Green Climate v. Rollins

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1760
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GREEN CLIMATE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01760 (CJN)

BROOKE L. ROLLINS, Secretary of Agriculture,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Green Climate challenges a memorandum issued by Secretary of Agriculture

Brooke Rollins that aims to streamline various National Forest Service operations by designating

vast areas of federal land as currently in an “emergency situation.” The Government moves to

dismiss, arguing (among other things) that Green Climate lacks Article III standing. The Court

agrees and grants the Government’s motion.

I. Background

On April 3, 2025, Secretary Rollins issued Secretary’s Memorandum 1078-006. See ECF

No. 7-2 (“Memo”). The Memo states that its purpose is “to improve the internal management of

the Department and to assure implementation of” Executive Order 14225, which called for the

“immediate expansion of American timber production.” Id. at 6, 1 (capitalizations altered). 1 As

most relevant here, the Memo designates several areas of federal land as presently in an

“emergency situation.” See id. at 2–5. Such designations authorize various “emergency actions

1 Because the complaint references and seeks judicial review of Memorandum 1078-006, the Court may consider the Memo on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

1 to respond to emergency situations,” such as the “[s]alvag[ing] of dead or dying trees” and the

“[h]arvest[ing] of trees damaged by wind or ice.” Id. at 3. The Memo states that, “[t]o the extent

there is any inconsistency between the provisions of this memo and any federal laws or regulations,

the laws or regulations will control.” Id. at 6.

Green Climate filed this suit later that day. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Green Climate is

“a charitable organization committed to the sustainability and environmental protection of our

natural resources,” with a focus on “forest conservation” and reducing greenhouse gases. Id. ¶ 7. 2

The organization’s members “enjoy National Parks and federal forest and wilderness lands across

the country” through “hiking, camping, and fishing,” and the members “also actively work to

protect federal forest and wilderness lands.” Id. Green Climate alleges that its “mission will be

directly harmed by significant additional harvesting of [National Forest Service] land that will

result from” the Memo. Id.

According to Green Climate, the memo designates roughly 67 million acres of Forest

Service lands because of wildfire risk, 79 million acres because of declining forest health, and 34

million acres because of both wildfire risk and declining health. Id. ¶ 12. But, Green Climate

contends, federal law provides that such designations are only permitted to “mitigate the harm to

life, property, or important natural or cultural resources on National Forest System land or adjacent

land” or to provide “relief from hazards threatening human health and safety.” Id. ¶¶ 12–13.

Green Climate characterizes the Memo as both making a final emergency situation

determination and directing the Forest Service to implement timber harvesting on National Forest

System lands. See id. ¶¶ 1–4, 11–12. The organization alleges that timber harvesting is not a

2 The Court takes this and the following factual assertions from Green Climate’s complaint, accepting them as true for purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

2 permissible “emergency action,” that the memorandum conflicts with the Infrastructure

Investment and Jobs Act and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, and that it was issued without

public notice or an opportunity for comment. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 13–21. Green Climate asks the Court to

declare the memorandum and its designations unlawful and enjoin their implementation. Id. at 8.

II. Legal Standard

Article III of the Constitution “confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of

‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). To satisfy

that requirement, a plaintiff must establish that he has standing to sue, meaning, at a minimum,

that he has (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the

defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction is the plaintiff’s

burden. Id. at 561. A challenge to standing is properly raised under Federal Rule of Procedure

12(b)(1). Noble v. District of Columbia, 725 F. Supp. 3d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2024).

At the pleading stage, plaintiffs “must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element.”

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation modified). The Court must “accept the

well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations

in the plaintiff[s’] favor.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of [standing], supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,”

and courts “do not assume the truth of legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). Because defects in standing are “defect[s] in subject matter jurisdiction,” if a

federal court lacks jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906

(D.C. Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3).

3 III. Analysis

As an organization, Green Climate can establish standing in one of two ways: “It can assert

standing on its own behalf, as an organization, or on behalf of its members, as associational

standing.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Com., 928 F.3d 95, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Green

Climate does not succeed under either theory.

A. Organizational Standing

“An organization may establish Article III standing if it can show that the defendant’s

actions cause a concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities that is more than

simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id. (citation modified). Because

mere frustration of an organization’s objectives “is the type of abstract concern that does not impart

standing,” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

courts must distinguish between “organizations that allege that their activities have been impeded

from those that merely allege that their mission has been compromised.” Abigail All. for Better

Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Determining

whether a plaintiff can establish organizational standing requires asking, “first, whether the

agency’s action or omission to act injured the organization’s interest and, second, whether the

organization used its resources to counteract that harm.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,

808 F.3d 905, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified).

Nothing in Green Climate’s complaint suggests that the organization satisfies either prong.

