Griffin v. Town of Whitefield, et al. CV-07-243-JL 08/05/08
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John R. Griffin
v. Civil No. 07-cv-243-JL Opinion No. 2 008 DNH 131 Town of Whitefield, Richard Brown, Shawn White, and Judith Ramsdell
O R D E R
John R. Griffin, proceeding pro se, has sued the Town of
Whitefield and several of its employees for various injuries
arising out of his allegedly unconstitutional arrest and
prosecution in 2004. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C
§ 1331 (federal question) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights).
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2008) .
The court heard oral argument on the motions on August 5,
2008. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Griffin's
motion for summary judgment, grants the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and awards judgment to the defendants. I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "The object of summary judgment is to
pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties'
proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required."
Davila v. Corporacion De P.R. Para La Difusion Publica, 498 F.3d
9, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted) (quoting Acosta v.
Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) ) . "Cross
motions [for summary judgment] simply require [the court] to
determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a
matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Littlefield v.
Acadia Ins. C o ., 392 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) .
II. BACKGROUND
In 2004, Griffin was investigated and criminally charged by
the Whitefield Police Department with attempting to violate a
restraining order obtained by his former wife. The charges
against Griffin were later dismissed by the trial court.
2 Based on their participation in his arrest and prosecution,
Griffin filed a state-court action against the Town of
Whitefield, Officers Richard Brown and Shawn White of the
Whitefield Police Department, and Judith Ramsdell, a justice of
the peace. Griffin alleged: (1) intentional false
arrest/imprisonment, (2) defamation, (3) intentional mental
distress, (4) issuance of a void arrest warrant, (5) malicious
prosecution, (6) misrepresentation and deceit, (7) malicious
abuse of legal process, and (8) interference with marital
relations. Prior to trial, the Coos County Superior Court
dismissed all claims against the defendants. See Griffin v.
White, slip ops.. Nos. 06-C-57, -58, and -60 (N.H. Sup. C t . Feb.
27, 2007, and Aug. 7, 2007); and Griffin v. Town of Whitefield,
slip ops.. Nos. 07-C-31, -32, and -33 (N.H. Sup. C t . Aug. 20,
2007). Several of Griffin's claims were dismissed for failure to
state a valid cause of action, while summary judgment was granted
on the remaining claims. Griffin filed a notice of appeal with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which was rejected as untimely.
See Griffin v. White, slip op.. No. 2007-0602 (N.H. Sept. 27,
2007) .
3 Griffin has since filed the pro se complaint now before this
court, which, liberally construed, see Raineri v. United States,
233 F.3d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 2000), alleges the following claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) false arrest and imprisonment, (2)
invalid arrest warrant, (3) fraud and misrepresentation, (4)
failure to educate, train, and supervise, and (5) malicious
prosecution. These claims are premised upon the same series of
events that formed the basis of Griffin's earlier state-court
petitions. The defendants have moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Griffin's claims are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
III. ANALYSIS
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars "parties or their
privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could have
been raised in [a previous] action." Breneman v. United States
ex rel. FAA, 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2004). Under New
Hampshire law,1 a prior lawsuit has res judicata effect over a
subsequent one when: (1) the parties in both actions are the
^ o r purposes of res judicata, federal courts apply the law of the state whose courts issued the earlier judgment. See Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2006) .
4 same, (2) the cases present the same cause of action, and (3) the
first action concluded with the issuance of a final judgment on
the merits. See Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 341
(2006). Here, the defendants argue that, as the result of final
judgments in earlier state-court proceedings where the parties
and the claims were the same as those now before the court,
Griffin's federal claims are precluded. Demonstrating a
fundamental misunderstanding of court procedure and the res
judicata doctrine, Griffin failed to squarely challenge the
defendants' contention in his written objection. At oral
argument, at the court's urging, he made several arguments
against application of the doctrine, but those too were
unavailing, and based on a limited, flawed understanding of the
doctrine. "This, of course, does not mean the unopposed party
wins on summary judgment; that party's uncontested facts . . .
must still show that the party is entitled to summary judgment."
