WOLLMAN, Chief Justice.
These are original proceedings in which applicant seeks writs of prohibition and mandamus. We deny the writs sought and quash the alternative writs previously issued.
In # 13079, applicant seeks to prohibit the Secretary of Revenue and the Director of Railroads from taking any action pursuant to Senate Bill 225, which was enacted by the Legislature on March 12, 1980.
In # 13080, applicant seeks to compel the Secretary of State to accept and file pursuant to SDCL 2-1-6.1 a copy of a petition that would propose to refer Senate Bill 225 to a vote of the electors at the 1980 general election.1 The Secretary of State refused to accept the petition for filing on the ground that the act sought to be referred contains an emergency clause and is therefore not referable in view of South Dakota Constitution article III, § 1, which provides:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a Legislature which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives, except that the people expressly reserve to themselves the right . to require that any laws which the Legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions .
Senate Bill 225 is entitled “An Act to provide for additional duties to the division of railroads, to create a South Dakota state railroad board, to provide for its duties and members, to increase certain taxes, to provide for certain rail expenditures, to make [753]*753an appropriation therefore [sic] and to declare an emergency.”
Sections 1 through 13 of the act affect SDCL Chapter 1-44, which sets forth the scope and functions of the Department of Transportation, by amending existing portions of that chapter and by adding new sections thereto.
As originally enacted, SDCL 1-44-17 provided: 2
A division of railroads is hereby created within the department of transportation. The head of the division of railroads shall be the director of railroads, who shall be appointed by the secretary of transportation with approval of the Governor.
Section 1 of the act amends this provision by providing that the Director of Railroads shall be appointed by the Governor.
SDCL 1-44-18 originally provided:
It shall be the duty of the division, within the state of South Dakota, to conduct research on basic railroad problems, to plan and assist in the development of rail transportation, to develop and maintain a federal-state relationship of programs relating to railroads, and to assist the department of transportation or any public or private agency or corporation in co-ordinating railroad services with those of other transportation modes.
As amended by § 2 of the act, SDCL 1-44-18 now reads:
It shall be the duty of the division, within the state of South Dakota, to conduct research on basic railroad problems, to plan and assist in the development of rail transportation, to develop and maintain a federal-state relationship of programs relating to railroads, to assist the department of transportation or any public or private agency or corporation in co-ordinating railroad services with those of other transportation modes, to recommend, prepare, and review plans and specifications for any project undertaken by the South Dakota railroad authority, and to arrange for and coordinate rail service over any and all properties and facilities acquired, leased or controlled by the state of South Dakota railroad authority.
Section 3 of the act adds the following section to Chapter 1-44:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the division of railroads, with the approval of the South Dakota state railroad board and the written consent of the Governor, may enter into agreements, contracts, leases (as lessor or lessee) or other arrangements with any corporation, partnership, individual, agency or authority, on such terms and conditions as the division shall determine, including, but not limited to, providing for the acquisition, operation, maintenance and improvement of public rail lines, and the acquisition and disposition of any and all rights-of-way, land, facilities, fixtures and appurtenant structures, services and equipment, determined by the division to be necessary or appropriate.
Section 3A of the act provides that the Railroad Authority and the Division of Railroads shall not purchase or contract to purchase any railroad rolling stock nor operate any railroad without prior specific approval of the Legislature.
Sections 4 through 13 of the act relate to the authority of the Division of Railroads, create the State Railroad Board, appropriate certain funds for administration and research by the Division of Railroads, and create a bipartisan legislative task force to monitor the impact of the rail car program authorized by Section 11 of the act.
Sections 14 through 21 of the act provide for an increase in certain sales, excise, and use taxes. Section 22 provides that the tax increase established in the foregoing sections is repealed on July 1, 1981, or when the revenue raised thereby is sufficient to repay all obligations incurred by the Railroad Authority, whichever occurs first. Section 23 provides that ninety-eight percent of the revenue derived from the increase in taxes pursuant to the foregoing sections shall be credited to the railroad [754]*754authority fund, with the remaining two percent to be credited to the state general fund.
Finally, Section 24 provides that “Whereas, this Act is necessary for the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Senate Bill 252, also enacted on March 12, 1980, and not under attack in these proceedings, is entitled “An Act to create the South Dakota railroad authority, to define its powers and duties and to declare an emergency.”
