REVISED - August 5, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-20217
GERRY M. GRIGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
STATE FARM LLOYDS; LARK P. BLUM,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
July 20, 1999 Before GARWOOD, DAVIS, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Gerry M. Griggs appeals from the district court’s orders
dismissing defendant Lark P. Blum as fraudulently joined, granting
Blum’s motion for attorney fees, and granting summary judgment in
favor of State Farm Lloyds as to all claims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This is an insurance dispute governed by Texas law. Between
1986 and 1992, Griggs maintained a homeowner’s insurance policy
issued by State Farm Lloyds. Griggs procured the insurance through
Blum, who is an independent State Farm Lloyds’ agent. At all times
relevant to this suit, that policy provided coverage in the amount
of $495,640 for unscheduled personal property and $49,564 for
personal property stored off premises. Griggs is an avid collector of sports cards and other
memorabilia. In December 1992, burglars entered a public storeroom
leased by Griggs and absconded with valuable sports memorabilia.
The locks on the storeroom were undisturbed, and Griggs did not
immediately discover the burglary. Even when Griggs entered the
storeroom and began to suspect that at least one box was missing,
he was unsure whether it was missing or merely misplaced in another
storeroom or in his home. Griggs finally became certain that some
of his collection was missing on January 16, 1993, when he observed
unique items from his personal collection being offered for sale by
other dealers at a large trade show. While at the show, Griggs
solicited the help of a Houston Police Officer and began
interviewing dealers to determine where the stolen merchandise had
been purchased.
That night, while Griggs was at the trade show, his house was
burglarized. This time, the burglars forcibly entered through a
rear door and left with a substantial portion of Griggs’
collection, as well as personal effects such as jewelry, cameras,
and a lap top computer.
Griggs estimates his loss from the burglaries in sports
memorabilia alone to be in excess of $1.2 million, with
approximately $700,000 in sports memorabilia being taken from the
storeroom and approximately $516,000 in sports memorabilia being
taken from his home. Griggs reported both burglaries to the
police, which resulted in the conviction of at least one person.
Griggs also reported both burglaries to State Farm Lloyds as
2 required by the policy.
In February 1993, State Farm Lloyds opened a claim file,
Griggs gave a recorded statement concerning his losses, and State
Farm Lloyds sent Griggs a letter requesting that he complete an
enclosed sworn proof of loss. State Farm Lloyds claims it never
received the requested proof of loss from Griggs. In March 1993,
Griggs notified State Farm Lloyds that he was in the process of
documenting what he knew to be stolen, as well as attempting to
recover stolen memorabilia. State Farm Lloyds replied that Griggs’
claim file remained open pending receipt of the required
documentation of his losses.
In April 1993, Griggs again notified State Farm Lloyds that he
was attempting to recover stolen property and requested their
assistance in recovering property out of state. In June 1993,
State Farm Lloyds responded that it encouraged but was unable to
assist Griggs’ efforts to recover out-of-state property, and that
State Farm Lloyds could not process Griggs’ claim until Griggs
returned a sworn proof of loss and some documentation of his loss.
The next month, in July 1993, State Farm Lloyds advised Griggs that
it was closing his claim file because Griggs had not forwarded any
information about his known losses. State Farm Lloyds informed
Griggs that it would be happy to reopen the file when Griggs was
able to provide the requested documentation.
Six months later, in January 1994, and again in March 1994,
Griggs informed State Farm Lloyds that he was still trying to
recover stolen property. In July 1994, one year after his claim
3 file was closed, Griggs advised State Farm Lloyds that he would
soon be ready to provide State Farm Lloyds with information about
his known losses.
In August 1994, more than nineteen months after his original
loss, Griggs delivered three boxes of documentation to the State
Farm Lloyds office. Griggs purported to include, among other
things, a sworn proof of loss, and inventories of the stolen
property with estimated values. A State Farm Lloyds employee
signed for the boxes. State Farm Lloyds claims it never received
the proof of loss, and Griggs was unable to produce a copy of any
proof of loss during the discovery phase of this lawsuit.
