Green v. Gerardo Cascella

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedAugust 1, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01819
StatusUnknown

This text of Green v. Gerardo Cascella (Green v. Gerardo Cascella) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. Gerardo Cascella, (D. Md. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ANDREW JAMES GREEN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: SAG-23-1819

NICOLA GERARDO CASCELLA, and GEETHA JAYARAM,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented plaintiff Andrew James Green filed the above referenced complaint against Nicola Gerardo Cascella and Geetha Jayaram, employees of Johns Hopkins Hospital, invoking this court’s federal question jurisdiction. ECF 1. Green seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF 2. Based on the information Green provides, he appears to be indigent. Green’s Motion is therefore granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing courts to allow indigent parties to proceed “without prepayment of fees”). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 instructs district courts that they “shall dismiss [a] case” filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002) (extending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 screening to non-prisoner pro se litigants). Because Green is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court must screen the complaint to determine if the case must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a pro se plaintiff must still carry “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Although a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, the facts alleged must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and require “more than labels and conclusions,” as “‘courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 561. Further, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, shall contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the relief sought . . . ” Moreover, each “allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d)(1). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Green states in support of his claim that on August 12, 2019, he was admitted to Johns Hopkins Hospital against his will because he was accused of waving a gun. ECF 1 at 6. He states that he was held in the hospital until September 18, 2019, because he refused to take their medicine. Id. Ultimately, Green took the medication which he claims “almost took over [his] body damaged [him] hard [he is] still to this day fighting this medicine off they wrongfully overdosed [him] with lithium and Risperdal. . . .” Id. Here,complaint, even construed liberally, cannot provide any basis for relief. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Because questions of subject matter jurisdiction concern the court’s power to hear the case, they must be resolved before the court can turn to the sufficiency

or merits of a claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible without exception.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil cases, with some exceptions that are not relevant here, in only two instances: (1) under federal question jurisdiction, where the case involves an issue of federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) under diversity jurisdiction, where the parties in the case are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Green invokes this court’s federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 4. He states as the

basis for federal question: “violation of my amendments and civil rights I was forced to be admitted in there and forced to take medicine.” Id. However, no federal question presents itself in the facts alleged. Further, at its core, a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is directed to unlawful conduct under color of law. See Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorney Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014). Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. provides, in part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . . Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Essential to sustaining an action under § 1983 are the presence of two elements.

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Related

Newsome v. EEOC
301 F.3d 227 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
Baker v. McCollan
443 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1979)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Albright v. Oliver
510 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
The Stouffer Corporation v. Donald E. Breckenridge
859 F.2d 75 (Eighth Circuit, 1988)
In Re Bulldog Trucking, Incorporated
147 F.3d 347 (Fourth Circuit, 1998)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
523 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office
767 F.3d 379 (Fourth Circuit, 2014)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Green v. Gerardo Cascella, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/green-v-gerardo-cascella-mdd-2023.