Torres-Rosado v. Rotqer-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003) .
It is undisputed, and abundantly clear to the court, that
the first two elements of res judicata have been met. The
parties are identical, and Griffin's federal claims arose out of
the same series of transactions or occurrences underlying his
5 state-court litigation--his arrest and prosecution in 2004. In
this context, a claim presents the same cause of action as that
resolved in an earlier judgment where the underlying facts share
"relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation" and "form a
convenient unit for trial purposes." Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 2 4, cmt. b (1982); see also Sleeper v. Hoban Family
Partnership, No. 2007-257, 2008 WL 2852957, at *3 (N.H. Sup. C t .
July 25, 2008) (cause of action refers "to all theories on which
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Griffin v. Town of Whitefield, et al. CV-07-243-JL 08/05/08
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John R. Griffin
v. Civil No. 07-cv-243-JL Opinion No. 2 008 DNH 131 Town of Whitefield, Richard Brown, Shawn White, and Judith Ramsdell
O R D E R
John R. Griffin, proceeding pro se, has sued the Town of
Whitefield and several of its employees for various injuries
arising out of his allegedly unconstitutional arrest and
prosecution in 2004. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C
§ 1331 (federal question) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights).
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2008) .
The court heard oral argument on the motions on August 5,
2008. For the reasons stated below, the court denies Griffin's
motion for summary judgment, grants the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and awards judgment to the defendants. I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "The object of summary judgment is to
pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties'
proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required."
Davila v. Corporacion De P.R. Para La Difusion Publica, 498 F.3d
9, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted) (quoting Acosta v.
Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) ) . "Cross
motions [for summary judgment] simply require [the court] to
determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a
matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Littlefield v.
Acadia Ins. C o ., 392 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) .
II. BACKGROUND
In 2004, Griffin was investigated and criminally charged by
the Whitefield Police Department with attempting to violate a
restraining order obtained by his former wife. The charges
against Griffin were later dismissed by the trial court.
2 Based on their participation in his arrest and prosecution,
Griffin filed a state-court action against the Town of
Whitefield, Officers Richard Brown and Shawn White of the
Whitefield Police Department, and Judith Ramsdell, a justice of
the peace. Griffin alleged: (1) intentional false
arrest/imprisonment, (2) defamation, (3) intentional mental
distress, (4) issuance of a void arrest warrant, (5) malicious
prosecution, (6) misrepresentation and deceit, (7) malicious
abuse of legal process, and (8) interference with marital
relations. Prior to trial, the Coos County Superior Court
dismissed all claims against the defendants. See Griffin v.
White, slip ops.. Nos. 06-C-57, -58, and -60 (N.H. Sup. C t . Feb.
27, 2007, and Aug. 7, 2007); and Griffin v. Town of Whitefield,
slip ops.. Nos. 07-C-31, -32, and -33 (N.H. Sup. C t . Aug. 20,
2007). Several of Griffin's claims were dismissed for failure to
state a valid cause of action, while summary judgment was granted
on the remaining claims. Griffin filed a notice of appeal with
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which was rejected as untimely.
See Griffin v. White, slip op.. No. 2007-0602 (N.H. Sept. 27,
2007) .
3 Griffin has since filed the pro se complaint now before this
court, which, liberally construed, see Raineri v. United States,
233 F.3d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 2000), alleges the following claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) false arrest and imprisonment, (2)
invalid arrest warrant, (3) fraud and misrepresentation, (4)
failure to educate, train, and supervise, and (5) malicious
prosecution. These claims are premised upon the same series of
events that formed the basis of Griffin's earlier state-court
petitions. The defendants have moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Griffin's claims are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
III. ANALYSIS
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars "parties or their
privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could have
been raised in [a previous] action." Breneman v. United States
ex rel. FAA, 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2004). Under New
Hampshire law,1 a prior lawsuit has res judicata effect over a
subsequent one when: (1) the parties in both actions are the
^ o r purposes of res judicata, federal courts apply the law of the state whose courts issued the earlier judgment. See Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2006) .
