Gray v. St. Martins Press

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 8, 1999
• Docket: CV-95-285-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Gray v. St. Martins Press CV-95-285-M 06/08/99 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Robert K. Gray, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 95-285-M

St. Martin's Press, Inc. and Susan Trento, Defendants

O R D E R

In this defamation action plaintiff seeks to recover damages

for injuries sustained as a result of defendants' publication of

four allegedly defamatory statements in The Power House, a book

authored by Susan Trento and published by St. Martin's Press.

The current dispute between the parties involves a choice of law

guestion.

At the final pretrial conference the parties raised this

dispute. Because trial was scheduled to commence shortly, the

court asked counsel to expeditiously file legal memoranda

addressing the choice of law guestion, which has been done.

Discussion

Gray, who resided in Virginia when The Power House was

published, alleges that the law of the District of Columbia

should govern both his claims and the extent to which he may

recover damages. In the alternative. Gray asserts that the court should apply Virginia law in determining defendants' liability

(if any) and the damages to which he is entitled.

Trento, a resident of Virginia, and St. Martin's Press, a

corporation organized under the laws of New York with a principal

place of business in New York City, assert that plaintiff's

claims should be governed by the substantive law of Virginia, but

that his entitlement to damages should be governed by New

Hampshire law (defendants have failed to explain the legal basis

for their position, but it is likely found in the fact that New

Hampshire law does not provide for punitive damages).

When making choice-of-law determinations, a federal court

exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law

rules of the state in which it sits. See Crellin Technologies,

Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994)

(citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491

(1941)). Because New Hampshire is the forum state, its choice of

law principles govern.

In 1966, the New Hampshire Supreme Court joined the then-

current trend in American jurisprudence by rejecting the

principle of lex loci and adopting a five part test to assist

courts in resolving choice of law guestions. See Clark v. Clark,

107 N.H. 351 (1966). The five factors identified by the Court

for consideration are:

2 (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the States in our federal system; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement by the court of its own State's governmental interests rather than those of other States; a n d (5) the court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law.

Ferren v. General Motors Corp., 137 N.H. 423 425 (1993) (citing

Clark v. Clark, supra) . Those factors are substantially similar

to the factors set forth in section 6 of the Restatement (Second)

Conflict of Laws. See also Restatement (Second) Conflict of Law,

§ 145. And, in cases such as this, in which a plaintiff seeks to

recover in a single action for damages sustained as a result of

allegedly defamatory statements which were published in several

jurisdictions, the Restatement provides:

(1) The rights and liabilities that arise from defamatory matter in any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one broadcast over radio or television, exhibition of a motion picture, or similar aggregate communication are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) When a natural person claims that he has been defamed by an aggregate communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state where the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was published in that state.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 150.

Applying the principles articulated by the New Hampshire

Supreme Court, as well as those identified in the Restatement,

3 the court concludes that the parties' dispute (as to both

liability and the availability of damages) is most appropriately

governed by the law of the Commonwealth of Virginia. At the time

the allegedly defamatory statements were published, plaintiff was

a resident of Virginia, as was defendant, Susan Trento. The

adverse impact upon plaintiff's reputation as a result of those

statements was likely the greatest in Virginia (concededly

plaintiff likely also suffered substantial injury in the District

of Columbia, where he rendered many of his professional

services). Additionally, Trento performed much of her research

for the book in Virginia, and many of the parties whom she

interviewed lived in Virginia.

New Hampshire, on the other hand, has little (if any)

connection to any party. New Hampshire provides the forum for

this suit simply because: (1) some copies of The Power House were

sold in New Hampshire; and (2) New Hampshire's relevant statute

of limitations is longer than that of most other forums.

Accordingly, there is no sound foundation upon which to rest a

decision to apply New Hampshire's substantive law of defamation.

There is even less reason to conclude, as defendants suggest,

that only its law concerning damages should apply to this action.

C f . Lessard v. Clarke, ___ N.H. ___ , 1999 WL 301255 (May 14,

1999) (concluding that in a case arising out of a motor vehicle

collision in New Hampshire between two vehicles owned and

4 operated by Canadian residents, Canada's law of damages applied)

There is certainly some connection between the parties (and

the allegedly defamatory statements) and the District of

Columbia. Nevertheless, the court is persuaded that: (1) there

are more substantial connections with the Commonwealth of

Virginia; and (2) Virginia has a greater interest in seeing that

its law is applied in resolving this dispute than does the

District of Columbia. Accordingly, applying the factors

identified by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, as well as those

set forth in the Restatement, the court concludes that Virginia

law applies to this case.

Conclusion

While plaintiff would prefer that the court apply the law of

the District of Columbia, he concedes that it may properly apply

Virginia law. Defendants seem to agree, at least with regard to

the guestion of liability. And, because defendants have advanced

no reasoned basis for the court to apply New Hampshire's law of

damages (other than the advantage of avoiding punitive damages),

the court declines their invitation to do so.

Plaintiff's entitlement to judgment and, if appropriate,

damages, shall be determined in accordance with the law of the

Commonwealth of Virginia.

5 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

June 8, 1999

cc: James G. Walker, Esq. Cletus P. Lyman, Esq. William L. Chapman, Esq. John C. Lankenau, Esq. Steven M. Gordon, Esq. Seth L. Rosenberg, Esq. Mark D. Balzli, Esq.