Gregory A. Jones v. Nancy Marthakis

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 26, 2026
Docket3:24-cv-00231
StatusUnknown

This text of Gregory A. Jones v. Nancy Marthakis (Gregory A. Jones v. Nancy Marthakis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gregory A. Jones v. Nancy Marthakis, (N.D. Ind. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

GREGORY A. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-231-TLS

NANCY MARTHAKIS,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Gregory A. Jones, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case “against Dr. Nancy Marthakis in her individual capacity for money damages for denying him adequate medical care for a painful skin condition and prescribing him a medication that caused liver damage in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 11 at 3. Dr. Marthakis filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 31. Jones filed a response, and Dr. Marthakis filed a reply. ECF 36, 37, 38. Dr. Marthakis’ summary judgment motion is now fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). However, a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). “[I]nferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir.

2009). Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th

Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has explained: [M]edical professionals are not required to provide proper medical treatment to prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment that reflects professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one proper way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the field. A medical professional’s treatment decisions will be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances. Id. at 697–98. Negligence, incompetence, or even medical malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference. Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, a prisoner is not entitled to demand specific care, nor is he entitled to the “best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Where the defendant has provided some level of care for a prisoner’s medical condition, in order to establish deliberate indifference the prisoner must show that “the defendants’ responses to [his condition] were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere disagreement with medical professionals about the appropriate treatment does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003).

Dr. Marthakis provides Jones’ medical records and her own affidavit, which show the following facts: Throughout his entire incarceration in the Indiana Department of Correction, Jones has had a diagnosis for plaque psoriasis. ECF 31-1 at 3. Plaque psoriasis is a chronic autoimmune disease that causes skin cells to reproduce very fast, resulting in thick, scaly patches on the skin called psoriasis. Id. There is no cure for plaque psoriasis, and the condition will have flare-ups and can be in remission at times. Id. There are a variety of medications that can be used to control the symptoms of plaque psoriasis, including coal tar shampoo, corticosteroids, injectable medications, oral medications, and topical creams. Id. The medications that treat plaque psoriasis can be hard on the patient’s liver, so regular lab work is necessary to monitor

liver functioning. Id. Liver enzymes (AST and ALT) tell doctors how a patient’s liver is functioning. Id. The liver detoxifies most medication from the body, so when the liver is taxed by a medication, the proper treatment is to withhold that medication to allow the liver time to recover. Id. Jones was enrolled in Indiana State Prison’s (ISP) Chronic Care Clinic program for his plaque psoriasis, meaning he had regularly scheduled appointments with medical staff to manage his condition. ECF 31-1 at 2–3. The Chronic Care Clinic program allows medical staff to regularly monitor the patient’s chronic condition, order any needed lab work, and renew and prescribe medications for that condition. Id. Jones was primarily treated at ISP by nurse practitioners rather than by Dr. Marthakis. Id. at 2. Dr. Marthakis does not supervise or oversee the nurse practitioners, as they practice as independent medical providers and make their own independent decisions on patient care based on their medical judgment. Id. Dr. Marthakis is available when the nurse practitioners need input regarding a patient. Id. On January 18, 2022, Jones saw Nurse Practitioner (NP) Diane Thews in the Chronic

Care Clinic and she continued him on Methotrexate, folic acid, and a topic steroid cream for his plaque psoriasis. ECF 31-1 at 3; ECF 31-2 at 3–6. Methotrexate is an immunosuppressant that treats a variety of autoimmune disorders and was administered to Jones via weekly injections. Id. On March 8, 2022, Jones saw NP Thews again in the Chronic Care Clinic and she continued him on Methotrexate and folic acid and ordered lab work. ECF 31-1 at 4; ECF 31-2 at 15–18. On March 23, 2022, Jones saw NP Todd Wolford, who noted Jones had little success from the Methotrexate treatment and had psoriasis on his upper and lower extremities, torso, and back.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Ogden v. Atterholt
606 F.3d 355 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Harry Rodriguez v. Kenneth R. Briley
403 F.3d 952 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Kuhn v. Goodlow
678 F.3d 552 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Hayes v. Snyder
546 F.3d 516 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Jackson v. Kotter
541 F.3d 688 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Trade Finance Partners, LLC v. AAR CORP.
573 F.3d 401 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Michael Thomas v. Aline Martija
991 F.3d 763 (Seventh Circuit, 2021)
Sommerfield v. City of Chicago
863 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Gregory A. Jones v. Nancy Marthakis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gregory-a-jones-v-nancy-marthakis-innd-2026.