Graves v. Solorzano

2025 Ohio 4472

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 114974
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Graves v. Solorzano, 2025-Ohio-4472.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CHRISIONNA GRAVES, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 114974 v. :

JILLIAN SOLORZANO, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 25, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. CVH00033

Appearances:

Chrisionna Graves, pro se.

Jillian Solorzano, pro se.

DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:

Plaintiff-appellant Chrisionna Graves (“Graves”) appeals from the

judgment entry of the Parma Municipal Court denying her motion for possession of

property. Graves had filed a replevin action seeking the return of a cat from

defendant-appellee Jillian Solorzano (“Solorzano”). For the reasons stated below,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History

This appeal revolves around a dispute over the possession of an orange

tabby cat named Marvin.

On January 2, 2025, Graves filed a complaint for replevin and motion

for possession of property in the Parma Municipal Court. On January 22, 2025, the

trial court held a hearing on Graves’s motion. Both Graves and Solorzano appeared

pro se and testified at the hearing.

The record reveals that Graves and Solorzano obtained Marvin in

California on February 20, 2022, while they were in a romantic relationship. In

June 2022, the couple moved from California to Ohio and began cohabitating. In

April 2023, the romantic relationship ended, and on September 29, 2023, Solorzano

moved out of the shared apartment without Marvin. From that point, Marvin went

back and forth between homes until around November 2024 when Solorzano, who

was in possession of Marvin at that time, blocked Graves’s telephone number and

refused her access to Marvin.

Graves testified to the following at the replevin hearing: Marvin was

given to both her and Solorzano. After Solorzano moved out, Marvin went back and

forth between their homes but he was mostly with Graves. Graves believes she has

paid for the bulk of Marvin’s food and veterinary bills since Solorzano’s move.

Solorzano testified to the following at the replevin hearing: Marvin was

acquired when he was gifted to her exclusively. She has pictures showing that even

after she moved out, Marvin was in her care at least once a month. After she moved out of the shared apartment, she continued to pay for Marvin’s pet health insurance

and some food and veterinary bills.

The following was admitted into evidence at the hearing: Graves’s

statements from Apple Pay, Cash App, and her bank showing cat food and veterinary

bill expenditures; an unsworn letter signed by Alyssa Everk, stating that Marvin was

gifted exclusively to Solorzano; two one-year pet health-insurance policies for

Marvin listing Solorzano as the owner, one policy effective beginning July 9, 2022,

and a second policy effective beginning July 1, 2024; self-portrait photographs

Solorzano took of herself and Marvin in December 2023 and January, March, May,

June, July, September, and October 2024; a May 2, 2024 text message from Graves

to Solorzano stating she wanted “the cats to be able to go back and forth” once

Solorzano had her own apartment; an August 6 text message from Graves to

Solorzano that states, “I think I’m fine with you just taking Marvin when you move,”1

which led to several text messages before Solorzano responded they “could talk

about him going back and forth even if he’s living with [Solorzano]”; and an August 8

text message where Solorzano states that “Marvin is [Solorzano’s] cat.”

On February 21, 2025, the trial court denied Graves’s motion for

possession, finding that prior to the end of their relationship, Graves and Solorzano

intended to “enjoy [Marvin] equally.” The trial court also found that when Solorzano

moved out, she did not abandon Marvin because she continued to maintain a

1 Some text messages between Graves and Solorzano that were admitted into

evidence at the hearing show the month and day they were sent but not the year. relationship with him and when he was in her care, she provided monetary support

and other needs for Marvin. The trial court went on to find that Graves failed to

show that she has a superior claim to Marvin.

Graves raises the following assignments of error for our review:

1. The Municipal Court erred as a matter of law in holding that Graves did not meet the burden of proof to establish probable cause to support the claim, thereby denying the replevin action.

2. The Municipal Court erred in finding that the defendant if in fact was gifted the cat and thereby the owner, did not violate section 959.01, Revised Code in reference to abandonment of animals, despite the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Replevin

In her first assignment of error, Graves argues that the trial court erred

when it denied her motion for possession of property.

The standard of review following a civil bench trial is whether the trial

court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Gudenas v.

Gudenas, 2024-Ohio-3009, ¶ 39, citing Revilo Tyluka, L.L.C. v. Simon Roofing &

Sheet Metal Corp., 2011-Ohio-1922, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), App.R. 12(C); Seasons Coal Co.,

Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984). “Judgments supported by some

competent, credible evidence going to all the material elements of the claim must

not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id., citing C.E.

Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.3d 223 (1994), syllabus. Under a

manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, “[r]eviewing courts must oblige every

reasonable presumption in favor of the lower court’s judgment and findings of fact.” Gudenas at ¶ 39, citing Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226 (1994),

Seasons Coal Co., Inc. at 80, fn. 3.

On review, the appellate court “review[s] the entire record, weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must

be reversed, and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387

(1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

“A replevin action provides the means to obtain possession of specific

personal property that one has a right to possess” and lies “against one having, at

the time the suit is begun, actual or constructive possession and control of the

property.” Lacy v. State, 2020-Ohio-3089, ¶ 62 (11th Dist.). A cat is property, and

its owner is entitled to maintain a replevin action for its wrongful taking. Livengood

v. Markusson, 31 Ohio App. 183, 184 (9th Dist. 1928); Dukuzumuremyi v. Martin,

2025-Ohio-508, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.).