Section 1 of this act sets forth in some detail the legislative declaration concerning the serious emergency within the state resulting from the imminent abandonment by railroads of substantial services and the necessity of public participation in the operation and ownership of railroad properties and facilities and the conduct of railroad services.
Section 3 of the act creates the South Dakota Railroad Authority. Section 10 authorizes the Railroad Authority to, among other things, acquire, maintain, and equip railroads and railroad facilities. Section 13 authorizes the Railroad Authority to “acquire . . . construct, maintain and equip railroad facilities as the Legislature by law declares to be in the public interest.” Sections 11 and 14 provide that the Division of Railroads shall establish the priority listing of projects to be entered into by the Railroad Authority and shall have supervision over any projects‘undertaken by the Railroad Authority. Other sections of the act specify the terms under which the Railroad Authority may enter into leases and the terms and conditions under which it may raise funds by issuing bonds. Section 45 of the act contains an emergency clause similar to that found in Senate Bill 225.
Senate Bill 249, also enacted on March 12, 1980, and also not under attack in these proceedings, authorizes the South Dakota Railroad Authority to acquire certain rail lines within the state. Section 1 of this act provides that:
It being hereby declared to be in the public interest, the South Dakota railroad authority is authorized to acquire, construct, improve and equip facilities for the division of railroads, such facilities consisting of the following segments of existing railroad facilities, including land and all fixtures and appurtenances adjacent thereto and including necessary expenses and reasonable reserves all for the estimated cost, not to exceed twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000) .
There follows a description of certain existing railroad facilities of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, the Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company, Burlington Northern, Inc., and the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company.
Section 5 of the act authorizes the Division of Railroads to enter into lease agreements with the Railroad Authority and to make rental payments from appropriations to be made by the Legislature. Section 6 of the act provides that the “acquisition, construction, improvement and equipping of such facilities shall be under the general charge and supervision of the division of railroads . . ..” Section 7 of the act contains an emergency clause similar to those found in Senate Bills 225 and 252.
We have discussed the provisions of the three bills in some detail because the acts obviously were intended to carry out the intention of the Legislature to acquire certain rail lines in order to preserve the existence of adequate rail service within the state.
With this trilogy of legislative enactments as a backdrop, we proceed to an analysis of applicant’s attack upon the validity of the emergency clause attached to Senate Bill 225.
Although the state argues in the alternative that notwithstanding the wording of the emergency clause contained in Senate Bill 225 this Court could find, under the authority of Culhane v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 65 S.D. 337, 274 N.W. 315 [755]*755(1937), that the act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, we conclude that the conditions that gave rise to the legislation in issue in the Culhane case are not present in the case before us. Accordingly, we will limit our discussion to a consideration whether Senate Bill 225 is necessary for the support of the state and its existing public institutions.
We address first the question whether there is an existing public institution within the meaning of art. Ill, § 1 that Senate Bill 225 may be said to support.
South Dakota Constitution art. XVII, § 15 states in part that “Railways heretofore constructed or that may hereafter be constructed, in this state are hereby declared public highways, and all railroad and transportation companies are declared to be common carriers and subject to legislative control . . . .”
Chapter 106 of the Laws of 1931 (codified as SDCL 49-17; repealed by 1976 Sess. L. ch. 294, § 39) provided for public aid to railroad construction, including the issuance by county commissioners of bonds for the purpose of aiding in the construction of proposed railroad lines.
As has already been indicated above, the Legislature in 1975 created the Division of Railroads within the Department of Transportation.
By Chapter 342, Laws of 1978, the Legislature established a program whereby the Department of Transportation was directed to take action to improve branch line railroad service within the state. See SDCL 49-17-22 through 49-17-29. Section 1 of this act (SDCL 49-17-22) provides:
The department of transportation shall identify those segments of branch line railroad trackage which, if improved, may provide increased transportation services for the citizens of this state.
Chapter 343, § 1 of the laws of 1978 (SDCL 49-17-19) authorized the Transportation Commission to, among other things, “contract for the acquisition, construction, improvement, maintenance or operation of railroads or railroad facilities.”