Green Climate alleges that it is committed to sustainability and forest conservation and that its

“mission will be directly harmed” by the challenged memorandum and emergency situation

determination. Compl. ¶ 7. Mere frustration of an organization’s objectives, however, “is the type

of abstract concern that does not impart standing.” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1433.

Green Climate must instead allege injuries that are sufficiently concrete, but its complaint does not

4 allege that the Memo caused Green Climate to, for example, divert staff time, spend money on a

new program, alter its day-to-day operations, or otherwise impair a relevant organizational activity.

See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that an

organization lacked standing where it had “not asserted the alleged violation ‘perceptibly

impaired’ a non-abstract interest”) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379

(1982)). In short, Green Climate’s allegations do not explain how the Memo “directly affected

and interfered with” Green Climate’s “core business activities.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 395 (2024). Accordingly, the allegations are insufficient to plead

organizational standing. 3

B. Associational Standing

Green Climate also fails to plead facts sufficient to establish associational standing. An

organization has associational standing if: “(1) at least one of [its] members has standing to sue in

her or his own right, (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose,

and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of an individual

member in the lawsuit.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr., 928 F.3d at 101 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC,

401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Green Climate “stumbles on the first step,” Fund Democracy,

LLC v. SEC., 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002), as it has not sufficiently alleged any details about

any of its members, let alone that any of its members were injured by the Memo.

According to Green Climate, its members “enjoy National Parks and federal forest and

wilderness lands across the country” through, among other activities, “hiking, camping, and

3 Green Climate’s organizational standing theory fails for the additional reason that it did not contest the Government’s arguments on this front at all. Compare ECF No. 7 (Motion to Dismiss) at 5–6 with ECF No. 13 (Response) at 9–11. The Court can thus “treat [those] unaddressed arguments as conceded.” Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

5 fishing.” Compl. ¶ 7. Green Climate fears that “actions authorized by the Memorandum will lead

to increased logging activity on millions of acres of federal forest land, with direct and indirect

environmental impacts including loss of wildlife habitat, increased carbon emissions, soil erosion,

water quality degradation, and impacts to endangered species.” Id. ¶ 19. Green Climate argues

that those two paragraphs suffice “to find that at least one of [the organization’s] members have

standing in their own right” to bring this claim. ECF No. 13 (Response) at 9.

The Court disagrees. “[A]n organization bringing a claim based on associational standing

must show that at least one specifically-identified member has suffered an injury-in-fact.” Am.

Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 820 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Green Climate’s

complaint does not come close to meeting that bar. At most, Green Climate states—in its

opposition—that it has members willing to “provide affidavits adequately documenting injury in

fact to this Court at the Summary Judgment” stage. Response at 9–10. But even assuming those

members belonged to Green Climate at the time it initiated this suit, a plaintiff cannot cure flaws

in its complaint with a promise of facts at a later stage or in a later brief. See Singh v. District of

Columbia, 55 F. Supp. 3d 55, 70 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] party may not amend [its] complaint through

an opposition brief.”).

And even further assuming that Green Climate’s complaint identifies real members

experiencing real injuries, the complaint’s threadbare allegations do not allege injuries that are

sufficiently “particular” and “concrete.” See Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339 (noting that “the

particularization and concreteness requirements” are separate inquiries). While it is true that “the

burden of production to establish standing is more relaxed at the pleading stage than at summary

judgment,” a plaintiff must still offer something by way of “general factual allegations of injury

resulting from the defendant’s conduct.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 667 F.3d at 12. Green

6 Climate’s allegations do not suffice. As the Supreme Court held in Summers v. Earth Island

Institute, allegations of “generalized harm to the forest or the environment” do not alone support

standing. 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009). But those are precisely the type of allegations that Green

Climate makes. See Compl. ¶ 19 (warning of “logging activity,” “loss of wildlife habitat, increased

carbon emissions, soil erosion, water quality degradation, and impacts to endangered species”).

Green Climate provides no indication that the Memo will harm specific members by “affect[ing]

the[ir] recreational or even the[ir] mere esthetic interests.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 494. For this

and the preceding reasons, then, Green Climate lacks associational standing. 4

IV. Conclusion

Because Green Climate has failed to establish that it has Article III standing to press its

claims, the Court will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. A separate

Order will issue contemporaneously.

DATE: March 27, 2026 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge

4 Because the Court concludes that Green Climate lacks Article III standing, it need not address the Government’s ripeness and APA arguments. See Mot. at 8–12.