Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co.

673 A.2d 216, 1996 Me. LEXIS 66
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMarch 22, 1996
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 673 A.2d 216 (Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 673 A.2d 216, 1996 Me. LEXIS 66 (Me. 1996).

Opinion

ROBERTS, Justice.

Jacqueline Green appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.) in favor of defendants Cessna Aircraft Company and Maine Instrument Flight. On appeal Green argues that the court erred by assessing the weight and credibility of her experts’ opinions rather than determining that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether a defect in William Green’s airplane caused it to crash. We affirm the judgment.

This ease arises from the following substantially undisputed facts. Shortly after noon on July 14, 1990, William Green attempted to land his six-passenger Cessna seaplane on Togus Pond near Augusta. Two eyewitnesses stated that the plane circled and then began to land directly downwind and that it made a normal approach and landing. After the plane had taxied, the left float lifted slightly from the surface of the water causing the plane to tip to the right. The float settled and the plane continued to taxi for about 150 feet. One of the eyewitnesses, himself a pilot and flight instructor, stated that the plane taxied “on the step,” that is, the plane was going fast enough to hydroplane. As the plane passed by an adjacent island into more open water, it again began tipping to the right. The right float submerged until the right wing tip hit the water, at which time the plane “cartwheeled.” One of the witnesses stated that the winds on Togus Pond are unpredictable and that it appeared the wind caught the wing or that the plane made a left turn and tipped over “like a tricycle.” The other eyewitness stated that the plane was in an area on the lake where the wind is stronger due to a funneling effect. Three bystanders rescued an unconscious Green from the overturned plane. He later died, without regaining consciousness.

A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator inspected Green’s plane within hours after the accident. He noted that both the flap lever and indicator were at twenty degrees. He also noted that the right wing was partially separated from the fuselage and that the flaps on both wings were at twenty degrees. The plane was subsequently dismantled and transported to an airport in Waterville.

Jacqueline Green, William’s widow and the personal representative of his estate, brought the instant action after the experts she hired concluded that the retract cable, which controls the flaps used by pilots to increase or decrease altitude, broke prior to William’s use of the flaps for the landing. 1 When the retract cable broke, according to this theory, its sudden movement jerked the follow-up cable out of the clamp that attaches the two cables. With the follow-up cable not working, the flap indicator would not be “told” when the flaps reached the point William had asked for on landing and thus could not have shut off the flap motor. The flaps would continue moving until they could go no fur *218 ther (full flaps), or on this plane forty degrees. Metallurgical testing, however, showed that the failure of the retract cable must have resulted from a single overload; namely, the crash. As a result of this finding, Green’s experts concluded that, since the retract cable had not failed prior to the crash, the failure of the follow-up cable caused the crash. Green’s expert mechanic concluded that the follow-up cable slipped out of the clamp holding it onto the retract cable prior to the crash. Using a microscope, Green’s metallurgist found crushing and fatigue factors of individual strands of the follow-up cable at the point where the clamp was placed. He concluded that the cable separated from the clamp, at least partially, as a result of the clamp being over-tightened. He was unable to determine if the cable separated before or as a result of the crash.

Following discovery, Cessna and Maine Instrument Flight moved for a summary judgment. The court granted the defendants’ motions, finding that there is no evidence that the failure of the clamp or the follow-up cable caused the crash and that Green’s experts’ opinions amount to nothing more than speculation, and that the physical evidence in fact points to pilot error as the cause.

A summary judgment is “appropriate only when the facts before the court so conclusively preclude recovery by one party that judgment in favor of the other is the only possible result.” Spickler v. Greenberg, 586 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Me.1991). In an appeal from a grant of a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been granted, independently determining whether the record supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Cushman v. Tilton, 652 A.2d 650, 651 (Me.1995).

In addition to M.R.Evid. 702, which requires that expert testimony be specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence, an expert’s opinion must also be “sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the [factfinder] in resolving a factual dispute.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 481 (1993) (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.1985)). As we recently stated:

[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

Bouchard v. American Orthodontics, 661 A.2d 1143, 1144-45 (Me.1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). This proposition applies equally to expert opinion testimony, which must “result[ ] from the application of scientific principles and physical laws to adequate facts which are in evidence. The expert’s opinion may not be based upon surmise or conjecture.” Parker v. Hohman, 250 A.2d 698, 702 (Me.1969). In other words, an expert theory may not form the basis of a favorable verdict if there are no facts in evidence on which to apply the theory to the case at hand.

According to Green’s theory, William probably selected twenty degrees of flaps when he was preparing to land but got forty degrees because the flap indicator was never “told” by the follow-up cable, which allegedly was disconnected, to shut off at twenty degrees. Although this may be a valid hypothesis, there simply are no facts in evidence that this plane crash resulted from a failed follow-up cable.

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