CARDINE, Justice.
Following a jury trial upon a charge of first-degree murder, appellant Carol Griffin was convicted, for killing her husband, of voluntary manslaughter in violation of § 6-2-105(a)(i), W.S.1977, which provides:
“(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either:
“(i) Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion * *
She received a sentence of eight to ten years in the Wyoming Women’s Center.
On appeal, she states the issues as:
1. “Was the competent evidence presented to the jury insufficient to sustain the conviction of voluntary manslaughter.”
2. “Was the introduction of Appellant’s request for an attorney and her subsequent statements reversible error.”
3. “Did the trial court improperly limit voir dire.”
4. “Was it error for the Court to refuse proffered jury instruction F.”
We affirm.
The critical question presented for our review is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant contends she was a battered wife who in self-defense shot and killed her husband. We must abide by our established rule that after conviction, on appeal, we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, drawing all possible, reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the crime necessary for conviction. If, after viewing the evidence in this light, there exists sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the jury’s verdict of conviction must be affirmed. Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 740 (1987); Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 (1986).
“ ‘Stated another way — it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.’ ” Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980), quoting Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1979). See also Polston v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1 (1984).
It is claimed that appellant is a battered wife, i.e., a woman so physically, emotionally and psychologically destroyed by continuous, severe beatings that she has become an emotional cripple, unable to resist, unable to act, fearful of leaving, believing there is nowhere to turn and no one to help, unable to contemplate divorce or separation, who in utter desperation kills her husband. Thus it is said:
“Battered women have traditionally been reluctant to seek help. If ‘seeking help’ would not protect her from further physical abuse and if there was no place to go to escape from the assaults, then what was the use of seeking help? For many years this was the plight a battered woman faced. All too often these women have been ashamed of being victims of spouse abuse. They have endured repeated assaults because of an overriding desire to keep the family together, uncertainty over where to get legal aid and social work services, fear of poverty, guilt that they are in some way to blame for the abuse, and fear of intensified physical reprisals if they left home or filed a complaint against the husband.” A. Roberts, Sheltering Battered Women, at 7 (1981).
Appellant hardly qualifies for what the literature describes as a battered wife. She was not afraid to contact the police, having done so on five prior occasions. Each time the police came to their residence, there was an argument between the parties over who had done what, who was [249]*249at fault; and in each instance appellant was enormously drunk. She had pushed Clyde Griffin out of the house on several occasions, fought with him and cut him with a broken bottle and knife, had employed a lawyer and entered into two separation agreements. The parties were separated at the time of the shooting. She had been married four times prior to this marriage to the deceased, three of those marriage's ending in divorce. She knew how to get out of her marriage without killing Clyde Griffin. She could hardly have believed it necessary to kill him to terminate the relationship.
FACTS
The appellant, Carol Griffin, married the deceased, Clyde Griffin, on July 1,1983. It was appellant’s fifth marriage and the deceased’s first. The marriage, marked by alcohol abuse, separation and acts of violence by both husband and wife, ended with the death of Clyde Griffin on January 26, 1986.
The events leading to the killing began when David Lopez, Jeanette Alphin, Charles Kellogg and appellant met the evening of January 25, 1986, at appellant’s mobile home in Cowley, Wyoming, to celebrate the birthday of Lopez. Everyone except Kellogg had been drinking before they moved the celebration to Powell, Wyoming. They returned to Cowley about midnight, and the party continued at Kellogg’s mobile home until about 2:45 a.m. Sunday. Appellant remained at Kellogg’s home until about 6:00 a.m. She and Kellogg then went to the appellant’s home where, at 6:38 a.m., she telephoned Clyde at the ranch house near Byron where he was staying during the couple’s separation. Ten or fifteen minutes later, Clyde called back to ask for help in getting a vehicle out of a ditch. Appellant and Kellogg traveled to the ranch bringing appellant’s gun with them.
Appellant, Clyde and Kellogg practiced shooting the gun. It was the first time appellant had fired the gun. Kellogg and appellant then returned to appellant’s home about 9:30 a.m. Kellogg cleaned the gun, reloaded it and placed it on a coffee table in appellant’s living room.
At about 10:00 a.m., a neighbor, Melvin Buck, drove Clyde to appellant’s home. Buck found Clyde to be friendly and calm. Clyde entered the trailer house, accused Kellogg of “bird dogging” his wife, and ordered Kellogg out of the mobile home. Kellogg started to leave when the appellant fired the gun, its bullet hitting a closet. Kellogg heard Clyde say: “[Y]ou are not going to shoot me, are you, Carol?” and before he reached the bottom of the steps, the appellant fired a second shot, striking and killing Clyde.