By Chapter 344, Laws of 1978, the Legislature adopted the Regional Railroad Authority Act. SDCL 49-17A. Under this chapter, subdivisions (defined as “any county, municipality, or other body politic of this state”) may form a regional railroad authority by agreement, which agreement shall state that the railroad authority “is created and incorporated ... as a political subdivision of this state.” SDCL 49-17A-l(4), 49-17A-2, 49-17A-3(l). Pursuant to SDCL 49-17A-16, regional railroad authorities are empowered to
plan, establish, acquire, develop, construct, purchase, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate, regulate, and protect its railroads, and railroad facilities used or useful in the operation of the railroad. For such purposes an authority may acquire by purchase, gift, devise, lease, condemnation real or personal property or any interest therein.
In interpreting the provisions of art. Ill, this Court has frequently looked to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Washington, for the corresponding provisions of that state’s constitution are similar to art. Ill of our Constitution. See, e. g., State ex rel. Kornmann v. Larson, 81 S.D. 540, 138 N.W.2d 1 (1965); State ex rel. Wegner v. Pyle, 55 S.D. 269, 226 N.W. 280 (1929); Hodges v. Snyder, 43 S.D. 166, 178 N.W. 575 (1920). In responding to the argument that an existing public institution is some activity of the state that has taken form and is lodged in buildings or structures, the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
The words “public institutions” can be given no such restricted meaning. A public institution is any organized activity created or established by law or public authority. . [It] is not alone those institutions of a physical character, but also all branches and departments created by law and exercising any activity or function defined by the Legislature and existing at the time the amendment was adopted, or which, if newly created by the Legislature, have not been rejected by resort to the referendum.
[756]*756State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28, 32-33 (1915).
This language was repeated by the Washington court in State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash.2d 320, 363 P.2d 121, 100 A.L.R.2d 304 (1961).
The Supreme Court of Michigan followed the reasoning of the Washington court as set forth in the Clausen case, supra, and held that the state highway department was a state institution within the meaning of that portion of the Michigan Constitution that excepted from the referendum acts making appropriations for state institutions. Detroit Automobile Club v. De Land, 230 Mich. 623, 203 N.W. 529 (1925).
We conclude that the interpretations by the Washington and Michigan courts of their respective constitutional provisions are sound, and therefore we interpret the phrase “existing public institutions,” as used in art. Ill, § 1 of our Constitution, in a similar manner. Accordingly, we hold that in the light of this state’s long-standing commitment to the development and maintenance of an adequate rail system, as expressed in the constitutional and statutory provisions set forth above, Senate Bill 225, read together with Senate Bills 249 and 252, operates to support an existing public institution of the state. The Division of Railroads was existing on the date Senate Bill 225 was enacted and signed into law. True, it may not have had the expanded powers granted to it by Senate Bill 225, but nonetheless it was as much in existence on March 12, 1980, as was the Department of Transportation or any other existing state institution. The argument that Senate Bill 225 created a new state institution out of whole cloth and set the state upon a previously untrodden course is belied by the provisions of SDCL 49-17 and SDCL 49-17A, discussed above. To the contrary, Senate Bill 225, together with its companion bills, constitutes a plan of action, compelled by the immediacy of the demise of certain rail lines in this state, to utilize, albeit in a more expanded fashion, the state’s existing institutional framework, complemented by the administrative adjunct created by Senate Bill 252, to fulfill the state’s commitment to assure adequate rail transportation for its citizens. Given the history of the state’s involvement in the development and maintenance of an adequate rail transportation system, it would be far too chary a reading of art. Ill, § 1 to say that the Division of Railroads is not an existing public institution of this state.
We recognize the fact that there may from time to time indeed be legislative constructs that are yet so evanescent or inchoate as not to warrant recognition as existing public institutions. Indeed, this Court has recognized that not all public institutions are of like character.
We content ourselves with observing that no matter what the case may be with public institutions of a different character, a municipal auditorium is such an institution as may not exist or function without a physical plant, and that therefore an auditorium that has its being solely in an ordinance and the wishful thinking of a progressive citizenry is not an “existing public institution.”
State ex rel. Saylor v. Walt, 66 S.D. 14, 20, 278 N.W. 12, 15 (1938).
In the light of the development of railroad legislation in this state, it would be a strained interpretation indeed to hold that the Division of Railroads has its being solely in statute and in legislative reverie.
