Gratiot v. United States

45 U.S. 80, 11 L. Ed. 884, 4 How. 80, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 386
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 14, 1846
StatusPublished
Cited by51 cases

This text of 45 U.S. 80 (Gratiot v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. 80, 11 L. Ed. 884, 4 How. 80, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 386 (1846).

Opinions

Mr. Justice WAYNE

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is now before us upon exceptions, taken upon its trial in the Circuit Court, to the instructions which were given by the court, and such as it refused to give to the jury. We do not think them well-founded. When the instructions were given and refused, the only matters in controversy were items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, in General Gratiot’s set-off. The 4th, 9th, 10th, 12th items, and one half of the 11th, had been withdrawn, having been allowed in former settlements. The other half of 11, and the entire 5th item, were admitted by the district attorney, in the course of the trial, to be audits against the demand of the United States. The instructions then are to be considered in reference to the disputed items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15.

The first instruction was given upon item number 1, the second upon item 2, the third upon item 3, the fourth upon items 6 and 7, the fifth upon the 8th item, the sixth and seventh upon item 14, and the eighth instruction upon item 15, comprehending under the last all the. particulars in the account attached to Mr. Benjamin Fowler’s deposition.

The instructions were intended by the court to be legal concluclusions from all the evidence in the cause. Our inquiries will be, Are they so ? And, as legal conclusions, were they given in-such terms as in no way to encroach upon the province of the jury to weigh the evidence as to the facts in the case ?

The first instruction denies the right to commissions upon the [111]*111amount turned over to James Maurice. After another reason in no way material to be here noticed, the court gives as a final reason for rejecting the charge, that the only evidence in support of it was the transcriptj and that such evidence was not sufficient to authorize any commission to be allowed for turning over the money to an accounting officer.

The transcript alluded to is the account of General Gratiot with the United States. It was a part of the record in the case reported in 15 Peters, 336, and was used again as evidence upon the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court, with the consent of General Gratiot.

We learn from it, that between the 27th August and the 20th September, 1821, $46,050 had been remitted to General Gratiot, then a major in the Corps of Engineers and the superintending engineer of fortifications at Old Point Comfort; and that he, within the dates just mentioned, turned over the money to James Maurice, agent of fortifications, on account of Forts Calhoun and Monroe. This is the only evidence bearing upon the item. It is a charge of a commission of 2| per cent, upon the amount,. as it is expressed in the set-off, for safe keeping and the responsibility incurred in receiving and turning it over to the agent, when General Gratiot was not a disbursing agent. ■ It is then established, that the money was received and turned over to Maurice, when he was the agent; and also what were the relations of General Gratiot and of Maurice to the government at Old Point Comfort. Those relations arose from the ,67th article of the General Regulations of the Army, published in orders from the War Department in July, 1S21. From the detail in that article, particularly that paragraph of it directing in what kind of money the agent should make payments, and in what banks it was to be kept by him, there is no doubt it was intended that he should disburse from remittances made to himself by the government. Such was to be the ordinary nature of remittance. But by another paragraph, the superintending engineer had a general superintendence of the agents’ disbursements, and none could be made without his signature. .And by a third paragraph in the same article, he could be required to perform the duties of agent, when there was no agent of fortifications, for which service a particular compensation is allowed. Is it not obvious, then, with such a power in the Engineer Department, in the contingency mentioned, to call upon the superintending engineer to perform the duties of agent, that remittances could be made to him to be disbursed by himself, when at the time of the remittance there was no qualified agent to receive it, or to be turned over to an agent when one became qualified. The exact state of the case in that respect-we do not know, — the transcript does not show it; but it is because it does not show it, and because the money was not disbursed by General Gratiot, but was paid over by him to [112]*112the agent in so short a time after it was received, that we are bound to presume there was not an agent at Old Point qualified to receive the remittances made to General Gratiot, and that intermediately, before the money was turned over, the agent who did receive and disburse it became qualified. There were only two officers .to whom remittances could be made and by whom they could be disbursed,— the superintending engineer and the agent for fortifications. Such, then, must be the inference, as we have stated it, unless we come to the overstrained conclusion, that the money was remitted to General Gratiot for some other purpose than for disbursement, and that the department was experimenting in a third way, as to the manner of making remittances and of disbursement, contrary to the regulations giving to it the direction of fortifications. The money was clearly sent to be disbursed by General Gratiot, or by an agent. If not for such purpose, it would not have been remitted. But having been remitted to the superintendent of fortifications, and not having been disbursed by him, it could alone have been prevented by the supervention of an agent whose duty it became to do it, the regulation not permitting it to be done by the superintendent, except when there was no ageqt for fortifications. It is not necessary for us t) go out of this course of reasoning for the purpose of confirming it, but it is confirmed by the manner in which the charge is made. It is “ for the safe keeping of and responsibility for the following sums, placed in the custody of C. Gratiot, from the 27th August up to the 7th and 20th September, 1821, the dates of their being turned over to James Maurice, as shown on the credit side of the transcript, &c., &c., when General Gratiot was not a disbursing agent.” Why for safe keeping, if at the time the money was remitted James Maurice was a qualified agent to whom the remittance could have been made? Why paid over to him, if between the 27th August and the 7th and 20th September Maurice had not become so? The terms in which the charge is made disclose the fact to have been as we have inferred it was ; and the error in making it has arisen from its having been supposed that the superintending engineer could be the custodium of government money in any other character or purpose than that in which it could be remitted to him.by the Engineer Department, under the 67th article of the Army Regulations of 1821. In this view of the claim, no case of compensation by way of usage can apply to it. Here is a case of an officer with certain duties, absolute and contingent, well ascertained, with a fixed and equally well ascertained compensation for any and every service which he could be called on to render. Compensation by way of usage has never been sanctioned by the court in any case, except for extra official service, which was within the equity of the act of 1797, ch. 74, as that act was originally construed and applied in the case of the United' States v. Wilkins, 6 Wheaton, 135, and subsequently in [113]*113the cases of McDaniel, Ripley, and Fillebrown, in 7 Peters, 1, 18, 28.

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Bluebook (online)
45 U.S. 80, 11 L. Ed. 884, 4 How. 80, 1846 U.S. LEXIS 386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gratiot-v-united-states-scotus-1846.