Griffin v. Brand

90 S.E. 90, 18 Ga. App. 641, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1160
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 30, 1916
Docket7847
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 90 S.E. 90 (Griffin v. Brand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. Brand, 90 S.E. 90, 18 Ga. App. 641, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1916).

Opinion

Wade, C. J.,

concurring specially. In my opinion, the general scheme of our law contemplates that the review of all final judgments rendered by a judge of the superior court shall he by hill of exceptions; and I therefore question the soundness of the rulings which permit such a judgment to be reviewed otherwise — as would result where an extraordinary motion for a new trial has been entertained and overruled by a judge who thereafter declines to certify to a bill of exceptions complaining of his ruling in refusing the motion, where upon application for mandamus to compel the certification of the bill of exceptions the reviewing court examines into the merits of the case as presented in the petition and determines the propriety of such refusal by passing upon the motion [643]*643itself and the legal correctness of the final judgment denying the same. Of course, where the judge declines to entertain an extraordinary motion for a new trial which is entirely without merit, the Supreme Court or this court will not by mandamus compel him to certify a bill of exceptions assigning error upon such refusal (Harris v. Roan, 119 Ga. 379; White v. Butt, 102 Ga. 552; Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Reid, 6 Ga. App. 18); but where he does in fact entertain the motion and hears and determines the same and renders final judgment against the movant, in my opinion a mandamus nisi should be granted by the reviewing court to compel the judge to certify a bill of exceptions (notwithstanding it may be a second bill of exceptions), without any investigation by the reviewing court as to the errors assigned, unless it appears beyond question that the bill of exceptions, if signed, would be a mere nullity, or would be so defective as to necessitate a dismissal of the writ of error in ease it should be certified. Sistrunk v. Pendleton, 129 Ga. 255 (1).

Apparently, however, the right of the reviewing court to inquire into the merits of an extraordinary motion for a new trial, where such a motion has been entertained by the trial judge and overruled, and application is made for a mandamus to compel such judge to certify a bill of exceptions complaining of his final judgment on the motion for a new trial, was clearly recognized in the eases of Malone v. Hopkins, 49 Ga. 221, and Kelley v. Hall, 50 Ga. 636; and since this court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court as precedents, and there is no direct ruling to the contrary, I am constrained to concur in the judgment refusing a mandamus, as I agree with the majority of the court that the motion for a new trial is without merit.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Grant v. State
282 S.E.2d 668 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1981)
Jackson v. State
50 Ga. App. 243 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1934)
Mills v. Pomeroy
42 Ga. App. 392 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1930)
Henderson v. Maddox
149 S.E. 59 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1929)
Boatright v. Speer
120 S.E. 132 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1923)
Cox v. State
91 S.E. 422 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 S.E. 90, 18 Ga. App. 641, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-brand-gactapp-1916.