl.’s Reply in Supp. 22 of the Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 17]; (6) Def.’s Objection and Request to Strike Pl.’s Reply (the “Objection”) [ECF No. 18]; (7) Def.’s Suppl. Opp’s to 23 the Motion (the “Supplemental Opposition”) [ECF No. 21]; and (8) Pl.’s 24 Suppl. Briefing in Supp. of the Motion (the “Supplemental Brief in Support”) 25 [ECF No. 22]. To the extent that Lazorosas raised arguments related to the timeliness of removal in the Reply, the Court disregards those arguments. See 26 Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) 27 (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 1 Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 2 Act.5 3 Mercedes-Benz removed this action to this Court in May 2024 on the 4 basis of federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.6 Lazorosas filed the 5 instant Motion in September 2024.7 In her Motion, Lazorosas asserts that 6 Mercedes-Benz cannot establish federal question jurisdiction because Mercedes- 7 Benz cannot satisfy its burden to show that the amount in controversy in this 8 matter exceeds $50,000, which is necessary for federal jurisdiction under the 9 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.8 Lazorosas did not, however, concede that she 10 seeks a monetary judgment of less than $50,000.9 Therefore, on its own 11 Motion, the Court granted Mercedes-Benz leave to engage in jurisdictional 12 discovery and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the 13 amount in controversy.10 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 16 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 17 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 18 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 19 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 20 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 21 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 22
23 5 See id. 24 6 See Notice of Removal. 25 7 See Motion. 26 8 See generally id. 27 9 See id. 1 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 2 quotation marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of 3 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 4 removal jurisdiction. See id. 5 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 6 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 7 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 8 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 9 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 10 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. “Complete diversity” means 11 that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” 12 In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 14 In other words, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that 15 removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th 16 Cir. 2006) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on 17 removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 18 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[t]he strong presumption against removal jurisdiction 19 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 20 proper” (quotation marks omitted)). Any doubts regarding the existence of 21 subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. 22 (“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 23 removal in the first instance”). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 An action removed based upon the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does 26 not trigger federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy 27 exceeds “the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) 1 § 2310(d)(3)(B). To determine the amount in controversy, a court looks to the 2 California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, which permits a plaintiff to 3 recover “an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer” less 4 any amount “directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer 5 first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized 6 service and repair facility for correct if the problem that gave rise to the 7 nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). A successful plaintiff 8 may also recover a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages. 9 See id. at § 1794(c).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GRISELDA LAZOROSAS, Case No. 8:24-cv-01161-JWH-DFM
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 12] 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Griselda Lazorosas to remand 2 this case to Orange County Superior Court.1 In broad strokes, Lazorosas argues 3 that Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC has not presented sufficient evidence 4 to establish that the amount in controversy in this action exceeds the statutory 5 threshold for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 6 §§ 1331 or 1332.2 The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for 7 resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After 8 considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,3 the Court orders that 9 the Motion to Remand is DENIED, for the reasons set forth herein. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 Lazorosas commenced this action in Orange County Superior Court in 12 April 2024.4 In her Complaint, Lazorosas asserted three claims for relief against 13 Mercedes-Benz based upon violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty 14 15 16 17 1 Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 12]. 18 2 See generally id. 19 3 The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including 20 the following papers: (1) Notice of Removal (including its attachments) [ECF No. 1]; (2) Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-2]; (3) Motion; (4) Def.’s 21 Opp’n to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 16]; (5) Pl.’s Reply in Supp. 22 of the Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 17]; (6) Def.’s Objection and Request to Strike Pl.’s Reply (the “Objection”) [ECF No. 18]; (7) Def.’s Suppl. Opp’s to 23 the Motion (the “Supplemental Opposition”) [ECF No. 21]; and (8) Pl.’s 24 Suppl. Briefing in Supp. of the Motion (the “Supplemental Brief in Support”) 25 [ECF No. 22]. To the extent that Lazorosas raised arguments related to the timeliness of removal in the Reply, the Court disregards those arguments. See 26 Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) 27 (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived.”). 1 Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 2 Act.5 3 Mercedes-Benz removed this action to this Court in May 2024 on the 4 basis of federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.6 Lazorosas filed the 5 instant Motion in September 2024.7 In her Motion, Lazorosas asserts that 6 Mercedes-Benz cannot establish federal question jurisdiction because Mercedes- 7 Benz cannot satisfy its burden to show that the amount in controversy in this 8 matter exceeds $50,000, which is necessary for federal jurisdiction under the 9 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.8 Lazorosas did not, however, concede that she 10 seeks a monetary judgment of less than $50,000.9 Therefore, on its own 11 Motion, the Court granted Mercedes-Benz leave to engage in jurisdictional 12 discovery and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the 13 amount in controversy.10 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 16 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 17 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the 18 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 19 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 20 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 21 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 22
23 5 See id. 24 6 See Notice of Removal. 25 7 See Motion. 26 8 See generally id. 27 9 See id. 1 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal 2 quotation marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of 3 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 4 removal jurisdiction. See id. 5 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the 6 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 7 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may 8 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 9 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 10 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. “Complete diversity” means 11 that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” 12 In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 14 In other words, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that 15 removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th 16 Cir. 2006) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on 17 removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 18 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[t]he strong presumption against removal jurisdiction 19 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 20 proper” (quotation marks omitted)). Any doubts regarding the existence of 21 subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id. 22 (“[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 23 removal in the first instance”). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 An action removed based upon the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does 26 not trigger federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy 27 exceeds “the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) 1 § 2310(d)(3)(B). To determine the amount in controversy, a court looks to the 2 California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, which permits a plaintiff to 3 recover “an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer” less 4 any amount “directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer 5 first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized 6 service and repair facility for correct if the problem that gave rise to the 7 nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). A successful plaintiff 8 may also recover a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages. 9 See id. at § 1794(c). 10 Lazorosas contends that, for the purpose of the amount in controversy, 11 she seeks only $49,140.79, which places this case just below the threshold for 12 federal jurisdiction.11 That amount includes the payments made, loan payoff, 13 and insurance premiums, less mileage offsets.12 It does not include civil 14 penalties or attorneys’ fees—each of which Lazorosas seeks—because 15 Lazorosas contends that neither civil penalties nor attorneys’ fees are properly 16 included in the amount in controversy.13 More specifically, Lazorosas maintains 17 that civil penalties should not be included because they are not guaranteed and 18 that attorneys’ should not be included because they are “costs.”14 19 Neither of those arguments is persuasive. Courts routinely include civil 20 penalties when calculating the amount-in-controversy for Magnuson-Moss 21 purposes. See, e.g., Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240-41 (C.D. 22 Cal. 2005). More importantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “attorneys’ fees 23 are not ‘costs’ within the meaning of the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act] and 24
25 11 See Supplemental Brief in Support 2:15-19. 26 12 See id. 27 13 See id. at 4:22-5:14. 1|| therefore must be included in the amount in controversy if they are available to 2|| prevailing plaintiffs pursuant to state fee-shifting statutes.” Shoner ». Carrier 3|| Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2022). The Song-Beverly Act permits a || successful plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, so attorneys’ fees must 5|| be included when calculating the amount in controversy here. See 6|| Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 7 Adding either the applicable civil penalties or a reasonable fee award to || Lazorosas’s $49,140.79 damages request necessarily results in a sum greater 9|| than $50,000. Accordingly, the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, and 10|| the Motion is DENIED. 11 IV. DISPOSITION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Lazorosas’s instant Motion to remand [ECF No. 12] is DENIED. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16\| Dated: January 7, 2025 MX, Ld — 17 {SNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28