Greely-Bey v. Wainwright

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 11, 2010
DocketCivil Action No. 2010-1349
StatusPublished

This text of Greely-Bey v. Wainwright (Greely-Bey v. Wainwright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greely-Bey v. Wainwright, (D.D.C. 2010).

Opinion

/fl

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

ERNEST MATTHEW GREELY-BEY, 1 1 2010 Clvrk. u.s. oasm @. Petitioner, blm Dlsit:!tict sta v. Civil Action No.

10 1349

S.T. WAINRIGHT,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On June 22, 2010 in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the petitioner was sentenced to a terrn of 28 months’ incarceration followed by a 36-month tenn of supervised release. The sentence allegedly exceeded the applicable sentencing guidelines by 16 months, and the petitioner challenges the sentence on several grounds.

By motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110, a District of Columbia Code offender may seek "to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence" if "(l) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]" D.C. Code § 23-1 lO(a). ln relevant part, D.C. Code § 23-1 10 provides:

[An] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner

who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Fea'eral . . . court if it

appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it

also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to

test the legality of his detention. D.C. Code § 23-1 lO(g) (emphasis added). "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas corpus." Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. l992). lt is settled that "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention"’ Byrd v. Hena’erson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.Zd 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. a'enz`ed, 479 U.S. 993 (1986).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice. An Order consistent

with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this date.

Date: 7/£//0 United states District 125

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Related

Saleh v. Braxton
788 F. Supp. 1232 (District of Columbia, 1992)

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Greely-Bey v. Wainwright, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greely-bey-v-wainwright-dcd-2010.