The two elements to a replevin action are as follows: ‘“(1) that the

plaintiff is the owner of the property in question and (2) that he is entitled to

possession of the property in question.’” Harris v. Mayfield Hts., 2013-Ohio-2464

(8th Dist.), quoting Brown v. Rowlen, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2174 (5th Dist.

May 12, 1994). The party filing a complaint in replevin has the burden to prove, by

a preponderance of evidence, they are entitled to possession of the property. Eltibi

v. Kocsis, 2021-Ohio-2911, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.). In this case, Graves failed to establish that she is the sole owner of

Marvin and thus entitled to possession. The record reflects that Graves and

Solorzano obtained Marvin while living together and both cared for him physically

and financially in his early years. In the time since Solorzano moved out of the

shared apartment, both Graves and Solorzano continued to care for Marvin

physically and financially, although not in equal amounts. Even though Graves may

have provided a greater amount of care than Solorzano provided, it does not negate

any ownership interest Solorzano has to Marvin. We cannot say that the trial court

erred when it found that Graves failed to show a superior claim to Marvin. Graves’s

first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Abandonment

In her second assignment of error, Graves argues that the trial court

erred when it did not find that Solorzano abandoned Marvin pursuant to R.C.

959.01, leaving Graves as his sole owner.

Graves urges us to adopt the R.C. 959.01 definition of “abandon.”

Pursuant to R.C. 959.01, “[n]o owner or keeper of a dog, cat, or other domestic

animal, shall abandon such animal.” However, a review of cases discussing

R.C. 959.01 reveals its use exclusively in the context of criminal prosecution for

abandonment of an animal where the owner left an animal with no intention of

returning to it or plans for the care of the animal. See State v. White, 2024-Ohio-

4654 (1st Dist.) (defendant convicted for abandoning animals under R.C. 959.01,

because she admitted she left dogs at a home where she no longer resided, had not returned to care for them, and the dogs had no food or water when they were found);

State v. Harding, 2023-Ohio-3508 (2d Dist.) (defendant convicted of abandonment

under R.C. 959.01 and failure to confine when she released a dog on the side of the

road); State v. Wolfe, 2017-Ohio-1326 (5th Dist.) (defendant convicted of

abandoning animals under R.C. 959.01 after an ill puppy was found in a plastic bag

behind a store); State v. Amos, 2014-Ohio-3097 (5th Dist.) (defendant convicted of

abandoning animals under R.C. 959.01 after leaving a cat outside a closed

veterinarian’s office).

Graves specifically urges this court to adopt the definition of

“abandon” as found in White. The appellant in White was convicted of abandoning

animals under R.C. 959.01. The White Court adopted the Black’s Law Dictionary

of ‘“abandon’” as ‘“to leave (someone), especially when doing so amounts to an

abdication of responsibility.’” (Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 25, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). The White Court also found that “[t]he intent of the

owner or keeper of the animal is crucial to determining whether an animal has been

abandoned.” Id. at ¶ 29. The court looked to 1 Ohio Jur.3d, Abandoned, Lost, and

Unclaimed Property, § 8 (2024), for whether an offender intended to abandon an

animal, which states that “intent to abandon can be established by either

‘unequivocal and decisive acts indicating such intention’ or ‘express declaration,’ or

may be ‘inferred from circumstances indicative of intention.’” Id. at ¶ 30. As

discussed above, the context of White and R.C. 959.01 is criminal convictions for abandoning an animal; thus, we decline to apply the definition in a civil replevin

action.

In replevin actions, abandonment of an animal has been defined as

‘“an absolute unequivocal relinquishment of a right or status without regard to self or any other person. It is a virtual throwing away without regard as to who may take over or carry on. It is a total desertion of what existed or went before; and evidence thereof must be direct, affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of throwing away.”’

Long v. Noah’s Lost Ark, Inc., 2004-Ohio-4155 (7th Dist.), quoting Davis v. Suggs,

10 Ohio App.3d 50, 52 (12th Dist. 1983), quoting State ex rel. Reeder v. Mun. Civ.

Serv. Comm., 1958 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 285, *31-32 (Franklin C.P. 1958).

In this case, we must determine if the trial court erred when it found

that Solorzano did not abandon Marvin when she moved out of the apartment she

shared with Graves. A review of the record reflects that it supports the trial court’s

finding. Solorzano testified that she never intended to abandon Marvin, and her

actions do not indicate abandonment. Both she and Graves testified that Marvin

went back and forth between them after Solorzano moved out and that Solorzano

visited Marvin. In addition, Solorzano continued to contribute financially to

Marvin’s care after she moved out of the shared apartment by purchasing food and

paying for Marvin’s health insurance, albeit her financial contribution was a lesser

amount than Graves’s contribution. Her continued care for Marvin also shows a

lack of total desertion or virtual throwing away of Marvin. Graves fails to show that Solorzano abandoned Marvin when she moved out of the shared apartment. In fact,

the record reflects the opposite.

Therefore, competent, credible evidence existed to support the trial

court’s finding that Solorzano did not abandon Marvin. Graves’s second assignment

of error is overruled.

The trial court did not err when it denied Graves’s motion for

possession of property where she sought the return of Marvin the cat from

Solorzano. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s order.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR