Greene v. CDCR

Opinion

----oo0oo---- WENDY GREENE, No. 2:23-cv-00082 WBS DMC Plaintiff, v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE CORRECTIONS AND PLEADINGS KNEDLER, J. FLORES, R. CHANDLER, M. ZARATE, M. WOODRUFF, E. HALL, HAUSER, K. OLIVER, and DOES 1- 35, Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Wendy Greene brought this action alleging failure to protect, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and deprivation of familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and negligence and wrongful death under California law. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) This action concerns the death of plaintiff’s son, Michael Hastey, who was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison and was killed by two other inmates on February 18, 2022. (See id. ¶¶ 1-2.) Defendants -- the California Department of Corrections (“CDCR”) and various prison officials -- now move for partial judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s wrongful death and negligence causes of action on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the California Government Claims Act. (Docket No. 31.) I. Judicial Notice Though a court generally may not consider material outside the complaint on a motion to dismiss, the court may look beyond the pleadings at “matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of plaintiff’s government claim form filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 900 et seq. (See Docket No. 31 at 13-14 (“Claim Form”).) Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of the document provided by defendant and does not object to the court taking judicial notice of the claim form. (See Docket No. 38 at 4.) The court will therefore grant defendants’ request for judicial notice. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1223 (9th Cir. 2004) (a court “may take judicial notice of a record of a state agency not subject to reasonable dispute”). II. California Government Claims Act The California Government Claims Act requires presentation of a claim as a condition precedent to maintaining any cause of action seeking damages against a public entity. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 905; City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). “Compliance with the claims statutes is mandatory and failure to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action,” see City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 454 (internal citations omitted), including for actions asserting tort claims, see Donohue v. State, 178 Cal. App. 3d 795, 797 (2d Dist. 1986). To sufficiently present a claim, the claimant must include “[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted,” and “[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim.” Cal. Gov’t. Code § 910. The claim must “provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 455. In Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Insurance Authority, 34 Cal. 4th 441 (2004), the California Supreme Court thoroughly explained the standards a claim must meet to satisfy the Government Claims Act. The Court stated that a claim “need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading” or “specify each particular act or omission later proven to have caused the injury,” but rather “need only fairly describe what the entity is alleged to have done.” Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). “As the purpose of the claim is to give the government entity notice sufficient for it to investigate and evaluate the claim, not to eliminate meritorious actions, the claims statute should not be applied to snare the unwary where its purpose has been satisfied.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “A complaint’s fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given in the claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an entirely different set of facts.” Id. at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only where there has been a complete shift in allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by different persons than those described in the claim, have courts generally found the complaint barred.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly reflects the facts pled in the complaint.” Id. Further, the Court explained that because additional “theories [of liability] do not represent additional causes of action,” they “need not be separately presented” in a claim to satisfy the Government Claims Act. Id. The court finds that plaintiff’s claim form in this case adequately provides a general description of the injury alleged and gives sufficient notice of defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct. The claim includes the date and location of the incident that led to Mr. Hastey’s death, along with his name and CDCR number. (See Claim Form at 1.) The claim indicates that the claimant seeks damages for the “[p]re-death injuries and death of Michael Hastey” and describes the incident, stating: “Michael Hastey . . . was violently murdered by two armed inmates on the yard at High Desert State Prison.” (Id.) The claim indicates that CDCR officials were aware of Mr. Hastey’s “unique vulnerability” to harm by other inmates. (See id.) The claim alleges that CDCR officials “failed to safely house” Mr. Hastey. (Id.) It also alleges that Mr. Hastey’s death occurred “in full view of corrections officers” and that CDCR and its employees “failed to . . . adequately protect” him, indicating that CDCR officials were present at the time of the incident and failed to prevent his death. (See id.) The claim form closely tracks several of the allegations made in support of the wrongful death and negligence causes of action. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 29 (certain of the defendants were “correctional officials charged with intervening during the attack that claimed Michael’s life”); id. ¶¶ 86, 94 (“As Michael’s jailers, each of the Individual Correctional Defendants had an affirmative duty to protect Michael from reasonably foreseeable harm inflicted by third parties, including [the inmates who killed him].”).) Defendants argue that the additional facts and theories presented in the complaint were not fairly presented in the claim. Specifically, defendants point to the complaint’s allegations that correctional officials failed to act in a manner that would protect Michael by placing him at High Desert, where he was likely to be targeted due to his father being a local CDCR guard; failing to place him in protective custody given his vulnerability; failing to transfer him to a different facility where he would not be targeted; failing to search the other inmates for weapons before entering the yard where the incident occurred; failing to fire shots to intervene during the attack; and failing to summon or provide medical care following the attack. