Greene v. Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services

733 N.W.2d 490, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 84, 2007 WL 1746878

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: June 19, 2007
• Docket: A06-804
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

*

Appellant Buddie Green is a member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (MCT), which provides employment service to its members pursuant to an agreement, permitted by statute, in which MCT and the State of Minnesota arrange for services to recipients under The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), a public assistance plan for low-income families with children. Appellant contends that without her freedom for access to an Aitkin County employment service, serving non-members of MCT, she is denied equal protection of the laws. Because the channeling of appellant’s right of access to her tribal service occurs as part of her tribe’s contractual arrangement for the benefit of its members, it is political rather than racial in nature, and appellant fails to show a loss of her constitutional rights. We affirm, as did the district court, the commissioner’s decision upholding a county-imposed, partial suspension of appellant’s MFIP benefits based on her failure to participate in employment services.

FACTS

This appeal stems from an amended order of the Commissioner of Human Services upholding a sanction imposed by Aitkin County that partially suspended the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) benefits received by appellant Buddie Greene. The MFIP, codified in chapter 256J of the Minnesota statutes, is a state welfare reform program for low-income families with children. The program helps families by providing cash and food assistance. Pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 256J.09, subd. 1 (2006), an individual may seek assistance from the MFIP by applying for benefits through the county social service agency in the county where the person lives. After eligibility is established, Minn.Stat. § 256J.46, subd. 1 (2006), mandates that MFIP program participants comply with ongoing program requirements, one of them calling for participation in employment and training services. Program participants who fail to comply with employment services may be sanctioned and lose MFIP benefits under Minn.Stat. § 256J.46, subd. 1, absent a showing of good cause under section 256J.57.

Minn.Stat. § 256J.645 (2006), provides the commissioner with the authority to enter into agreements with federally recognized Indian tribes whereby the tribe provides MFIP employment services to members of the tribe. Subdivision 3 of this statute dictates that Indian tribes opting to enter into such an agreement with the State of Minnesota directly receive state funding at the same levels and under the same conditions as counties that provide those services. Subdivision 4 provides that Indian tribe members “receiving MFIP benefits and residing in the service areas of an Indian tribe operating employment services under an agreement with the commissioner must be referred by county agencies in the service area to the Indian tribe for employment services.”

The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (MCT) and the commissioner entered into an agreement for fiscal year 2004/2005, wherein the MCT agreed to provide MFIP employment services for specific public assistance recipients who are of Indian descent. The language of the agreement is consistent with the statutory language set forth in chapter 256J; it provides in relevant part that the tribe “shall provide” MFIP employment services to those who are eligible for such services, receive MFIP benefits, reside within the “Tribal program area,” and

[t]he person is enrolled or eligible for enrollment in the [MCT]. The [MCT] consists of six reservations: Bois Forte, Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, White Earth, Leech Lake, and Mille Lacs Reservations. ...

No provision in the agreement allows the MCT to refer eligible members to the county social service agency for the MFIP employment services.

The service delivery area for the MCT includes Aitkin County, and the service provider locations are Cass Lake, Duluth, Virginia, Cloquet, and Bemidji. Aitkin County residents are located from 70 to 100 miles from the nearest service center operated by the tribe, which appears to be the Cloquet office. Appellant alludes to this distance information, but she rests her claim solely on her freedom of choice, not an assertion of any disadvantage in dealing with the tribal service. Notably, the tribal office offers services to members located in Aitkin County, or any place distant from its primary office, by designating agents in those places to meet with members to deliver agency services.

At the time this dispute arose, appellant received MFIP benefits for herself and a minor child. On July 20, 2004, Aitkin County referred appellant to the MCT for employment services because appellant is an enrolled member of the MCT, was eligible to participate in the MFIP, and resided within the tribal MFIP service delivery area of Aitkin County. Appellant subsequently asked the MCT for a referral to a county employment service provider. The MCT declined the request, stating that it “is mandated to provide you service and cannot refer you elsewhere.”

In December 2004, the MCT learned that appellant was non-compliant with employment requirements and, therefore, requested that Aitkin County impose a sanction under which appellant’s MFIP benefits would be partially suspended. Appellant challenged the sanction and a hearing was held on the matter. At the hearing, appellant admitted that she did not attend the required employment service overview and that she did not develop an employment plan with the MCT. Appellant also failed to articulate any explanation that might qualify for good cause to be excused from the requirements of Minnesota Statutes chapter 256J.

