Griffith v. Clarkstown Police Dept.

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 14, 2021·No. 7:20-cv-06505·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRANDON GRIFFITH, Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE -against-

CLARKSTOWN POLICE DEPT.; P.O. 20-CV-6505 (PMH) PAPENMAYER, Badge #508; AMKC RIKERS

ISLAND; DEPUTY WARDEN FOO; HARTS ISLAND; DR. JANE DOE; JOHN DOE, SGT., Defendants. PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Brandon Griffith (“Plaintiff”), who appears pro se, is currently serving a term of parole supervision. He filed the complaint commencing this action while he was incarcerated in the Auburn Correctional Facility. He sues: (1) the Clarkstown Police Department (“CPD”); (2) CPD Police Officer Papenmeyer; (3) unidentified CPD Police Sergeant “John Doe;”1 (4) “AMKC Rikers Island;”2 (5) “Harts Island;” (6) AMKC Deputy Warden Foo; and (7) unidentified AMKC physician “Dr. Jane Doe.” He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks damages. (Doc. 2). By Order dated December 21, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. 7). For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the CPD and his claims against Papenmeyer and Sgt. John Doe in their official capacities. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to add the Town of Clarkstown (“TOC”) as a defendant, and directs service on

1 Plaintiff specifies that he sues Papenmeyer and Sgt. John Doe in their individual and official capacities.

2 “AMKC” is a reference to the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island. Papenmeyer and the TOC. The Court also directs the TOC Town Attorney to provide to Plaintiff and the Court the identity, badge number, and service address for Sgt. John Doe.3 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in

pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

3 The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendants in a separate Order.

4 For the purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or [a] diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Because Plaintiff filed his complaint while he was incarcerated, he is considered a prisoner under the PLRA. See Gibson v. City Municipality of New York, 692 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he relevant time at which a person must be ‘a prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA in order for the [PLRA’s] restrictions to apply is ‘the moment the plaintiff files his complaint.’”) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court

must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. Claims against the Clarkstown Police Department and against Papenmeyer and Sgt. John Doe in their official capacities The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the CPD as well as his claims against Papenmeyer and Sgt. John Doe in their official capacities as members of the CPD. Municipal agencies or departments, like the CPD, do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal

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