GRIMES v. RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE CO. Et Al.

Supreme Court

GRIMES v. RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE CO. Et Al.

356 U.S. 252, 78 S. Ct. 687, 2 L. Ed. 2d 737, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1761

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedApril 7, 1958

Docket456

StatusPublished

Cited by95 cases

This text of 356 U.S. 252 (GRIMES v. RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE CO. Et Al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

GRIMES v. RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE CO. Et Al., 356 U.S. 252, 78 S. Ct. 687, 2 L. Ed. 2d 737, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1761 (1958).

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Opinions

Per Curiam.

The petitioner brought this suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, for injuries suffered while being transferred at sea in a “Navy life ring” from a tug to a Texas tower which the respondents, his employers, were constructing under a contract with the Government on Georges Bank, 110 miles east of Cape Cod. [253]*253The District Court directed a verdict for the respondents at the close of the petitioner’s case. The trial judge indicated his view that the evidence created a fact question on the issue as to whether the petitioner was a crew member, but held that the petitioner’s exclusive remedy was under the Defense Bases Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1651-1654, which incorporates the remedies of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Defense Bases Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for a member of a crew in light of § 1654 of the Act providing “This chapter shall not apply in respect to the injury ... of ... (3) a master or member of a crew of any vessel.” However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment, one judge dissenting, upon the ground that • the evidence was not sufficient to create a fact question as to whether the petitioner was a crew member. 245 F. 2d 437. We granted certiorari, 355 U. S. 867.

We hold, in agreement with the Court of Appeals, that 42 U. S. C. § 1654 saves the remedy under the Jones Act created for a member of a crew of any vessel. We hold further, however, in disagreement with the Court of Appeals, that the petitioner’s evidence presented an evi-dentiary basis for a jury’s finding whether or not the petitioner was a member of a crew of any vessel. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U. S. 370; Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U. S. 879; South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251.

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

is of opinion that, since the course of argument demonstrated that the case turns [254]*254entirely on evaluation of evidence in a particular set of circumstances, the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted and should be dismissed.

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Per Curiam.

The petitioner brought this suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688, for injuries suffered while being transferred at sea in a “Navy life ring” from a tug to a Texas tower which the respondents, his employers, were constructing under a contract with the Government on Georges Bank, 110 miles east of Cape Cod. [253]*253The District Court directed a verdict for the respondents at the close of the petitioner’s case. The trial judge indicated his view that the evidence created a fact question on the issue as to whether the petitioner was a crew member, but held that the petitioner’s exclusive remedy was under the Defense Bases Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1651-1654, which incorporates the remedies of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Defense Bases Act did not provide the exclusive remedy for a member of a crew in light of § 1654 of the Act providing “This chapter shall not apply in respect to the injury ... of ... (3) a master or member of a crew of any vessel.” However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment, one judge dissenting, upon the ground that • the evidence was not sufficient to create a fact question as to whether the petitioner was a crew member. 245 F. 2d 437. We granted certiorari, 355 U. S. 867.

We hold, in agreement with the Court of Appeals, that 42 U. S. C. § 1654 saves the remedy under the Jones Act created for a member of a crew of any vessel. We hold further, however, in disagreement with the Court of Appeals, that the petitioner’s evidence presented an evi-dentiary basis for a jury’s finding whether or not the petitioner was a member of a crew of any vessel. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U. S. 370; Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U. S. 879; South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251.

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

is of opinion that, since the course of argument demonstrated that the case turns [254]*254entirely on evaluation of evidence in a particular set of circumstances, the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted and should be dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

356 U.S. 252, 78 S. Ct. 687, 2 L. Ed. 2d 737, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1761, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-raymond-concrete-pile-co-et-al-scotus-1958.

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