Grigsby Lane v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

District Court, D. Oregon·Decided January 23, 2023·No. 3:22-cv-00081·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MICHAEL G.L.,1 Case No. 3:22-cv-00081-JR Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. RUSSO, Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Michael G.L. brings this action for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits. All parties have consented to allow a Magistrate Judge enter final orders and judgement in this case in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and initial of the last name of the non-governmental party or parties in this case. Where applicable, this opinion uses the same designation for a non-governmental party’s immediate family member. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Born in November 1971, plaintiff alleges disability beginning November 19, 2019, due to chronic pain syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety disorder, depression, and panic

disorder. Tr. 161, 180. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 105- 112. On March 18, 2021, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), wherein plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified, as did a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. 44-65. On May 13, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 22-35. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. Tr. 3-8. THE ALJ’S FINDINGS At step one of the five step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Tr. 24. At step two, the ALJ determined the following impairments were medically determinable and severe: “right ankle

fracture, status post open reduction internal fixation (ORIF); fibromyalgia; status post hernia repair; irritable bowel syndrome; diverticulitis; obesity; depression; anxiety; and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).” Id. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 25. Because he did not establish presumptive disability at step three, the ALJ continued to evaluate how plaintiff’s impairments affected his ability to work. The ALJ resolved that plaintiff had the residual function capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: “[H]e can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can frequently climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold and vibration. He can tolerate no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and moving mechanical machinery. He can understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks in a routine work setting involving no more than occasional workplace changes. He can never perform rapid pace assembly line work. He can tolerate occasional superficial interaction with the general public.” Tr. 27. At step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 33. At step five, the ALJ concluded, based on the VE’s testimony, that there existed a significant number of jobs in the national economy plaintiff could perform despite his impairments, such as mail room clerk, office cleaner, and office helper. Tr. 34-35. DISCUSSION Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of treating physician Mischa Ronick, M.D. Alternatively, plaintiff argues the ALJ must factor plaintiff’s need for unscheduled work breaks into the RFC. Where, as here, the plaintiff’s application is filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ is no longer tasked with “weighing” medical opinions, but rather must determine which opinions are most “persuasive.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(b), 416.920c(a)-(b). “To that end, there is no longer any inherent extra weight given to the opinions of treating physicians . . . the ALJ considers the ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency’ of the opinions, followed by additional sub-factors, in determining how persuasive the opinions are.”2 Kevin R. H. v. Saul, 2021 WL 4330860, *4 (D. Or.

2 As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, “[u]nder the revised regulations . . . a medical source’s relationship with the claimant is still relevant when assessing the persuasiveness of the source’s opinion.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). The new regulations nonetheless “displace our longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide” different levels of reasoning (i.e., “clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate”) based on a hierarchy of medical sources. Id. at 787. Sept. 23, 2021). The ALJ must “articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions” and “explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors.” Id. At a minimum, “this appears to necessitate that an ALJ specifically account for the legitimate factors of supportability and consistency in addressing the persuasiveness of a medical opinion.” Id.

On January 22, 2020, Dr. Ronick completed a medical source statement providing a medical opinion as to plaintiff’s condition and ability to work. Tr. 401-02. Dr. Ronick opined that plaintiff’s symptoms are severe enough to frequently interfere with the attention and concentration to perform simple work-related tasks. Tr. 401. He noted that plaintiff would require unscheduled breaks lasting 15-60 minutes each, every 1-2 hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. He reasoned that plaintiff would need to recline or lie down in excess of the typical work breaks. Id. Lastly, Dr. Ronick opined that plaintiff would likely be absent from work more than four times per month due to his physical impairments. Tr. 402. The ALJ determined Dr. Ronick’s opinion was “not persuasive.” Tr. 33. Regarding the supportability factor, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Ronick’s opinion is not well supported regarding

how the plaintiff’s impairments require these limitations. Id. The ALJ further reasoned that plaintiff’s reported need for frequent trips to the restroom is not supported by the record, because there were times plaintiff reported to doctors that he was experiencing constipation. Tr. 30. The ALJ’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. In Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251 (9th Cir. 1996), an ALJ permissibly rejected three psychological evaluations completed via “check-off reports” because they “did not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.” Id. at 253; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2012). However, if a check-box questionnaire is “based on significant experience . . . and supported by numerous records . . . [it is] entitled to weight that an otherwise unsupported and unexplained check-box form would not merit.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). See also, Popa v.

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