The following summer, in July and August 1995, State Farm
Lloyds assigned a new claims representative, who contacted Griggs
about his claim. That representative again requested that Griggs
provide a sworn proof of loss. Griggs claims he returned two sworn
proofs of loss on the required forms. Despite State Farm Lloyds’
discovery request, Griggs never produced copies of those sworn
proof of loss forms until shortly before the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Lloyds. Copies of those
documents are in the summary judgment record, but do not reflect
any notary’s seal. State Farm Lloyds claims that the sworn proof
of loss forms were never received.
In September 1995, State Farm Lloyds informed Griggs that the
sworn proof of loss forms were never received, and requested that
he forward additional information, including completed personal
property inventory forms (provided by State Farm Lloyds) and
4 supporting documentation. Griggs received the letter in October
1995, and informed State Farm Lloyds that the information was being
copied by a third party.
In November 1995, Griggs and the assigned claims agent
arranged to meet to discuss Griggs’ documentation. The State Farm
Lloyds agent missed two scheduled meetings. Later that month,
another State Farm Lloyds representative sent Griggs a reservation
of rights letter indicating that State Farm Lloyds had not received
required and requested documentation, and that State Farm Lloyds
was not waiving any rights arising from Griggs’ failure to comply
with policy terms requiring him to document his loss.
In December 1995, Griggs met with State Farm Lloyds
representative to review the status of his claim. State Farm
Lloyds explained to Griggs the documentation of items stolen and
their values that was required to process his claim. In mid-
December 1995, three years after the loss, Griggs provided State
Farm Lloyds with an inventory of the items stolen. The inventory
was not provided on the standardized forms provided by State Form
for the purpose, but was instead compiled using a variety of
undecipherable and inconsistent recording systems. State Farm
Lloyds hired an accountant and a sports card expert to interpret
the Griggs inventories. Sample pages in the summary judgment
record from the approximately 1,000 page inventory do not ascribe
values or cost bases to the items cryptically described. Moreover,
the inventory apparently reflects all of Griggs’ collection without
delineating which items were stolen, which had been recovered, and
5 which were still missing. State Farm Lloyds’ accountant asked for
a variety of documents that would help to substantiate Griggs’
claim. Griggs refused to tender all of the documents, but did give
the accountant twenty boxes of personal financial records, which
contained everything from receipts for dry cleaning to receipts for
cards that were not being reported stolen. At some point, the
accountant reduced the Griggs inventories to spreadsheet form,
which revealed that the inventories contained duplicative pages and
both duplicative and illegible entries. Neither State Farm Lloyds
nor the experts hired for the purpose were able to document Griggs’
claim for him from the materials provided.
On January 22, 1996, State Farm Lloyds sent Griggs a detailed
letter by certified mail advising Griggs that he had not complied
with his duties under the policy to provide a sworn proof of loss,
an accurate inventory with supporting documentation, and access to
all of the pertinent records and documents. The State Farm Lloyds
policy provides, in relevant part:
3. YOUR DUTIES AFTER LOSS. In case of a loss to covered property caused by a peril insured against, you must:
d. furnish a complete inventory of damaged personal property showing the quantity, description and amount of loss. Attach all bills, receipts and related documents which you have that justify the figures in the inventory.
e. as often as we reasonably require: * * * (2) provide us with pertinent records and documents that we request and permit us to make copies.
6 f. send to us or our agent, if we request, your signed sworn proof of loss within 91 days of our request on a standard form supplied by us.
There is no dispute about the fact that the policy is worded in
such a way that the insured’s compliance with each of these duties
is a condition precedent to coverage.
State Farm Lloyds informed Griggs that, notwithstanding
Griggs’ failure to respond to requests made in February 1993, June
1993, June 1995, and November 1995 for a sworn proof of loss, State
Farm Lloyds was willing to extend the deadline for filing a sworn
and notarized proof of loss one final time. The letter
unequivocally stated that Griggs would have ninety-one days from
the date he received the certified letter to file a sworn proof of
loss. State Farm Lloyds further explained why the inventories
submitted to State Farm Lloyds by Griggs did not conform to policy
requirements, and cautioned Griggs to include an itemized listing
of the items stolen with individual values, and where possible,
supporting documentation for either Griggs’ cost basis or the
estimated value at time of loss. Finally, State Farm Lloyds
described in detail the types of documentation that it needed to
review to process Griggs’ claim, including copies of invoices or
canceled checks reflecting the purchase of such items, and any
independent evaluations or appraisals of the collection. State
Farm Lloyds explained, in admirable detail, why such documentation
was necessary for the processing of Griggs’ sizable claim, and
gratuitously permitted Griggs another ninety-one days in which to
comply. A sworn proof of loss form was attached to the letter.