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3-10, 80, 88.)1 These details constitute merely additional theories of liability under plaintiff’s negligence and wrongful death causes of action, which also rely upon the allegations cited above that more closely mirror the content of the claim. (See Compl. ¶¶ 83- 97.) As a result, these details -- which do not present separate causes of action -- need not have been specifically expounded upon in the claim, and plaintiff is not precluded from asserting them now. See Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447; see also City of Stockton v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007) (“[t]he purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to 1 At oral argument, defense counsel also referenced a supposed allegation that defendants “disseminated” Mr. Hastey’s juvenile records. However, the court does not find that the complaint makes such an allegation. The complaint refers to the content of those records becoming known among High Desert officials and inmates, but does not accuse any entity or individual of disseminating that information and does not appear to directly premise liability on the spread of that information. (See Compl. ¶¶ 51-56.) adequately investigate”). Further, contrary to defendants’ arguments, the allegations of the complaint “are predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants” alleged in the claim form, see Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447 -- namely, the failure to prevent Mr. Hastey’s death resulting from the attack by other inmates that occurred on February 18, 2022. The claim form alleged that defendants failed to “safely house” Mr. Hastey despite his “unique vulnerability” to other inmates (see Claim Form at 1), which fairly reflects the complaint’s allegations that defendants placed Mr. Hastey at risk despite their knowledge of his vulnerability by housing him at High Desert, failing to place him in protective custody, and failing to transfer him to a different facility. The claim also alleged that correctional officers were present at the time of the attack yet “failed to . . . adequately protect” Mr. Hastey (see id.), which fairly reflects the complaint’s allegations that defendants failed to intervene during the attack and failed to summon medical care following the attack. Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the claim refers not merely to the isolated actions of the inmates in attacking Mr. Hastey, but also the broader context in which that attack occurred and caused Mr. Hastey’s death. It is reasonable to expect that the state, based on the information provided in the claim, would investigate the chain of events leading to the attack, correctional officials’ actions during the attack, and officials’ actions immediately following the attack. Indeed, is hard to imagine how the state could adequately investigate whether it was liable for Michael’s death without investigating those facts, which are inherently connected to both the incident itself and the notion that defendants were in some way at fault for Mr. Hastey’s death. Because the additional theories pled in plaintiff’s complaint “did not shift liability to other parties or premise liability on acts committed at different times or places,” the claim “fairly reflects the facts pled in the complaint.” See Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447-48. See also Blair v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226 (3d Dist. 1990) (where claim alleged that state negligently maintained highway surface by failing to sand it to prevent icing, it was permissible for complaint to assert that state failed to provide warning signs and a guardrail because both the claim and complaint “generally assert[ed] negligence in the construction and general maintenance of the highway”) (cited with approval in Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 448-49); White v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1505, 1511 (1st Dist. 1990) (where claim alleged that officer assaulted and battered plaintiff, it was permissible for complaint to assert claims for negligent hiring and intentional failure to train because there had not been any “shift in the fundamental facts about her injury”) (cited with approval in Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447). Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff’s claim satisfied the requirements of the California Government Claims Act. III. Statutory Immunity Generally, a California public entity “is not liable EE EE EI II EOE EI EES

for . . . an injury proximately caused by any prisoner .. . [or] [a]Jn injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6(a). The failure to summon medical care is an exception to this statutory immunity. See id. § 845.6. Defendants argue that CDCR is statutorily immune from suit under § 844.6(a). Only the negligence cause of action is brought against CDCR. (See Compl. at 17.) The negligence cause of action alleges failure to “promptly summon and/or procure life-saving medical care.” (See id. 7 87.) The negligence cause of action also expressly cites the statute establishing the exception to CDCR’s statutory immunity for causes of action alleging failure to summon medical care. (See id. at 17 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6).) Because the cause of action against CDCR asserts failure to summon medical care, CDCR is not statutorily immune from suit on that cause of action.* IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 31) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. . * ak. ah tle (LA. Dated: February 6, 2024 WILLIAMB.SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 2 To the extent defendants argue that CDCR is immune because plaintiff’s claim did not provide adequate notice of the failure to summon theory, this argument fails. As explained above, the court concludes that plaintiff’s claim form provided adequate notice of the content of the complaint, including the failure to summon medical care theory.