Greater Heights Academy v. Zelman

522 F.3d 678, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8384, 2008 WL 1759975
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 18, 2008
Docket06-4162
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 522 F.3d 678 (Greater Heights Academy v. Zelman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greater Heights Academy v. Zelman, 522 F.3d 678, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8384, 2008 WL 1759975 (6th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim filed by two Ohio community schools, Greater Heights Academy and W.C. Cupe Community School (“Appellants”), against three Ohio public officials, Dr. Susan Tave Zelman, Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction, *679 Dr. Paulo A. DeMaria, Associate Superintendent for the Center for School Finance of the Ohio Department of Education (ODE), and Todd L. Hanes, Director of ODE’s Office of Community Schools (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellants sought injunctive relief consisting of a prayer for the receipt of state educational funds pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 3314.08 and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the denial of funding. Concluding that community schools are political subdivisions and barred from asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims against state officials, the district court dismissed Appellants’ suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The sole issue on appeal is whether Appellants are political subdivisions that therefore cannot invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against the state of Ohio.

I.

Ohio community schools, also known as “charter schools,” provide non-traditional public education to students from kindergarten through grade twelve. Chapter 3314 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth the operation and funding of community schools. All community schools contract with an authorized “sponsor” that provides oversight and support to the school, ensuring that they comply with state requirements. Ohio Rev.Code §§ 3314.02(C)(1), (D); Ohio Admin. Code § 3301-102-05. The sponsor may be either a public educational entity or a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entity. Ohio Rev.Code §§ 3314.02(C)(l)(a)-(f). Additionally, the sponsorship contract must comply with the criteria of Ohio Revised Code § 3314.03. Sponsors decide whether to place a community school on probation, suspension, or permanently terminate the community school’s contract because of non-compliance with state and federal educational requirements. Ohio Rev.Code §§ 3314.07, 3314.072, 3314.073. In turn, sponsors must seek ODE approval for preliminary agreements, according to criteria, procedures, and deadlines established by the ODE. Ohio Rev.Code § 3314.015(B). The ODE, in addition, may revoke approval of a sponsor and assume direct sponsorship of a community school in the event that a sponsor becomes unwilling or unable to complete its duties. Ohio Rev.Code § 3314.015(C).

Ohio community schools are financed solely by state educational funds that are diverted from Ohio school districts and awarded on a per pupil basis. Ohio Rev. Code § 3314.08. Under ODE funding procedures, after community schools submit their enrollment data, traditional school districts are permitted to “flag” certain students who they believe do not actually attend the community school. Traditional public schools and state officials may later remove the error flag. Where error flags remain, the state automatically denies payment for flagged students. Disputes about flagged students may be resolved during the ODE’s “reconciliation” period. In this case, the Cleveland Municipal School District and Columbus City School District flagged a number of students on Appellants’ lists. As a result, Appellants did not receive payment for those students. They were not provided the opportunity for a hearing prior to the denial of payment.

II.

Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that Appellees are ‘political subdivisions’ and therefore unable to invoke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir.1997); Allard v. Weitzman (In re De- *680 Lorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1239-40 (6th Cir.1993).

It is well established that political subdivisions cannot sue the state of which they are part under the United States Constitution. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186-87, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923) (With respect to political subdivisions, “the state is supreme and its legislative body ... may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.”); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196, 43 S.Ct. 539, 67 L.Ed. 943 (1923) (“The regulation of municipalities is a matter peculiarly within the domain of the state.”); South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Washington Twp., 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir.1986) (“The relationship between [political subdivisions] is a matter of state concern; the Fourteenth Amendment protections and limitations do not apply.”). An entity is a political subdivision of a state if it is a creation of the state, if its power to act rests entirely within the discretion of the state, and if it can be destroyed at the mere whim of the state, “unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.” See City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187, 43 S.Ct. 534; see also South Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at 504 (“Being a subdivision of the state, the ‘State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges [from a municipality] as it sees fit.’ ” (quoting id. at 187, 43 S.Ct. 534) (alteration in original)). In determining whether a particular entity is a political subdivision, courts look to statutory and case law. South Macomb Disposal Auth., 790 F.2d at 506; Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ. for Ark., 745 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir.1984).

After considering Ohio’s statutory and case law, as well as the substantive control that Ohio exerts on its community schools, it is apparent that community schools are political subdivisions of the state.

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Bluebook (online)
522 F.3d 678, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8384, 2008 WL 1759975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greater-heights-academy-v-zelman-ca6-2008.