4 same, (2) the cases present the same cause of action, and (3) the
first action concluded with the issuance of a final judgment on
the merits. See Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 341
(2006). Here, the defendants argue that, as the result of final
judgments in earlier state-court proceedings where the parties
and the claims were the same as those now before the court,
Griffin's federal claims are precluded. Demonstrating a
fundamental misunderstanding of court procedure and the res
judicata doctrine, Griffin failed to squarely challenge the
defendants' contention in his written objection. At oral
argument, at the court's urging, he made several arguments
against application of the doctrine, but those too were
unavailing, and based on a limited, flawed understanding of the
doctrine. "This, of course, does not mean the unopposed party
wins on summary judgment; that party's uncontested facts . . .
must still show that the party is entitled to summary judgment."
Torres-Rosado v. Rotqer-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003) .
It is undisputed, and abundantly clear to the court, that
the first two elements of res judicata have been met. The
parties are identical, and Griffin's federal claims arose out of
the same series of transactions or occurrences underlying his
5 state-court litigation--his arrest and prosecution in 2004. In
this context, a claim presents the same cause of action as that
resolved in an earlier judgment where the underlying facts share
"relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation" and "form a
convenient unit for trial purposes." Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 2 4, cmt. b (1982); see also Sleeper v. Hoban Family
Partnership, No. 2007-257, 2008 WL 2852957, at *3 (N.H. Sup. C t .
July 25, 2008) (cause of action refers "to all theories on which
relief could be claimed on the basis of the factual transaction
in question"). Indeed, as stated in Griffin's opposition papers,
his federal complaint involves "an ongoing disagreement with the
town of Whitefield, NH in respect to the actions of its
employees. Police Officers Shawn White, Richard Brown and
Administrative Assistant and Justice of peace representing
Whitefield, NH; Judith Ramsdell."
It is similarly apparent to the court that Griffin's state-
court actions concluded with a final judgment on the merits. "A
judgment is upon the merits when it contains an order that there
shall be no further action for the same cause." Moore v.
Lebanon, 96 N.H. 20, 22 (1949). It is well settled that grants
of summary judgment, and dismissals for failure to state a claim.
6 both constitute final judgments on the merits. See Caballero-
Rivera v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir.
2002) (summary judgment); AVX Corp. v. Cabot Corp., 424 F.3d 28,
30 (1st Cir. 2005) (dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action). Indeed, on essentially the same factual and procedural
background as the matter before the court, Griffin had a separate
but related complaint against these same defendants dismissed as
a result of the earlier state-court judgments. See Griffin v.
Town of Whitefield, slip op.. No. 08-cv-07-PB (D.N.H. May 5,
2008).
At bottom, and as he conceded at oral argument, Griffin's
argument seems to be that although the doctrine of res judicata
may very well bar his claims, the court should decline to apply
the doctrine based on what he sees as the egregious nature of the
misconduct alleged in those claims. He cites no authority or
precedent supporting this approach; of course, there is none.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Griffin previously sought relief in New Hampshire
state court, and lost on the merits of his claims, he is barred
from relitigating those same claims (against the same defendants)
7 in federal court. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Griffin's motion for summary judgment contains no memorandum
of law, makes no legal argument in support of his position, and
cites no authority to explain why he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Further, it contains no authority or argument
that counters the defendants' summary judgment motion. The
court, therefore, denies Griffin's motion for summary judgment,
grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and awards
judgment to the defendants. All other motions are denied as
moot. The clerk is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 5, 2008
cc: John R. Griffin, pro se R. Matthew Cairns, Esq.