Appellant called the Big Horn County Sheriff’s office in Lovell and informed the dispatcher that she had just shot her husband. Two deputies arrived at the mobile home five minutes later to find Clyde slumped against a wall, dead. While traveling to the sheriff’s office in Lovell, appellant stated she would like to speak to an attorney and was advised that an attorney would be provided. At the sheriff’s office, she waived her Miranda rights after they were read to her and was left in the custody of a Lovell police officer until transportation to the Big Horn County jail in Basin could be arranged. Although the officer asked no questions about the shooting incident, appellant started talking about it. When appellant asked if she should lie and say someone else shot Clyde, the officer suggested she say no more until she consulted with an attorney. A blood alcohol test showed her blood alcohol level to be .23 percent some three hours later.
Appellant's trial on the first-degree murder charge began on April 28, 1986. The jury rejected appellant’s self-defense justification for the shooting and, on May 7, 1986, found her guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter under § 6-2-105(a)(i), supra.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The State’s evidence was directed to proof of premeditation, motive and malice necessary to establish murder in the first degree. Thus, witnesses testified that appellant would drink daily in bars, make [250]*250advances to other men, and other men would come on to her. The deceased’s employer, Peterson, testified that “he [Clyde] was upset by her association with other fellows”; that “[h]e handled it much better than I would have,” and one morning when Mr. Peterson gave appellant a ride as they drove past Kellogg’s trailer, appellant said,
“Carol’s down to Kellogg’s, and he got out and walked down to the trailer. That was about 8:30.
“Q. In the morning?
“A. In the morning, yes.
“Q. Was—
“A. He was aware that she was staying down there at nights and this bothered him to some extent.”
Sandra Folkerts testified:
“Q. Now then, did Clyde ever mention to you the relationship between his wife and Mr. Kellogg?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Was that causing him any concern? “A. It was causing him a lot of grief, heartache.
⅜ * * 5⅜ * *
“A. He came to my house one night and he said that he had been over to Cowley and that Carol was at Chuck’s house and he asked her for the checkbook and credit cards, he felt if she was going to have a relationship with Chuck he was not going to continue to support her, I guess, I don’t know.”
Mr. Garrett testified:
“Q. And did he ever mention any suspicions or fears he may have had about Mr. Kellogg?
“A. He said he felt Mr. Kellogg and Mrs. Griffin were having an affair.”
There was also the testimony set forth in the dissent concerning a customer in a bar playing with appellant’s breasts. There was not a single objection to any of this testimony. It is not surprising there was no objection, for such evidence is clearly relevant to motive, malice and plan to kill.
Doctor Welch, who saw appellant after their fights, testified: “She was under the influence of alcohol each time,” and stated further: “[M]y impression was that she was a pusher, Carol was a pusher. When she would get drunk she would drive him up the wall and whether it was a short fuse or not, it was understandable I felt at the time.” And finally Dr. Welch stated that he never considered her injuries serious.
Mr. Lopez, a friend of appellant’s, testified that the difficulties, verbal fights, and pushing were the result of alcohol and that “usually when things got pretty bad * * * he [Clyde Griffin] would leave.”
Mr. Whittman testified:
“A. Carol slapped Clyde.
“Q. What was his response to this?
“A. He was trying to hold her arms together and take her home because she was yelling and screaming and waking up the kids. I asked them to leave.
“Q. Did you ever see Clyde Griffin physically attack his wife during that altercation?
“A. No.
“Q. Were there any other instances which you witnessed or which you were party to which led you to form an opinion as to Carol Griffin’s temper?
“A. Quite often she would start arguments with him.”
Ms. Folkerts stated:
“A. He told me that he had to defend himself against her. He came to the house one time and mentioned to me that she had broken a bottle and gone after him with it in their home. And he came to me at a different time and told me that she had gone after him with a butcher knife.
“Q. Did you ever see any indications of injury on him?
“A. He had wrapped his arm one day and said it was cut. It was wrapped when he came over and he was telling me about one of these incidents, yes. He told me another time that she pushed him out the back door of the trailer and they had no steps.”