7 On April 9, 1996, State Farm Lloyds sent another certified
letter to Griggs informing him that his sworn proof of loss and
related documentation were due to be filed with State Farm Lloyds
by April 23, 1996. Griggs responded on April 22 that he could not
comply with the sworn proof of loss requirement because he did not
have the required form. Griggs responded to the remaining
provisions by providing State Farm Lloyds’ with a half-page summary
describing his loss and a batch of unsorted personal records.
Although Griggs was able to present an exact dollar estimate of his
loss, Griggs did not provide comprehensible paperwork
substantiating his calculation of that loss.
On May 20, 1996, State Farm Lloyds sent Griggs another
certified letter stating that Griggs’ half page summary of loss,
combined with the cumbersome inventories and unsorted financial
records, were not adequate under the policy to satisfy Griggs’
duties under the policy to document his losses. The May 20, 1996
letter provided another sworn proof of loss form for Griggs’ use,
but expressly reserved any rights State Farm Lloyds may have as a
result of Griggs’ non-compliance. One month later, on June 20,
1996, State Farm Lloyds provided Griggs with notice that it was
denying his claims because Griggs failed to comply with his
contractual duties to provide a sworn proof of loss, to produce an
accurate and itemized inventory of the items stolen, and to permit
reasonable access to records and documentation in support of his
claim.
8 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Griggs filed this suit against State Farm Lloyds and Blum in
Texas state court. Griggs amended his petition before serving
either State Farm Lloyds or Blum. Shortly thereafter, Griggs
served State Farm Lloyds. Blum was never served. State Farm
Lloyds then timely removed the case, alleging diversity
jurisdiction.
Griggs and Blum are both citizens of Texas. State Farm Lloyds
is for jurisdictional purposes a citizen of Illinois. State Farm
Lloyds’ removal petition alleged that diversity jurisdiction was
proper, notwithstanding the fact that Griggs and Blum are both
Texas residents, because Blum was fraudulently joined. State Farm
Lloyds thereafter moved to dismiss Blum as fraudulently joined, and
Griggs joined issue by moving for remand to state court.
In October 1997, the district court held a hearing on the
propriety of State Farm Lloyds’ removal. In the course of that
hearing, the district court entered an oral finding that Blum was
fraudulently joined. The district court also invited State Farm
Lloyds to file a motion seeking to recover its attorney fees to the
extent they were expended defending Blum against the fraudulent
claims. The district court thereafter entered orders dismissing
Blum as fraudulently joined and denying Griggs’ motion to remand,
ordering Griggs to pay Blum’s attorney fees in the amount of
$4,725, and holding that diversity jurisdiction was proper.
Griggs appeals from these holdings.
9 ORDER DENYING GRIGGS’ MOTION TO REMAND
I.
The district court’s orders dismissing Blum and denying
Griggs’ motion to remand to state court present questions of law,
which we review de novo. Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d
213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995). To establish that a non-diverse
defendant has been fraudulently joined to defeat diversity
jurisdiction, the removing party must prove that there has been
outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of the jurisdictional
facts, or that there is absolutely no possibility that the
plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the
non-diverse defendant in state court. Burden, 60 F.3d at 217;
Cavallini v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259 (5th
Cir. 1995). There is no dispute concerning the fact that both
Griggs and Blum are Texas residents. Consequently, our sole
concern is whether, as a matter of law, Griggs has alleged a valid
state-law cause of action against Blum. Burden, 60 F.3d at 217-18;
Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 259. Stated differently, we must determine
whether there is any reasonable basis for predicting that Griggs
might be able to establish Blum’s liability on the pleaded claims
in state court. Burden, 60 F.3d at 217; Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 262
n.13. In making this legal determination, we are obliged to
resolve any contested issues of material fact, and any ambiguity or
uncertainty in the controlling state law, in Griggs’ favor.