There remains the question whether Senate Bill 225 is necessary for the support of the Division of Railroads and therefore properly within the class of laws subject to immediate implementation by legislative declaration pursuant to art. Ill, § 22, which provides:
No act shall take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it passed, unless in case of emergency, (to be expressed in the preamble or body of the act) the Legislature shall by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected of each house, otherwise direct.
The interrelationship of these two sections of art. Ill was addressed by this Court in Hodges v. Snyder, supra:
[757]*757The exception found in section 1 of article 3, names two classes of laws that are not subject to the referendum: First, such laws as are declared by the act itself to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety of the state; and, second, such laws as are necessary for the support of the government and its existing public institutions. A law may be necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and still be subject to the referendum, unless the Legislature declares it necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety . . But a law that is necessary for the support of the state government or its existing institutions is not subject to the referendum in any event, and will go into effect in accordance with the provisions of section 5111, Rev.Code 1919, unless the Legislature declares the existence of an emergency, under section 22, art. 3, Const., in which case such law will go into effect immediately or at such time as the Legislature may fix.
43 S.D. at 174-5, 178 N.W. at 577.
Whether an act falls within one of the two classes of laws that are excepted from the referendum by art. Ill, § 1 is a matter subject to judicial review. Whether an emergency exists within the meaning of art. Ill, § 22 is a matter solely for the Legislature to decide, however, so long as the law to which the emergency clause is attached in fact falls within one of the two excepted classes. Hodges v. Snyder, supra; State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 36 S.D. 260, 154 N.W. 707 (1915).
The principles governing our review of the question of the necessity of the support provided by a particular legislative act were well summarized in State ex rel. Kornmann v. Larson, supra:
[A] legislative declaration of an emergency is a nullity where the act could not by any fair inference be said to be in the exercise of the police power nor in support of the state government and its existing institutions. . . . This court in determining whether a law is necessary for the support of the state government and its existing institutions will consider the effect upon such support of delay incident to referral and the consequences if the law is defeated. If the efficient operation of the state government would be unaffected by the delay or possible defeat, the law in such instance cannot be said to be necessary so as to prevent a referral.
While this court must give to the action of the legislature every favorable presumption, the mere fact that a statute is for the support of the state government will not preclude judicial review of the question whether the act is “necessary” for such support. This court, however, will not enter upon an ascertainment of facts through formal proof by sworn witnesses and authenticated documents to determine necessity of a statute for the support of the state government. The scope of the review is limited to what appears upon the face of the act and facts within the court’s judicial knowledge.
81 S.D. at 544-545, 138 N.W.2d at 4.
Included within the materials that the Court may take judicial notice of are public or official records of general public interest such as legislative bills and legislative journals. 81 S.D. at 547, 138 N.W.2d at 5.
The proper scope of our review is outlined in the Kornmann case in the following language:
In order that this court may be justified in declaring that the act in question is not necessary for the support of the state government and its existing institutions and therefore subject to referendum it must at least appear from facts of which we may judicially notice that the conclusion is not reasonably disputable. In Ritholz v. Johnson, 244 Wis. 494, 12 N.W.2d 738, the court said: “When it appears from the information at hand that the facts are such as to render the conclusion to be drawn therefrom fairly debatable, the matter is for the determination of the Legislature and the court may not set up [758]*758its judgment against a legislative determination.”
* * * * * *
We must give to the legislative determination that the law in question is necessary every favorable presumption. As ordinarily considered the existence of a rational basis for a legislative judgment of necessity is dependent upon facts within the sphere of judicial notice at the time of enactment.
81 S.D. at 548, 138 N.W.2d at 6.
In reviewing the question of the necessity of the support provided by the act in question, we must presume that the Legislature availed itself of the opportunity to determine the facts when it made its determination that the act was necessary for the support of state government and its existing public institutions. State ex rel. Kornmann v. Larson, supra; State ex rel. Botkin v. Morrison, 61 S.D. 344, 249 N.W. 563 (1933).
With these principles of judicial review in mind, we turn, then, to the information available to the Legislature at the time it enacted Senate Bill 225 and its companion bills.
That the railroad system in South Dakota is in dire condition is not open to serious question. The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company has been in bankruptcy since 1977.
