Green v. State

706 S.W.2d 653, 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1215
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 19, 1986
Docket351-85
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 706 S.W.2d 653 (Green v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. State, 706 S.W.2d 653, 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1215 (Tex. 1986).

Opinion

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appellant was convicted by a jury in Cause No. 15,074 of aggravated assault. On July 10, 1984, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections bat suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed appellant on probation for ten years. The trial court also ordered the judgment granting probation cumulated with appellant’s conviction in Cause No. 6975, wherein appellant was convicted of possession of marihuana and sentenced to eight years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. 1 The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Green v. State, No. 10-84-142-CR (Tex.App.—Waco 3/3/85). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the trial court could cumulate the judgment granting probation in Cause No. 15,704 with the prior sentence of confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections in Cause No. 6975. We find that it could not and will reverse the court of appeals.

Appellant, while watching an argument in the parking lot of a bar, struck Barney Blair in the face. Blair was hospitalized and eventually placed in a rest home as a result of extensive head injuries. After appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, the trial court, in an attempt to provide financial help for the victim’s wife, placed appellant on probation for ten years, included payment of $30,000 in restitution as a condition of probation, and cumulated the judgment granting probation with an eight year prison sentence that appellant was already serving in Cause No. 6975. 2

*655 The Waco Court of Appeals overruled appellant’s claim that the trial court “improperly cumulated” the judgment granting probation with the eight year prison sentence. The court of appeals held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Article 42.08, Y.A.C.C.P. (1979). 3

Appellant argues in his brief before this Court that Article 42.08, supra, only allows a trial court to cumulate sentences that include punishment by confinement in a prison or jail. He argues that an order granting probation is not punishment by confinement in a prison or jail; therefore, a judgment granting probation may not be cumulated with a prior prison or jail sentence. Appellant claims this is a case of first impression.

In its brief, the State responds that Article 42.08, supra, allows a trial court to cumulate a judgment granting probation, although a sentence was not imposed, so long as a sentence assessed confinement in a prison or jail, citing Ex parte Davis, 542 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

In Davis, supra, a petitioner was convicted for two offenses, and the trial court assessed punishment for each offense at ten years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections and ordered those sentences to run concurrently. The petitioner was also convicted of a third offense by the same trial court and sentenced to five years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. However, the trial court suspended the sentence and placed petitioner on probation. The trial court, in the order granting probation, ordered the probationary period to commence when the prison terms in the first two cases had been discharged, thus “stacking” the judgment granting probation onto the two earlier sentences.

We held that the cumulation order was not effective because the order was “found only in the separate order granting probation.” Id., at 118. We did not decide “whether a trial court can cumulate a judgment granting probation with prior sentences under our procedure where a proper cumulation order is found in the judgment....” Id.

Initially, we note that our decision in Davis, supra, does not control the outcome of the instant case. In the instant case, the cumulation order was placed in a single document that contained the judgment, the sentence, and the order granting probation. This multipurpose document does not suffer the malady found in Davis, supra. Therefore, we can now reach the issue left undecided in Davis, supra: whether a trial court may cumulate a judgment granting probation with a prison term from a preceding conviction so that the probationary period would not commence until the judgment and sentence in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate.

Under Article 42.08, supra, if a defendant has been convicted “in two or more cases” and the “punishment assessed” includes prison or jail time, a rational construction of the statute leads one to believe that a trial court must mandatorily pronounce sentence “as if there had been one conviction.” However, Article 42.08, supra, creates an exception to this requirement and affords the trial court the discretion to order the “punishment” in the “second and subsequent convictions” to begin *656 “when the judgment and sentence in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate” or to “run concurrently with the other case or cases.” Thus, Article 42.08, supra, effectively grants a trial court the discretion to cumulate the “punishment” in a case when there is a prior conviction imposing prison or jail time, and this Court has so held. Smith v. State, 575 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Article 42.08, supra, grants trial court “absolute discretion to cumulate sentences.”); Gordon v. State, 575 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing) (“The cumu-lation of sentences has been approved by this Court for eighty-two years.”) and cases cited therein. 4 In the instant case, the trial court chose to cumulate the judgment granting probation, obviously considering the judgment granting probation to be “punishment” within the meaning of Article 42.08, supra. Therefore, our examination of Article 42.08, supra, must focus upon the statutory meaning of “punishment.”

Although “punishment” is not specifically defined under Article 42.08, supra, the use of the term throughout the Code of Criminal Procedure, when compared with the use of the term “probation,” indicates that the Legislature has not intended for “probation” to be subject to cumulation under Article 42.08, supra. 5 For example, Article 42.01, § 1(10), V.A.C.C.P., states:

“In the event of conviction where any probated punishment is assessed [the judgment should reflect] that the imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation, setting forth the punishment assessed, the length of probation, and the probationary terms and conditions[.]”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
706 S.W.2d 653, 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-state-texcrimapp-1986.