Greyfield Resources, Inc. v. Drummer (In Re Drummer)

457 B.R. 912, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, 2011 WL 3563189
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedAugust 5, 2011
Docket19-51752
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 457 B.R. 912 (Greyfield Resources, Inc. v. Drummer (In Re Drummer)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greyfield Resources, Inc. v. Drummer (In Re Drummer), 457 B.R. 912, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, 2011 WL 3563189 (Ga. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER

JAMES R. SACCA, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Movant’s Motion for Relief from Stay [Doc. No. 11] (the “Motion”) to proceed with the foreclosure of the equity of redemption with respect to Debtor’s residence located at 4690 Kent Road, NW, College Park, Fulton County, GA, 30331 (the “Property”), title to which Movant acquired at a tax sale on February 2, 2010. The matter came on for hearing on April 21, 2011. The parties stipulated the facts and certain exhibits and the matter was taken under advisement. In addition to the Motion, stipulations, exhibits and arguments of counsel, the Court has considered Debtor’s “Brief in Response to Court’s Direction” [Doc. No. 27], the Mov-ant’s “Brief in Support of Motion for Relief from Stay” [Doc. No. 28] and all other matters of record.

In the Motion, the Movant seeks relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to complete the statutory proceeding under Georgia law to foreclose the equity of redemption in connection with a tax sale of the Property pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-40 to -48 (the “Barment Statutes”). Accordingly, the Court must determine the parties’ respective interests in the Property; whether, or under what circumstances, the Property may be redeemed; and whether the parties have m'et their respective burdens under § 362(d).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Debtor filed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on February 18, 2011. Movant is the holder of a tax deed (the “Deed”) on the Property from the Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia dated February 2, 2010 and recorded on April 8, 2010. Hr’g Ex. 3. The Deed was acquired by Movant at a Sheriffs tax sale (the “Sale”) after it successfully purchased the Property, having bid the amount of $11,000. The tax sale of the Property was based upon a fien facias for unpaid state and county taxes for tax year 2005 in the principal amount of $948.07. Hr’g Ex. 2. Debtor’s “Schedule A-Real Property” lists the Property as an asset in which the Debtor *915 asserts she has a fee simple interest with a value of $55,000. [Docket No. 17]. On her “Schedule D-Creditors Holding Secured Claims,” she has listed “HFC” as the holder of a mortgage on the Property in the amount $74,000. 1 Id. Movant is listed by Debtor on her “Schedule E-Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims,” with a claim of $15,000. Id. Debtor’s Amended Chapter 13 Plan [Doc. No. 19] (the “Plan”) provides for Movant to receive payment of $15,000 over a period of 36 months as a priority tax claimant. The hearing on the confirmation of Debtor’s Plan is scheduled for August 25, 2011.

On February 21, 2011, three days after Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition, the Movant’s “Notice of Foreclosure of Equity of Redemption” (the “Barment Notice”) was served by tacking a copy on the front door of the Property. Hr’g Ex. 1. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-45 2 and -46, 3 the *916 Barment Notice indicated that the right to redeem the Property will be forever barred unless the redemption price was paid on or before April 2, 2011.

Movant filed the Motion on March 22, 2011 in which Movant alleges that, inter alia, the Movant is the owner of the Property rather than merely being the holder of a secured or priority claim, that the price to redeem the Property at the time of the filing of the Motion was approximately $13,200, that the Debtor’s only interest in the Property is her equity of redemption and that the automatic stay should be terminated to permit Movant to protect its interest in the Property as the owner by permitting it to foreclose the equity of redemption as set forth in the Barment Notice pursuant to the Barment Statutes.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The Parties’ Respective Interests in the Property

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), upon the filing of a voluntary petition by a debtor, an estate is created which is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” at that time. State law controls whether or to what extent a debtor has a legal or equitable interest in property at the commencement of a bankruptcy case. See Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979).

The Barment Statutes are the applicable Georgia law to determine the Debtor’s interest in the Property. The Barment Statutes provide that when real property is sold for the collection of delinquent taxes, any person having any right, title or interest in or lien upon the property has a right to redeem the property by paying the redemption price up until the holder of the tax deed forecloses on that right. See O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48. 4 The *917 holder of a tax deed cannot commence the foreclosure process set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-45 and -46 until after the passing of 12 months time from the date of the tax sale. Pursuant to the Barment Statutes, if the redemption price is not timely paid, any person who could redeem the property is forever barred from doing so and fee simple title to the property is vested in the holder of the tax deed upon the earlier of either: (a) the completion of the foreclosure process under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-45 and -46 5 or (b) the passage of four years from the recordation of the tax deed if the holder of the tax deed does not commence and complete the foreclosure process under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-45 and -46 within said four-year period. See O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-40 to -48. Accordingly, until such time as the right to redeem is terminated pursuant to the Barment Statutes, the tax deed vests the purchaser with an inchoate or defeasible interest in the property, subject to the right of redemption, but it does not vest the purchaser with the immediate and exclusive right to possession. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., LLC., 277 Ga. 41, 43, 586 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2003); BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC., 285 Ga. 5, 7, 673 S.E.2d 205, 207 (2009).

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Bluebook (online)
457 B.R. 912, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, 2011 WL 3563189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greyfield-resources-inc-v-drummer-in-re-drummer-ganb-2011.