On November 4, 1979, the President signed into law the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act, P.L. 96-101 (93 Stat. 736), which provided, among other things, that no later than December 1, 1979, an association composed of representatives of national railway labor organizations, employee coalitions, and shippers might submit to the Interstate Commerce Commission a plan to convert all or a substantial part of the Milwaukee Railroad into an employee or employee-shipper owned company. On December 31, 1979, the Interstate Commerce Commission rejected a plan filed by the New Milwaukee Lines, a coalition of various Milwaukee Railroad employees and shippers, to convert a part of the Milwaukee Railroad into an employee-shipper owned company. I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 29171, December 31, 1979.
On January 16, 1980, Governor Janklow delivered a special transportation message to a joint session of the Legislature. House Journal, Fifty-fifth Session, pp. 304-324. In his message, Governor Janklow reviewed the status of rail transportation in this state, including the effect of the bankruptcy of the Milwaukee Railroad and of the potential abandonment of various segments of railroad trackage. He referred to the detrimental consequences to the economic well-being of the state should some action not be taken to prevent the wholesale abandonment of railroad trackage within the state.
On January 30, 1980, the Legislature recessed for one day for the purpose of considering the status of rail transportation within the state.
On February 25, 1980, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered an order directing the Trustee in bankruptcy to embargo all traffic originating on certain points on the Milwaukee system as of 11:59 p. m., February 29, 1980. No. 77 B 8999, In Re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., Order No. 290 A, N.D. Ill., February 29, 1980.
In addition to this documentary information, we must acknowledge the information that we share in common with the other citizens of this state, including the members of the Legislature, concerning the general decline of rail transportation within the state. Who of us has not instinctively responded to the habits of a lifetime only to realize that there is no longer any necessity of slowing for a crossing where the rails no longer run? Who of us has not observed a freight train making its slow, almost tentative, progress over bent, worn rails supported by broken, rotting ties that can only be described as the detritus of a once flourishing rail system?
As stated above, in determining whether or not a legislative act is necessary for the support of state government and its exist[759]*759ing institutions we must give every favorable presumption to the legislative determination that the law in question is necessary. This is not to say that there are no cases in which this Court should declare an emergency clause to be of no force and effect. Indeed, this Court has not hesitated to declare an emergency clause a nullity where from the substance of the act in question there clearly could not have been an emergency. For example, in State ex rel. Kleppe v. Steensland, 46 S.D. 342, 192 N.W. 749 (1923), this Court held to be without force or effect an emergency clause that was attached to a bill amending the statutes relating to bastardy proceedings. In contrast to such specious use of the emergency clause, however, the 1980 Legislature was faced with facts, including the probability of the imminent abandonment of numerous rail lines within this state, from which it could validly make the determination that a situation existed that justified including an emergency clause as a part of Senate Bill 225. We members of the judiciary are not possessed of such clairvoyance as to be able to say with any degree of certainty that the consequences that the .Legislature sought to avoid by the immediate implementation of Senate Bill 225 and its companion bills would not occur prior to July 1,1980. Because the question whether Senate Bill 225 is necessary for the support of state government and its existing public institutions is fairly debatable, we should not substitute our judgment on this issue for that of the Legislature. State ex rel. Kornmann v. Larson, supra. Accordingly, we hold that Senate Bill 225 is necessary for the support of an existing public institution of the state and that the emergency clause is valid.
In quashing the alternative writs heretofore issued and in denying applicant the relief she seeks, we pass no judgment on the wisdom of the act in question. Whether Senate Bill 225 and its companion bills ultimately prove to represent a farsighted legislative response to a situation of imminent public need or an ill-considered extension of the state’s involvement in the rail transportation system of this state remains for the future to assess. It is enough for us to say that the citizens of this state long ago recognized the need to impose upon the popular will the limitation inherent in the delegation to our duly elected representatives of the responsibility and authority to determine what means are required to cope with problems affecting the common good that by their very nature require immediate resolution. So long as such legislative action is taken on the basis of information upon which reasonable men and women could come to the conclusion that immediate action is necessary to support the state and its existing public institutions, the courts should not interfere with that legislative determination.
In # 13079, the alternative writ of prohibition is quashed and the application for a permanent writ of prohibition is dismissed.3 In # 13080, the alternative writ of mandamus is quashed and the application for a permanent writ of mandamus is dismissed.
FOSHEIM, J., concurs.
DUNN and MORGAN, JJ., concur specially.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.