For five months the parties were separated pursuant to two separation agreements. Upon the expiration of the agreements, they lived together for about two [251]*251months when, on December 22, 1985, decedent again moved out of the trailer. During all of this time Clyde Griffin was appellant’s sole support. For the last five months Clyde Griffin had stopped drinking, was attending Alcoholics Anonymous, and was living alone at the house on his parents’ ranch. His employer had suggested to him that he get a divorce. Clyde Griffin informed Ms. Folkerts one night that he was thinking about “changing his will and getting a divorce * * *.” The jury could have inferred that appellant was interested in other men; was having an affair with one of them; that while separated she was being supported by Clyde Griffin; that if she and Clyde were divorced she would have no further support, but if he died while they were still married, she would inherit from his estate. Fifteen days before Clyde was shot and killed by appellant, she purchased a .38 caliber handgun and two boxes of ammunition. The day of Clyde Griffin’s death, she telephoned him at the ranch where he was staying. She and Mr. Kellogg then went to the ranch, taking the gun and the ammunition with them. She had never fired the gun before. At the ranch she fired the gun for the first time engaging in target practice. A few hours later, while seated on her sofa, in a drunken condition, she picked up her handgun and, as in target practice, fired a shot into the center of Clyde Griffin’s chest, killing him almost instantly. There was considerable evidence of premeditation and malice necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder.
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter, however, because of her drunken condition at the time of the killing. At her sentencing hearing her attorney conceded drunkenness was the cause, and so did her doctor who testified as follows:
“She has done something that is absolutely not acceptable in our society, and that’s killed someone. For that there ought to be some punishment and the jury of her peers so agreed. What that punishment should entail is difficult to assess. Carol does have a disease, and a disease led her to do what she did and, nonetheless the act was committed, a life was lost that can never be given back. It’s done and gone forever, so there is absolutely no restitution that can be made, and so for that reason that’s why I don’t envy the judge in this situation. I think that whatever sentence is imposed, ought to be absolutely tied to alcoholic treatment.”
The judge, in sentencing appellant to eight to ten years, stated:
“I also during the trial, of course, had an opportunity to observe you, listen to your testimony during that period of time and also here again this morning and I have the distinct feeling and impression that while you regret what happened, you more regret it because it got you in the mess you are in today and brought you before this court and that you somehow in your own mind feel the taking of Clyde Griffin’s life, under the circumstances, was justified. It is not. It cannot be, and this Court is never going to tell the public or society that if you have a problem which is greater than yourself the way to solve it is to pick up a gun and shoot someone else.
“You had ample opportunity prior to the time of the shooting to solve that problem by other means and other sources and you took no steps whatsoever as far as this Court’s concerned to avoid the eventuality that occurred when Clyde Griffin died.”
Twelve citizens in Big Horn County sitting on this jury heard all of the testimony, observed all of the witnesses, their manner of testifying, the inflection in their voices, their appearance, and assessed their credibility and truthfulness and found appellant guilty of manslaughter.
The dissent1 would have us believe that an appellate judge, having heard not one [252]*252bit of testimony from a live witness, never having observed the expression and demeanor of a single witness on the stand, and having had no opportunity to judge credibility, is in a better position, from the cold written word in a transcript of testimony, to ascertain who is truthful and who is lying, who is a perjurer, and to resolve disputed questions of fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to retry cases upon their facts. Twelve jurors believed appellant was guilty of manslaughter. The trial judge believed appellant was guilty of manslaughter. He denied a motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her upon conviction.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant relies in part on the Eagan rule to advance her contention that the killing was justified by reason of self-defense. The Eagan rule states:
“Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, * * * his testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if credibility has not been impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his testimony should be accepted.” Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942).
Appellant was the only witness to the shooting, but other people witnessed the events leading up to the shooting. Buck testified that the deceased was calm when he entered the trailer. Kellogg testified that the deceased reacted with a fearful statement after appellant fired the first shot. Expert testimony and evidence showed that the deceased was struck from a weapon fired from a distance of more than five feet. There was substantial evidence to support the jury’s rejection of the self-defense claim and substantial evidence to support its finding.
APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS
Appellant contends that her rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution2 were violated because the Lovell police officer testified about the statements she made to him concerning the killing. The dissent suggests that the police officers in this small rural town lied, cheated, and took advantage of appellant when it states: “[H]e [the police officer] never intended to honor her initial request for counsel * * * that a police officer and appellant were sitting together in a room for “an undisclosed time for an undisclosed purpose [and t]hen, almost by magic, after something is said that is deemed in[253]*253criminatory, the attendant officer leaves the room to draft his notes * * * this was “[cjlearly, a deliberate elicitation plan * * * portrayed in the events, including factors of time, place, circumstance, and prompted response * * *.”