Burden, 60 F.3d at 217-18; Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 259.
10 II.
Griggs’ original and amended petitions name Lark Blum as a
defendant, but allege no actionable facts specific to Blum. The
only factual allegation even mentioning Blum merely states that
“Defendants [sic], through its local agent, Lark Blum issued an
insurance policy.” The remainder of Griggs’ pleadings refer to
conduct by the “Defendants” that can in no way be attributed to
Blum. Both Griggs’ factual allegations and his articulation of his
legal claims focus solely upon State Farm Lloyds’ conduct in the
processing and ultimate denial of his claim.
Griggs argues that his amended petition adequately states
valid causes of action against Blum, pointing out that Texas law
requires only notice pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47. We
decline Griggs’ invitation to expand the concept of notice pleading
this far. See City of Alamo v. Casas, 960 S.W.2d 240, 251-52 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied) (The petition must at least
provide sufficient factual information that the defendant is able
to prepare a defense). We cannot say that Griggs’ petition, which
mentions Blum once in passing, then fails to state any specific
actionable conduct on her part whatsoever, meets even the
liberalized requirements that permit notice pleading. Id. at 251-
52 (holding that petition failed to state a claim based upon
factual insufficiency). Moreover, we note that notwithstanding
Blum’s identity as a defendant, Griggs did not make any attempt to
serve Blum with either the original or the amended petition. In
the district court, Griggs’ counsel initially represented that
11 there had been some difficulty achieving service of process, but
later abandoned that assertion when State Farm Lloyds produced
evidence that Blum had been in the same business location for
twelve years and that Griggs had been to that location on several
occasions. We conclude that Griggs’ pleadings, standing alone, do
not set forth actionable claims against Blum. Moreover, the record
does not support any inference that Griggs intended to actively
pursue claims against Blum.
III.
Griggs argues that the Court may consider, in addition to his
petition, his affidavit testimony, which was filed with the
district court before the district court’s ruling on the motion to
remand. State Farm Lloyds maintains that post-removal evidence may
not be considered when determining whether removal was proper.
Griggs has the better end of this argument, but only to the extent
that the factual allegations in his affidavit clarify or amplify
the claims actually alleged in the amended petition that was
controlling when the suit was dismissed.
Our Court has endorsed a summary judgment-like procedure for
reviewing fraudulent joinder claims. Thus, “[w]hile we have
frequently cautioned the district courts against pretrying a case
to determine removal jurisdiction,” a federal court may consider
“summary judgment-type evidence such as affidavits and deposition
testimony” when reviewing a fraudulent joinder claim. Cavallini,
44 F.3d at 263. Post-removal filings may not be considered,
however, when or to the extent that they present new causes of
12 action or theories not raised in the controlling petition filed in
state court. Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 263. With that rule in mind,
we will consider Griggs’ affidavit, to the extent material, for
purposes of determining whether there is any reasonable basis for
predicting that Griggs might be able to establish Blum’s liability
on the pleaded claims in state court. See Burden, 60 F.3d at 217;
Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 262.
Griggs’ affidavit adds to his petition in two ways. First,
Griggs alleges that Blum made the sort of pre-purchase assurances
to be expected from an insurance agent. For example, Blum is
alleged to have said that State Farm Lloyds would provide timely
and professional service, and that she, Blum, would personally
handle any questions or problems that might arise. Although none
of these facts appear in his state court petition, Griggs also
alleged that Blum made certain representations concerning the claim
at issue in this case. Specifically, Griggs alleged that Blum
promised to follow up on his claim, promised to get a competent
adjustor assigned to the file, represented that the delay attendant
to his independent efforts to retrieve his collection would not
prejudice the processing of his claim, represented that State Farm
Lloyds “had everything” they needed to process his claim, and
represented that his claims would be paid quickly.
Having defined the universe of factual allegations that may be
considered, we assess whether there is a reasonable basis for
predicting that Griggs would be able to establish Blum’s liability
on the state-law theories pleaded in his amended petition.
