Grimes v. Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedSeptember 4, 2019
Docket3:16-cv-00472
StatusUnknown

This text of Grimes v. Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC (Grimes v. Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grimes v. Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC, (N.D. Ind. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MATTHEW GRIMES, on behalf of himself ) and all others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Case No. 3:16-CV-472-JD ) EVERGREEN RECREATIONAL ) VEHICLES, LLC, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER Now before the Court is a joint motion [DE 73] for orders (1) preliminarily approving the settlement agreement [DE 73-1 at 1-59], (2) approving the form and manner of the class settlement notice [DE 73-1 at 43-59], (3) scheduling a final fairness hearing, and (4) finally approving the settlement agreement. While the Court DENIES as premature any request to finally approve the settlement agreement (because this issue will be considered after the final fairness hearing), the Court GRANTS the remaining requests as indicated below. I. Background On March 12, 2018, the Court ordered that class certification was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) for a class that was seeking damages against Defendants Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC (“Evergreen RV”), KR Enterprises, Inc. (“KR Enterprises”), and JMA, LLC (“JMA”) (collectively, “Defendants”), under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101. Plaintiff Matthew Grimes (“Grimes”) alleged that workers at Defendants’ two Middlebury, Indiana facilities (located at 10758 County Road 2 and 51700 Lovejoy Drive) were terminated without the advance notice required by the WARN Act. The Court certified the following class: Any and all persons who worked at or reported to a facility located at 10758 County Road 2, Middlebury, Indiana 46540 or 51700 Lovejoy Drive, Middlebury, Indiana 46540, within sixty days prior to the closing of those facilities.

Outten & Golden, LLP, was appointed as class counsel and Cohen & Malad LLP, was appointed as liaison counsel. Mr. Matthew Grimes was appointed as class representative. After the parties conducted additional discovery and twice engaged in mediation, they reached a settlement. As a result, the parties are requesting that the Court preliminarily approve the settlement, as well as grant related relief. II. Class Notice and Settlement For classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the notice that must be given to the class members concerning the class certification is dictated by subsection (c)(2)(B), which requires the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances and contains the enumerated details of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vii); Smith v. Shawnee Library System, 60 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that class members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to opt out, which is an absolute requirement for a court to exercise jurisdiction over those class members) (citations omitted). In this case, all 315 employees potentially affected by the closing of the Defendants’ facilities have been identified by the Defendants. Individual notice of the class certification was successfully sent by mail to all potential class members, save for 5 members whose current addresses could not be located. Only 5 members have requested exclusion. Relative to the settlement or compromise of class action claims, as presented by the parties’ proposed settlement agreement, Rule 23(e) indicates that the claims, issues, or defenses 2 of a certified class may be settled only with the court’s approval. The parties must provide the court with “information sufficient to enable [the court] to determine whether to give notice of the proposal to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). The court “must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal if giving notice is justified by the parties’ showing that the court will likely be able to . . . approve the proposal under Rule

23(e)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment (“The decision to give notice of a proposed settlement to the class is an important event. It should be based on a solid record supporting the conclusion that the proposed settlement will likely earn final approval after notice and an opportunity to object.”). In turn, subsection (e)(2) of Rule 23 indicates that the court may approve the proposal only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering whether: (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

In this case, based on the range of possible outcomes and the cost, delay, and uncertainty associated with further litigation, the Court finds that the settlement is within the range of likelihood for being approved under Rule 23(e)(3) and that preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is warranted. Specifically, the settlement agreement appears to be the product of earnest, informed, arm’s length, and non-collusive negotiations, especially given the extensive amount of investigation conducted, the fact that the parties exchanged potential 3 damage calculations, and given that counsel engaged in two different mediation sessions with different mediators. The settlement in the total amount of $1.2 million represents approximately 50% of the maximum theoretical damages of the class, which appears reasonable given that: Evergreen RV is now defunct; Evergreen RV would ultimately seek to reduce its liability based on attempts to avoid the shutdown and given unforeseeable business circumstances; and, KR

Enterprises and JMA dispute being defined as “employers” for purposes of liability under the WARN Act. In light of these issues, the risk of protracted litigation and non-payment is great absent the settlement agreement. A review of the settlement agreement reveals that the terms of: the one-time $10,000 service fee to the class representative, the proposed award of attorney’s fees (that is, one-third of the settlement amount net costs and the service payment), and the reimbursement of costs (not to exceed $30,000), are explicit and unambiguous. Moreover, these terms have been approved as reasonable in similar actions, including in the more than 50 WARN Act class action settlements litigated by class counsel [DE 74 at 11-18; DE 76]. Furthermore, the agreement appropriately identifies a non-profit organization dedicated to advancing employee

rights as the cy pres recipient and explains that any residual funds will only be directed to the recipient by Court approval upon motion by class counsel describing the efforts taken to deliver the funds to class members1 [DE 73-1 at 17].

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Related

Smith v. Shawnee Library System
60 F.3d 317 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)
Pearson v. NBTY, Inc.
772 F.3d 778 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Grimes v. Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-evergreen-recreational-vehicles-llc-innd-2019.