Griffin v. State

72 So. 474, 72 Fla. 79
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJuly 8, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 72 So. 474 (Griffin v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. State, 72 So. 474, 72 Fla. 79 (Fla. 1916).

Opinion

Shackleford, J.

—J. C. Griffin was indicted for the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, filed a plea of not guilty, was tried before a jury, was convicted of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter and was sentenced to confinement in the State Prison at hard labor for a period of five years.

The first assignment is as follows: “The court erred in refusing to give Special Charge Number iy2 requested by defendant, to-wit: 'Under the law of this State whoever through culpable negligence or a reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts any personal injury or injuries upon another not resulting in death is guilty of assault through culpable negligence.’ ”

The second assignment, which is argued together with the first, is as follows: “The court erred in refusing to give Special Charge Number 2,—to-wit: 'One of the lesser offenses covered by this indictment is assault through culpable negligence, the definition of which I have just charged you, and if you believe from the evidence that a personal injury was inflicted upon Fred Horne not resulting in death, by an assault committed by the defendant, but such personal injury was inflicted by the defendant through culpable negligence, or a reckless disregard for the safety of the said Fred Horne, or others, you should find him guilty of assault through culpable negligence.’ ”

[81]*81The indictment was unquestionably based upon Section 3230 of the General Statutes of 1906, Compiled Laws of 1914, which reads as follows: “Whoever commits an assault on another, with intent to commit any felony punishable with death or imprisonment for life, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding twenty years. An assault with intent to commit any other felony shall be punished to an extent not exceeding one-half the punishment which could have been inflicted had the crime been committed.”

The requested instructions were evidently predicated upon Section 3229 of the General Statutes of 1906, Compiled Laws of 1914, which originally formed Chapter 5212 of the Laws of Florida, (Acts of 1903, page 192) and is as follows: “Whoever through culpable negligence, or a reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts any personal injury or injuries upon another, not resulting in death, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”

It will be observed that the crime set forth in Section 3230 is a felony, while the crime denounced in Section 3229 is a misdemeanor. Undoubtedly the crime of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter is included within an indictment for the crime of an assault with intent to commit murder, with which crime the defendant was charged. We have several times expressly so held. See Williams v. State, 41 Fla. 295, 26 South. Rep. 184, and Bryan v. State, 45 Fla. 8, 34 South. Rep. 243. We would also refer to Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 South. Rep. 380, and Feagle v State, 55 Fla. 13, 46 South. Rep. 182. We have also held that “A man indicted for assault with intent to commit murder may, under such charge, be [82]*82convicted of an aggravated assault.” Pittman v. State, 25 Fla. 648, 6 South. Rep. 437. Also see Winburn v. State, 28 Fla. 339, 9 South, Rep. 694, and Freeman v. State, 50 Fla. 38, 39 South. Rep. 785. It may be true that the jury, under the indictment in the instant case, could have convicted the defendant of the crime set forth in Section 3229, which we have copied above, provided the evidence adduced so warranted. Even so, if the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict for the crime of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter, as found in the instant case, the refusal of the recjuested instructions would not constitute reversible error.

Very briefly stated, the evidence establishes that Fred Horne was driving a Ford car, belonging to Mr. Holmes Elmore in which Mr. Elmore was riding, on the night of the 14th of October from Sneads to Blountstown, when Fred Horne was struck by a ball fired from a pistol and seriously wounded, which pistol was discharged by the defendant, J. C. Griffin. At the time that he was struck by the ball Horne did not know who had fired the shot, and also testified as follows: “I had not had any difficulty with the defendant at all. At the time I was shot I was not trying to do anything to him at all; I didn’t see him; there was no reason that I know of for him to shoot me. This happened in Jackson County, Florida, about October 14th last.”

Cleve Lockey, a State witness, testified that on the night when the shooting took place he was walking with the defendant and before they got in the road an automobile passed and then proceeded to testify as follows: “and we went on and heard another one coming up the hill, and he said he believed he would shoot, and I said, ‘No, don’t shoot,’ and when it got close he got up on the bank and got between two little saplings and I passed on [83]*83by him a little piece and I stopped between a sapling and a haw bush, and just as the automobile got even I saw him feeling in his clothes, and I touched him on the arm and said ‘J. C. don’t do that,’ and just as it passed he got down in the road and shot. I was on the bank when he shot and I stepped down in the road and he made a remark : I said ‘Boy suppose you broke the one’s neck that is running it, you would have killed every one in there.’ I said T thought you shot straight up,’ and he said T shot right in behind the damned thing,’ and then we went on and I stopped at home and he went on to his house. The next day I saw you (Mr. Buford) and Mr. Tom Belser and Tom McKeown down there and showed you all where the shooting occurred. I did not have hold of Griffin, not when he shot; I was not in reach of him when he shot.”

On cross-examination, the witness testified: “We hadn’t stopped only when we heard the car coming he stopped. I don’t know exactly how far we were from the car when the pistol fired, about as far as from here to the further corner of the room. Q. When he pulled out that pistol and said, T believe I am going to shoot’ didn’t you grab at his arm and say, ‘Don’t shoot ?’ A. He didn’t say he would shoot then, he said that when he saw the car coming. When he pulled out his pistol I didn’t grab his arm or grab the pistol and say ‘Don’t shoot,’ I just touched his arm and said ‘Don’t shoot.’ I touched his arm along here (indicating between elbow and wrist) I touched his right arm; he had his gun in his right hand; I didn’t see him aim the gun right down the road like this (indicating on a level) I do not know as a matter of fact whether that the pistol hit something else before it hit the automobile or not; there were some trees there but they were not in the road; we were standing on the side of the [84]*84road among two saplings; that was not all the saplings there was on the road; there were some big oaks along side of the road; there was no house right there, just regular open pine woods. I don’t know as a matter of fact what direction that pistol was aimed when it actually fired. I couldn’t tell whether the pistol struck an oak or some obstruction and glanced and hit that automobile or not; I had no idea it hit anybody; I didn’t know whether he hit anybody or not until the next morning and he didn’t act like he hit anybody.”

The examination of the witness then proceeded as follows :

“Mr. Buford: I was up on the bank and he was down in the road. It is a graded road about 25 or 30 feet wide.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
72 So. 474, 72 Fla. 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-state-fla-1916.