On March 31, 2005, the appeals referee recommended that appellant be allowed to access county employment services, but the commissioner’s delegee notified the parties that the commissioner intended to adopt an order differing from the referee’s recommendation. After soliciting and receiving comments from appellant and Ait-kin County on a proposed amended order, the commissioner upheld the sanction, finding that “[a] person in appellant’s circumstances must get employment services through the [MCT] even though Aitkin County pays her cash benefits under the [MFIP], Appellant refused without good cause to do so, and the county agency imposed a reduction in cash payments as a sanction.”

Appellant sought relief in the district court, arguing inter alia, that Minn.Stat. § 256J.645 violated her right to equal protection. The district court subsequently affirmed the sanctioning of appellant’s MFIP benefits, concluding that the statute met the equal protection requirements under the state and federal constitutions.

ISSUE

Is a public law for the benefit of a tribe unconstitutional because its members are not given the freedom to refuse an included tribal service and participate instead in a non-tribal service?

ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Granville v. Minneapolis Sch. Dist., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 716 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.App.2006), review granted (Minn. Sept. 19, 2006). Minnesota statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the power to declare a statute unconstitutional is “exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989). The party challenging the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision. Id.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. “The guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires that the state treat all similarly situated persons alike.” State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 568 (Minn.1997). “An essential element of an equal protection claim is that the persons claiming disparate treatment must be similarly situated to those to whom they compare themselves.” St. Cloud Police Relief Ass’n v. City of St. Cloud, 555 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Jan. 7, 1997).

Minn.Stat. § 256J.645, subd. 4, provides that “Indian tribal members receiving MFIP benefits and residing in the service area of an Indian tribe operating employment services under an agreement with the commissioner must be referred by county agencies in the service area to the Indian tribe for employment services.” As appellant asserts, even if section 256J.645, standing alone, survives an equal protection claim, the statute must be read together with the state’s contract with the MCT. To support her claim, appellant points to the statutory language mandating that tribal members receiving MFIP benefits must be “referred” to the Indian tribe for employment services. See Minn. Stat. § 256J.645, subd. 4. The contract with the MCT provides that once individuals are referred to the tribe, the individual must use employment services provided by the tribe. Appellant asserts that non-Indians and members of other tribes are able to receive employment services through a county agency, while she is ineligible to receive these services. Thus, appellant argues that Minn.Stat. § 256J.645, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

There is no dispute that identified members of the MCT are treated differently under the statute; the dispute concerns the level of scrutiny to be applied. See Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 738 (Minn.2003) (stating that to determine whether a statute violates equal protection, this court first examines “whether the challenged classification must satisfy strict scrutiny or merely the rational basis standard.”). This court applies strict scrutiny to legislatively created classifications in two situations: (1) when they impermissibly limit a fundamental right; or (2) when they involve a suspect classification. Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Minn.App.1993) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1993).¹ “Strict scrutiny requires the classifications to be necessary or narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental purpose.” Id. When the classifications do not involve a suspect class or infringe upon a fundamental right, the legislation is subject to review under the rational basis standard. See id. Under this standard, if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, it does not violate the equal protection clause. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn.1986).

We agree with respondent that the issue is controlled by Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). In Mancari, non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) brought a class action challenging employment preference for qualified Indians in the BIA provided by the Indian Reorganization Act. 417 U.S. at 538-39, 94 S.Ct. at 2477. The Supreme Court articulated that preferences for American Indians are not racial but political when the preferences apply to members of federally recognized tribes. Id. at 553 n. 24, 94 S.Ct. at 2484 n. 24. Thus, the Court held that “as long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.” Id. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2485.

This court in Krueth followed the reasoning set forth in Mancari. In Krueth, non-Indian tenured teachers appealed from a decision of the school district placing them on unrequested leave of absence while less senior American Indian teachers were retained pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 126.501 (1990) (the American Indian Education Act). 496 N.W.2d at 831-32. In addressing the non-Indian tenured teachers’ equal protection claim, this court noted that Mancari found the American Indian classifications were not racial but political since they were limited to members of federally recognized tribes. Id. at 837. This court further noted that the “classification must be limited to members of federally recognized tribes, not just people of some American Indian ancestry, otherwise strict scrutiny would apply to limit state racial affirmative action preference.” Id. But because the classification of federally recognized tribes is political rather than racial, the court determined that a rational basis test should be applied. Id.