The statements by appellant were not the result of interrogation, compulsion, overreacting, or anything else. They were nothing more than the ramblings of a drunken woman. But, if it were otherwise, it is absurd to suggest that the statements made by appellant while sitting in a room, guarded by a police officer, awaiting transportation to Lovell, made any difference in the outcome of this case. The statements by appellant were as follows, Officer Irwin testifying: “[Ajnd then she says, it was premeditated, I was tired of him beating me up”; then she said, “should I lie and tell them somebody else shot him? I told her she probably shouldn’t make any more statements until she talked to an attorney.” And then she said: “[H]e attacked me.” Later, on redirect examination concerning the statement, should I lie and say someone else did it, Officer Irwin was asked:
“Was it your impression after listening to her and observing her demeanor that this was genuine?
“A. No, it wasn’t.
“Q. Why do you say that?
“A. All of her tone of voice, the way she said it, like it was — it’s hard to explain. Like it was kind of a joke or said facetiously. I don’t know how to explain it.”
The jury knew appellant had killed Clyde Griffin. Kellogg saw her fire the first shot, heard the second shot, returned to the trailer where there was only appellant with her smoking gun and Clyde Griffin slumped against the wall, dead. Appellant called the dispatcher at the police station and told them she had shot Clyde Griffin. Finally, she testified at the trial as follows:
“First of all, I guess you are not denying ■that he is dead?
“A. I am not denying that.
“Q. You are denying that you shot him?
“A. I am not denying that.
“Q. And you are also not denying that he is not here to rebut or counter anything you have said?
“A. That’s true.”
The jury obviously did not believe the killing was premeditated when it refused to find her guilty of first-degree murder but found her guilty only of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. To suggest that these few innocuous statements made any difference in the outcome of this case is pure fantasy, having no rational basis. The statements were voluntary, concerned matters admitted by appellant or were disregarded by the jury in convicting her of manslaughter.
This court is committed to the protection of those rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the requirement that an accused be advised of those rights, including right to counsel as stated by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739, 742 (1987). The purpose behind the Miranda decision is to prevent government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment. Arizona v. Mauro, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 1936, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987). Once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made available, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Arizona v. Mauro, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 1934; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Absent interrogation, no infringement of such rights occurs. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 486, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Interrogation reflects a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The definition of interrogation includes only words or actions by police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating [254]*254response. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690.
In the instant case, no interrogation took place. Appellant was being held in Lovell in a room with a police officer only until transportation to the Big Horn County jail could be provided. The place at which this killing occurred is a rural, sparsely populated area having limited numbers of law enforcement personnel. The police officer having custody of appellant had no reason to suspect that she would make incriminating statements.
Appellant also contends her statements were involuntary because she was intoxicated. A statement that is not the product of interrogation or compulsion attributable to authorities or some other improper action, is voluntary and admissible. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 817 (1961). Apparently, appellant here contends the statement was the product of compulsion resulting from the existing circumstances. We question the efficacy of that contention, but nevertheless respond to the claim. Although tests showed appellant’s blood alcohol percentage to be high, testimony at trial effectively rebutted any presumption that she was intoxicated. Two law enforcement officers noticed no signs of intoxication, and expert testimony at the trial indicated that a heavy drinker (as appellant) can function normally even with a high blood alcohol percentage. There was no factor other than the use of alcohol that would support a claim that the statement volunteered by appellant was involuntary. In Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127, 128 (1980), the defendant was interrogated by police and made a statement which he later sought to have suppressed because he
“was seventeen years of age, intoxicated, was suffering from physical injuries incurred from a severe beating, was emotionally overwrought and had been deprived of the counsel of his mother.”
We affirmed the trial court’s finding that the statement was voluntary, stating:
“An examination of the cases cited by appellant in support of his argument reflects the circumstances in each are far more aggravated and severe than those in this case. The trial court relied upon the factual situation as presented to it by the evidence, and it considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Such evidence as gauged against such standard supports the findings of the trial court.” 618 P.2d at 130.
Clearly, the circumstances here were not as aggravated as in any of the cases cited in Mayer v. State, supra. The evidence before the court supports the conclusion that the statement was voluntary. There was no error in its admission.
VOIR DIRE
During voir dire, appellant’s attorney questioned juror Creech concerning self-defense:
“MR. SPERRY: * * * Suppose that the Court gave you an instruction relating to self defense and it said in essence that an attack which appeared to a reasonable person to threaten serious bodily harm to that person might under certain circumstances that the Court would outline, authorize the use of deadly force or the necessary force to repel that threatened injury, that is, to serious bodily harm not just death to the defender. How do you feel about that, Mr. Creech? Could you abide by that Court instruction or would it put a little more burden on the defendant?