13 IV.
Griggs’ original and amended state court petitions allege
breach of the insurance contract, breach of the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas Insurance
Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Neither Griggs’
pleadings nor his affidavit allege that Blum was a party to any
implied or express contract of any sort with Griggs. Moreover, it
is undisputed that Blum had no claims processing responsibility and
no decision-making authority with respect to the processing of
Griggs’ claim or with respect to State Farm Lloyds’ ultimate denial
of Griggs’ claim. There is, therefore, no basis for Griggs’ claim
alleging that Blum breached the insurance contract.
Griggs next claims that Blum can be held liable for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. "[I]n an insurance
context, the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises only when
there is a contract giving rise to a ‘special relationship.’"
Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1994); see
also Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 262 (under Texas law, “the existence of
a contract, giving rise to a special relationship, is a necessary
element of the duty of good faith and fair dealing” (internal
quotations omitted)); Viles v. Security Nat’l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d
566 (Tex. 1990) (the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises
“from an obligation imposed in law as a result of a special
relationship between the parties governed or created by a contract”
(internal quotations omitted)); Coffman v. Scott Wetzel Servs.,
14 Inc., 908 S.W.2d 516, 516 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ)
(citing Natividad for the proposition that no duty of good faith
and fair dealing is owed by an agent to the insured absent privity
of contract). Once again, Griggs has not alleged that his
relationship with Blum was “governed or created by” any contract,
or that his relationship with Blum was otherwise imbued with
special characteristics that would give rise to the “special
relationship” required to impose a duty of good faith and fair
dealing. See Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 261-62; Viles, 788 S.W.2d at
567. There is, therefore, no basis under Texas law for Griggs’
claim against Blum for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
Griggs also maintains that he has alleged viable claims
against Blum under article 21.21 § 16(a) of the Texas Insurance
Code and § 17.50(a)(4) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Article 21.21 § 4 of the Texas Insurance Code provides an extensive
list of acts or practices forbidden as unfair or deceptive in the
business of insurance. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 4 (Vernon
Supp. 1999). Section 17.46 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act provides an extensive list of acts or practices that are
forbidden in all businesses as unfair or deceptive. TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp. 1999). Both the Texas Insurance
Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act permit a private
cause of action against “any person” who commits one of the
prohibited acts or practices. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. article 21.21
§ 16 (Vernon Supp. 1999); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon
15 Supp. 1999). Texas courts have recently recognized that the
statutory language is broad enough to permit in the appropriate
circumstances a cause of action against an insurance agent who
engages in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. In the two most
prominent cases, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors,
Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998) and State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no writ), Texas
courts acknowledged that a sales agent may be individually liable
when the agent misrepresents specific policy terms prior to a loss,
and the insured’s reliance upon that misrepresentation actually
causes the insured to incur damages. See Garrison, 966 S.W.2d 482
(agent misrepresented the amount of premium due under the policy);
Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908 (agent misrepresented that damage to home from
mudslide was covered under homeowner’s policy).
Griggs argues that the mere possibility that such a claim can
be stated requires the conclusion that he has stated a valid claim
in this case. We disagree. While the burden of demonstrating
fraudulent joinder is a heavy one, we have never held that a
particular plaintiff might possibly establish liability by the mere
hypothetical possibility that such an action could exist. To the
contrary, whether the plaintiff has stated a valid state law cause
of action depends upon and is tied to the factual fit between the
plaintiffs’ allegations and the pleaded theory of recovery. See
Burden, 60 F.3d at 218-221; see also Casas, 960 S.W.2d at 251-52.
No facts warranting liability exist here. As an initial
matter, we note that Blum’s pre-purchase statements that State Farm
16 Lloyds would handle Griggs’ claims professionally, as well as her
post-claim assurances that she would monitor the progress of
Griggs’ claim, are more in the nature of non-actionable puffery
than actionable representations of specific material fact. See
Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 838 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (discussing puffery defense to
misrepresentation claim). The record contains ample evidence that
Griggs is both a well educated gentleman and an unusually
sophisticated insured. Griggs has filed a large number of claims
that have been processed, according to State Farm Lloyds’
procedures, by the insurance company itself. Moreover, Griggs has
documented extensive and specific communication about the status
and progress of his claim with the State Farm Lloyds personnel with
the authority and responsibility for processing his claim. Griggs’
own evidence establishes that State Farm Lloyds repeatedly
forwarded certified letters return receipt requested notifying
Griggs that they needed additional documentation, and that the
company was reserving its rights under the policy. Thus, Griggs
was made expressly aware in specific terms of the insurance
company’s position by the very personnel responsible for processing
his claim and reaching a decision. When compared to this
documentation, Blum’s general, undocumented and non-specific
statements clearly fall short of the mark of actionable
representations under Texas law.
