Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.

125 F.3d 1371, 1998 A.M.C. 511, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29124, 1997 WL 631321
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit·Decided October 24, 1997·No. 95-8459·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

HATCHETT, Chief Judge:

Appellant, Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company (Lockheed), appeals from a district court order in favor of the appellees, Stacy Gray, Grace Schumacher and Wilma Jennings. The appellees, survivors of three naval aircraft crewmembers who were killed after ejecting from a crashing Lockheed-manufactured aircraft, filed actions against Lockheed for wrongful death and survival remedies on strict liability and negligence claims under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 761-768 (DOHSA), and general maritime law. Lockheed invoked the military contractor defense under Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). After a bench trial, the district court denied that defense, found Lockheed liable, and awarded damages to the appellees. The district court did not award prejudgment interest to appellees. We remand on the determination of prejudgment interest and affirm the judgment of the district court in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 1989, appellees’ decedents, Lt. Douglas G. Gray, Lt. John T. Hartman and Lt. (j.g.) David S. Jennings, were killed and Air Warfare Technician Second Class (AW2) Tracy Mann was injured when they ejected from a S-3 “Viking” jet aircraft (S — B) shortly before the aircraft crashed into the sea. 1 Lockheed manufactured and sold the *1374 S-3 to the United States Navy in 1975. In the 1960s, the Navy sought proposed designs for a new antisubmarine warfare aircraft (ASW) to neutralize the threat that submarines posed. Lockheed submitted its request for proposal, the Navy accepted, and the S-3 became the Navy’s new ASW aircraft. Navy engineers and Lockheed employees worked closely together on many aspects of the S-3’s development, and the Navy held a series of preliminary design reviews and critical design reviews. Upon completion of its manufacture, the S-3 passed all of the Navy’s acceptance tests, and Lockheed delivered the S-3 to the Navy.

At the time of their deaths, the decedents were all naval officers assigned to the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (the JFK), an aircraft carrier. On the day of the crash, the decedents boarded a S-3 on the JFK, which was located 125 miles off the coast of Virginia, as part of naval flight operations. Gray, the pilot of the S-3, sat in the left-front seat, and Hartman, the mission commander, sat in the right-front seat. Mann, the sensor operator and the only crash survivor, sat in the left-rear seat, and Jennings, the tactical coordinator, sat in the right-rear seat.

Prior to flying the S-3, Gray and other crewmembers properly conducted the required preflight checks. Gray verified that the S-3’s control surfaces (ie., the ailerons, spoilers, and elevators) worked properly. Gray executed a “control wipeout,” which means he moved the pilot’s control stick laterally and longitudinally through its range of motion. That maneuver allowed the aircrew and sailors on the JFK’s deck to observe the movement of the control surfaces. After Gray properly configured the control surfaces for takeoff, the S-3 was catapulted from the deck of the carrier in order to give it sufficient speed to achieve flight.

With both engines at full power and sounding normal, the S-3’s launch appeared normal; the S-3’s wings were leveled and it began a shallow climb. After approximately two seconds, Gray initiated a slow right roll by moving the control stick to the left. Gray attempted to halt the roll when the S-3 reached 20 degrees of bank angle, the normal bank angle for clearing a turn. The S-3 failed to respond to Gray’s movement of the control stick and continued the right roll. When the S-3 reached 45 degrees of bank angle, Mann heard Gray exclaim “Oh my God! Eject! Eject! Eject!” Hartman immediately initiated the sequence that would eject all four occupants from the S-3. Mann and Jennings, the two rear occupants, ejected first when the S-3 reached 90 degrees of right bank angle; and Gray and Hartman ejected when the S-3 was at or beyond 120 degrees of right bank angle. Their parachutes having scarce time to open, all three decedents struck the water with great force and suffered fatal bodily injuries upon impact with the water.

Appellees blame the S-3’s crash in part on design defects in the S-3’s aileron servo (the servo). Part of the S-3’s flight control system, the servo is contained in the S-3’s fuselage and it links the pilot with the ailerons. An aileron is “a movable part of an airplane wing or a movable airfoil external to the wing at the trailing edge for imparting a rolling motion and thus providing lateral control.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 24 (1979). On the S-3, a cable connects the pilot’s control stick to the servo’s input arm, and a rod from a ram mounted inside the servo passes through the S-3’s wings and attaches to the ailerons.

The S-3 has two jet engines that drive separate hydraulic pumps. The two hydraulic pumps each power a hydraulic system, creating 3000 pounds per square inch (psi) of hydraulic pressure in each system. Ordinarily, the servo functions in the “powered” mode using hydraulic power. In this mode, the pilot has no mechanical link with the ailerons. Instead, the pilot’s movement of the control stick triggers a sequence of functions causing hydraulic pressure in the servo to raise or lower the ailerons. If a hydraulic failure occurs, the servo should automatically switch to “manual” mode, a process known as the Emergency Flight Control System (EFCS). A latch and pin located inside the servo are key to the operation of the EFCS. “When the hydraulic pressure in both systems drops below 800 psi, a shutoff valve at the bottom of the servo should ‘trip,’ cutting off all hydraulic pressure in the servo. The absence of hydraulic pressure in the servo allows the springs to expand; this expansion *1375 should move the pin into the latch, an event called ‘latch-up.’” Gray, 880 F.Supp. at 1563. Once EFCS lateh-up occurs, the pilot has a direct mechanical link to the ailerons but has to use more effort to move the control stick.

Although Lockheed designed, manufactured, and sold the S-3 to the Navy, Lockheed subcontracted the manufacturing of the S-3’s servo to the Bertea Corporation (Bertea), which is now a subsidiary of the Parker-Hannifin Corporation. Bertea also developed the acceptance test procedure (ATP) for the servo. An ATP tests whether a product performs in accordance with its design specifications. The district court found that the ATP Bertea developed for the servo had several shortcomings. Although very important, the ATP did not measure the speed of the EFCS latch-up; nor did the ATP test the servo’s operation while subjected to simulated flight demands.

In the spring of 1990, the Navy recovered the crashed S-3. Post-crash testing of the servo revealed some malfunctions and deviations from design specifications. First, Douglas Crawford, a Lockheed engineer, found when he “deviated from the ATP and moved the servo’s input arm to stimulate commands from the control stick, the servo’s shutoff valve tripped at 1400 psi, not the specified 800 psi.” Gray, 880 F.Supp. at 1564. “The servo’s shutoff valve ‘sensed’ 800. psi, even though the actual pressure was 1400 psi.” Gray, 880 F.Supp. at 1564.

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Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., 125 F.3d 1371, 1998 A.M.C. 511, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29124, 1997 WL 631321 (11th Cir. 1997).

125 F.3d 1371 (Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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