“JUROR CREECH: That’s a hard question to answer. I would have to use my own feelings regardless of what I was told.
“MR. SPERRY: And, of course, you have told us here, Mr. Creech, haven’t you, that you feel that force, deadly force with a weapon, should be used only when the life is threatened; right?
“JUROR CREECH: Right.
“MR. SPERRY: Are you telling us then if the Court instructs you that self defense comes into play and is an effective defense for the defendant in this action, even if only serious bodily harm is threatened, that you would have a problem obeying that instruction of the Court?
“JUROR CREECH: Yes. I think so.
[255]*255“MR. SPERRY: Well, Your Honor, I would ask to excuse Mr. Creech.
“THE COURT: Mr. Creech, you don’t have that option. You have to follow what the Court gives you. The Court gives you the law of the case as it exists in the State of Wyoming and has been developed and handed down from the English Court. I don’t have it. If the Supreme Court says to me, jump over the Bench, I have to jump over the Bench. You are in the same position. Does that change your opinion?
“JUROR CREECH: I still think I would have to give it a lot of thought on my own.
“THE COURT: I think Mr. Sperry, what you are getting into is an area we can’t determine. If what you heard during the trial fits what the Court gives you that is the jury’s instruction.
“I don’t think that’s a proper challenge for cause. I don’t think Mr. Creech has said he is going to ignore the Court and become sole unto himself as the Judge and jury in this case, and you are also giving him a hypothetical which may not occur which we wouldn’t know until we get all the evidence just exactly what instructions the Court will give.
“Therefore, voir dire on the instruction at this time is not a proper method, and I know and I will explain this to the jury that both counsel in the case have a fairly accurate idea of what they are going to produce before you, but trials take funny turns, not everything that the attorney thinks he will present to you always happens.
“I think we are premature at this time.”
Mr. Sperry then resumed voir dire by questioning a different prospective juror on another area of self-defense.
The purpose of voir dire is to inquire of the prospective jurors as to their prejudices and biases which would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 111 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982). In voir dire examination, counsel shall not instruct the jury on the law or argue the case. Rule 701(d)(4), Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming. The impartiality of the jurors is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court upon the basis of proper questioning. Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1000 (1984). Deference is afforded to the trial court in determining the permissible bounds of voir dire examination. Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1986).
By focusing on one aspect of self-defense, appellant’s attorney in the instant case sought, through voir dire, to argue his case. The attorney’s questions did not give the juror a complete statement of law, only a part of the law taken out of context.3 The trial court could not, in this circumstance, decide whether a challenge for cause should be granted. The trial court properly held the challenge for cause premature. Appellant could have inquired further of possible bias or prejudice with respect to self-defense without reference to instructions or law. This approach would be preferable and more likely to develop information useful in exercising challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. Appellant chose not to interrogate juror Creech further. There was no error in voir dire.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant’s proffered instruction F reads:
“One who has reasonable grounds to believe that another will attack her, and that the anticipated attack will be of such a character as to endanger her life or [256]*256limb, or to cause her serious bodily ham, has a right to arm herself for the purpose of resisting such attack.
“If the defendant armed herself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that fact alone does not make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of the right to self-defense.”
The trial court refused this instruction because it felt the first paragraph had no pertinence to the case and other instructions covered the information presented in the second paragraph. The court also noted that appellant’s attorney was unable to present any authority stating the proposition presented as law.
If an offered instruction is sufficient to apprise the court of the defendant’s theory of the case, that theory still must be supported by competent evidence. Best v. State, supra, 736 P.2d at 744. The defendant’s own testimony indicated that she purchased the gun to protect herself from the person making the telephone calls; and although she initially suspected the deceased of making these calls, her suspicions soon focused on another person. She did not purchase the gun because she believed Clyde would attack her; she was not armed for that reason. On the contrary, she, having no fear of Clyde, had invited him to move back to her trailer. There was no evidence to support the giving of that part of the instruction.
If part of an instruction is erroneous, a trial court may properly reject the entire instruction. Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 (1982). A trial court may refuse a proposed instruction if the principle embodied in the requested instruction is covered by other instructions. Summers v. State, supra, 725 P.2d at 1044; Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935, 938 (1982). Because the first part of the instruction was erroneous, the trial court could have refused the entire instruction on that ground alone. However, the trial court found the second part redundant. Instructions 27, 28, 30 and 31 adequately covered the law of self-defense. Thus, the court properly refused both paragraphs of the proffered instruction.
Affirmed.
THOMAS and MACY, JJ., filed separate specially concurring opinions.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.