Here, appellant’s position is narrowly stated; that Mancan and Krueth are controlling law on the question of separate tribal-member benefits, but that it is quite different to limit the service agency choices of the members. This distinction is supported neither by any cited authority nor by any reason. The public has determined a benefit for the MCT, a tribal entity, in every respect in accord with its wishes, and this classification of administrative service programs does not become racial rather than political when member access is channeled to the tribal service program rather than the program provided for non-members. Although appellant’s argument that the arrangement here does more harm than good is significant, we note that appellant asserts no special harm and no lack of tribal benefit. Thus, in accordance with Mancan and Krueth, we conclude that strict scrutiny is not required.

Under a rational basis standard of review, the statute passes constitutional muster. The statutory scheme was enacted to provide the MCT with a greater responsibility for self-government. This legislation enables federally recognized Indian tribes that so choose to contract with the commissioner, to develop and to provide employment services programs that fulfill the MFIP requirements for their tribal members who receive MFIP benefits. Thus, the statute allows tribes that seek such tribal responsibility to assume ongoing interactions with their own members to ensure that tribal members receive employment services in the best and most effective way possible. This supports the legitimate state interest of protecting and promoting tribal sovereignty. Minn.Stat. § 256J.645 does not violate the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.

Appellant also contends that Minn.Stat. § 256J.645, violates the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution. This provision provides in relevant part that “[n]o member of this state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Minn. Const, art. I, § 2. Like the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, Article I, section 2 of the Minnesota Constitution begins with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only “invidious discrimination” is deemed constitutionally offensive. Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 769 (Minn.1986) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963)). But the Minnesota Constitution can be interpreted “to afford greater protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal constitution.” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn.2005).

Appellant argues that because Minnesota does not have the federal government’s unique obligation toward federally recognized Indian tribes, Minn.Stat. § 256J.645 violates the State of Minnesota’s equal protection clause by disparately treating members of the MCT. To support her claim, appellant relies on Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416 (Alaska 2003). In that case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a borough’s Native American hiring preference violated the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection because the borough lacked a legitimate governmental interests to enact a hiring preference favoring one class of citizens at the expense of others. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 427-28. But Malabed concerned a borough’s ordinance. In contrast, the challenged law here concerns state law. In declaring the borough’s ordinance unconstitutional, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that “we [do not] suggest that all state or local legislation pertaining to Alaska Natives or tribal governments should be assumed to establish suspect classifications presumptively barred by equal protection.” Id. at 426. The court noted that “[t]o the contrary, we think that the state has considerable latitude in dealing with recognized tribes as to matters of intersecting governmental concern when the state’s actions rationally promote legitimate mutual governmental or proprietary interest.” Id. at 427 n. 51.

Here, the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 256J.645 is to further the MCT’s ability to govern its members and provide tribal members with appropriate services. Although it is the federal government that has a “unique” obligation to American Indians, this “unique obligation,” characterized as the “trust doctrine,” also applies to state action. See Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 836. This court stated that “[s]tate action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under the trust doctrine and therefore be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights statutes.” Id. (quoting St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F.Supp. 1408, 1412 (D.Minn.1983)). Because the statutory purpose of Minn.Stat. § 256J.645 is to further the MCT’s self-governance of tribal members for the benefit of its members, the classifications are political rather than race based, a rational basis standard is applicable, and no different result from the federal constitution is mandated by our state constitution.

DECISION

Because the classifications under Minn. Stat. § 256J.645, subd. 4, are political rather than racial, a rational basis standard of review is applicable. The statute passes constitutional muster by supporting the legitimate state interest of protecting and promoting tribal sovereignty. Minn.Stat. § 256J.645, subd. 4, does not violate the equal protection clause of the federal or state constitutions.

Affirmed.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.

1 . We note that appellant makes no assertion that her “freedom of choice” argument implicates a fundamental right. Rather, appellant focuses her argument on the statute's disparate treatment of members of the MCT.