Gray Telephone Pay Station Co. v. Baird Mfg. Co.

174 F. 417, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5211
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 5, 1909
DocketNo. 1,470
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 174 F. 417 (Gray Telephone Pay Station Co. v. Baird Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray Telephone Pay Station Co. v. Baird Mfg. Co., 174 F. 417, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5211 (7th Cir. 1909).

Opinion

KOHESAAT, Circuit Judge,

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

It was old in the telephone toll-station art to employ means for imparting signals from the pay-box to the transmitter of a telephone. This was attained in several ways. It would be electrically effected by the employment of a coin in making or breaking the circuit, thereby at once advising the central office, or by operating the signal device from the central office, or by depositing a coin in the channel provided for that purpose, so arranged as to cause a bell or gong to sound. We have to do only with this latter device.

It seems to have been assumed that the signal could be conveyed to the transmitter through air waves alone. With this in view, various conductors were employed whereby the sound or signal was projected upon the diaphragm of the transmitter from the outside.

Complainant claims to have been the first to utilize the principle of solid vibration. Its patent first above named is for a device in which the signal is given to the transmitter by means of resonant connection between the signal or pay box and the transmitter-support, thereby avoiding all appliances which employ the air waves for that purpose. So far as the record discloses, such a device is desirable, being both effective and simple. In view of the art and the advantage to the public of every advance therein tending to better service, there seems to be little doubt that, if the patentee was the first to disclose a toll station employing this means of operating the transmitter, he and his assigns are entitled to the protection of a court of equity, unless they have in some waj' waived their rights. There are several patents in the prior art, which, in a degree at least, might well have been claimed, though unconsciously to their inventors, to have afforded the assistance of the vibration caused b}' resonant contact of the signal-box with the transmitter-support. The various signaling methods referred to, wherein the sound is conveyed by deflectors or other means for impacting upon the transmitter-diaphragm through the air, would undoubtedly, if so arranged as to permit of vibration, be supplemented directly, if indeed the vibration were not the principal channel of sound conduction to the transmitter, as, for instance, Gray’s several patents, Nos. 469,-649, 469,650, 462,813, and Root patent, No. 440,118, and Holbrook patent, No. 481,903. Owing to the fact that the signal-box and transmitter-support have a common backboard, even though they be not in actual close contact, there could hardly fail to be some degree of vibration through the limited resonant connection. Granting this to be [421]*421the case, yet the patentees neither made claim for such a result, nor sought to take advantage thereof, and the record fails to make it apparent that any satisfactory and practical results could have been obtained thereby.

“A patent for a mechanical combination is not anticipated by a drawing in a prior patent which incidentally shows a similar arrangement of parts, where such arrangement is not essential to the first invention, and was not designed, adapted, or used to perform the function which it performs in the second invention, and where the first patent contains no suggestion of the way in which the result sought is accomplished by the second inventor.” Brill v. Third Ave. R. C. (C. C.) 103 Fed. 289.

As was said in Canda v. Michigan Iron Company, 124 Fed. 486, 61 C. C. A. 194:

“But if the patent gives no sign of such contemplated use and makes no provision adapting it to other uses, the patentee cannot he said to have invented that for which he lias given no specific directions for construction. * * * II. (the patent there in suit) was not constructed, with a view to tshe special purpose of the patent in suit. It is true that it might happen that a casing would he made under the Hardy patent which would he adapted to the use contemplated by Canda; but, if so, it would be merely accidental. It would not result from any preconception nor from anything specifically directed by the patent for organizing his invention.”

Defendant cites Gentry patent, No. 516,433, granted March 13, 1894, for a telephone toll station, and Alexander patent, No. 544,077, granted August 6, 1895, for improvement in coin-signal apparatus for telephone pay stations. The application for the patent in suit was filed November 17, 1893. It thus appears that at the time the application for the patent in suit was filed these two alleged anticipating patents were not in the prior art, and cannot be availed of as anticipations. Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 25 L. Ed. 68; Anderson v. Collins, 122 Fed. 451. 58 C. C. A. 669 ; Eck v. Kutz, 132 Fed. 758; Walker on Patents, § 70; Robinson on Patents, § 331, and note, 332, 334; Barnes v. Sprinkler Co., 60 Fed. 605, 9 C. C. A. 154.

It is insisted by defendant that, even though the rule be as above stated, the fact that the patentee amended his application on July 1, 1896, by substituting the words “firm” or “firmly” in place of the words “close contact,” and inserting, after the words “transmitter-support,” the phrase, “thereby establishing a resonant connection between the signal within the box and the transmitter located outside thereof,” leaves these patents in the prior art as to the matters contained in the amendment. Theretofore the patentee had always used the term “close contact” to indicate a path of practical vibratory travel for the signal. To avoid any uncertainty as to his meaning, he substituted the word “firm.” There never was any doubt in the mind of any one, and certainly not in the mind of any one skilled in such matters, as to the meaning of the phrase “close contact.” The context, as well as the avowed object to attain sound travel from the signal to the transmitter, made it clear that the term first used meant just what was expressed in the amendment. Therefore the substitution of the word “firm” can be viewed as nothing more than an elaboration of the idea, and in no sense a new feature. There is therefore nothing in the record to warrant the consideration of either of these two patents as an anticipation.

Gray was the first to devise and construct a toll station based upon the idea that the pay-box signal should be communicated to the trans[422]*422mitter by means of resonant connection between the two. He took steps to secure the utmost freedom of vibration from one to the other. His means of doing so involved a firm or rigid relation of the one to the other — such as would afford the most complete vibratory medium. This would never have been achieved without the idea of vibratory conduction of the sound signal along the solid wood or metal located in the path of vibration between the signal and the transmitter. The accidental vibration growing out of the constructions of the prior art would never have developed reliable vibratory communication. Accuracy of enunciation is the end toward which telephony is striving. Every step in advance is a victory gained over the unknown. The invention must of necessity, if it be such, consist in the device of the patent, and not in the conception of the principle to be utilized. Sewall v. Jones, 91 U. S. 171, 23 L. Ed. 275. But the conception must precede the adaptation to practical use.

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Bluebook (online)
174 F. 417, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-telephone-pay-station-co-v-baird-mfg-co-ca7-1909.