In addition, both the Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act require proof that the defendant’s conduct was the
17 cause in fact of actual damages. Provident Am. Ins. Co. v.
Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. 1998) (Insurance Code); 2 Fat
Guys Inv., Inc. v. Klaver, 928 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. App.--San
Antonio 1996, no writ). Griggs claims to have been injured by
State Farm Lloyds’ failure to pay his claim. This is not a case
like Garrison or Gros, in which the plaintiff identifies a
particular representation which is causally connected to the
damages sustained. Griggs’ Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act claims fail because there is no conceivable basis in
law or fact upon which Blum’s non-specific statements can be
construed as actionable representations that caused the injury
alleged by Griggs.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no basis in Texas law or
in fact for Griggs’ claims against Blum. The district court did
not err in denying Griggs’ motion to remand.
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
The district court awarded State Farm Lloyds the attorney fees
incurred defending Blum against the fraudulent claims. The
district court held that Griggs’ continued pursuit of his plainly
meritless claims against Blum in federal court after removal was
sanctionable conduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Griggs challenges this decision on appeal, essentially arguing that
the award of fees was improper because Blum was not fraudulently
joined.
The district court’s decision that sanctions in the form of
attorney fees was appropriate is reviewed for an abuse of
18 discretion only. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447,
2461 (1990); Thornton v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 454
(5th Cir. 1998). In light of our agreement with the district court
that Blum was fraudulently joined, the record of the proceedings
below, and the deferential standard governing our review of this
issue, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding attorney fees in this case. The district
court’s order granting Blum’s motion for attorney fees is affirmed.
ORDER GRANTING STATE FARM LLOYDS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Griggs maintains that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Lloyds because there are
genuine issues of material fact about whether he complied with
conditions precedent to coverage and whether State Farm Lloyds had
a good faith basis for denying his claim. State Farm Lloyds
responds that the summary judgment record is adequate to
demonstrate its policy defense and its good faith as a matter of
law.
We have reviewed the extensive summary judgment record,
including the numerous exhibits submitted by Griggs, and find no
error in the district court’s disposition. We agree with Griggs
that there is a genuine factual dispute concerning whether Griggs
submitted a sworn proof of loss. But no reasonable trier of fact
could find that Griggs documented his losses as required by
conditions precedent in the applicable insurance policy. Absent
Griggs’ compliance with this independently sufficient condition
precedent to coverage, State Farm Lloyds had no duty to provide
19 benefits under the contract. Likewise, no reasonable trier of fact
could find that State Farm Lloyds’ handling of Griggs’ claim was
characterized by bad faith. State Farm Lloyds repeatedly extended,
with reservation of rights, its own deadlines for Griggs’
compliance. Indeed, Griggs is still unable to provide compre-
hensible documentation of his loss. The district court closely
supervised discovery in this case, ordering State Farm Lloyds to
provide an itemized list of the required documentation and ordering
Griggs to produce some reasonably comprehensible proof of his loss.
Even at that late date, State Farm Lloyds indicated some
willingness, at the district court’s urging, to consider Griggs’
claim if properly documented. Notwithstanding further meetings
between the parties, and the personal examination of the available
documentation by the district court at a hearing in which Griggs’
counsel was permitted to explain the documentation, no one,
including Griggs’ own lawyer, was able to explain how any
particular page in the thousands of pages tendered by Griggs proved
any aspect of his claimed loss.
State Farm Lloyds is not liable as a matter of law on Griggs’
claims under Texas common law, the Texas Insurance Code or the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Lloyds is in all respects
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court is in all
respects AFFIRMED.
20 21