Grant v. Lamont

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT et al. EDDIE PGlRaAinNtiTff, sJR., v. , Civil No. 3:22-cv-01223 (JBA) et al. EDWARD M. LAMONT, JR., in his official capacity, August 23, 2023 , Defendants . RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

On February 8, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss [Doc. # 29] claims in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint [Doc. # 13] against Defendants Governor Lamont, Chief State’s Attorney Griffin, and 10 of the 13 State’s Attorneys on grounds that they are improper parties under the Eleventh Amendment. (Defs.’ Mem. [Doc. # 29-1] at 1.) Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [Doc. # 48] on June 28, 2023 following Defendant Lamont signing into law CI.o nn. PRueblleicv Aanctt NFoa.c 2ts3 -53, and the pending Motion to Dismiss is directed to this SAC. See The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background of this case. ( Order Denying Mot. for TRO [Doc. # 41] at 3.) Plaintiffs Grant, Hamilton, and Stiefel (“the Individual Plaintiffs”) reside in Meriden, Enfield, and Montville, Connecticut, respectively. (SAC ¶¶ 8, 18, 24.) Plaintiff Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. (“CCDL”) is a Connecticut non- profit that “has over 41,000 members and supporters nationwide, with more thaInd .ninety- five percent of its members and supporters being residents of Connecticut”. ( ¶ 32.) Similarly, Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. (“SAF”) is a non-profit that IPdl.aintiffs represent has over 70,000 members, “including many members Iidn. Connecticut.” ( ¶ 37.) The Individual Plaintiffs are all members of both CCDL and SAF. ( ¶¶ 36, 39.) The Defendants are Governor Ned Lamont, Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection James Rovella, Chief State’s Attorney (“CSA”) Patrick Griffin, and the thirteen individual State’s Attorneys, each of whom is assigned a pIIa. rticuLlaerg jauld Sictaianl ddaisrtdri ct. (SAC ¶¶ 40-55.)

“[A] claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 1M2o(rbr)is(o1n) wv.h Neant ’tlh Aeu dsitsrtarliicat Bcoaunrkt Llatdcks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” 1 ., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). “When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court must take all facts allegeSdw iene tt hve. cSohmeaphlaanint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff[s].” , 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). “However, argAutml. eMnutta.t iIvnes. iCnofe. rve. nBcaelsfo fuarv oMraacbllaei ntoe tInhte' lp Latrdt.y asserting jurisdiction should not be drawn.” , 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992). In response to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “plaintiff[s] asserting subject matter Mjuariksadriocvtiao nv. hUan[vitee]d t hStea bteusrden of proving by a preponderanc e of the evidence that it exists.” , 201 F.3d 110, 1II1I.3 (2dD Cisirc.u 2s0s0io0n). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims against Governor Lamont, CSA Griffin, and 10 of 2 the 13 State’s Attorneys are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states and their officials unless the state consents to suit, Congress

Unless otherwise indicated, internal citations, quotation marks, and other alterations are omitted throughout in text quoted from court decisions. 2 Defendants do not dispute that Commissioner Rovella and State’s Attorneys Doyle, Walcott, and Narducci (who are responsible for the home judicial districts of the three Individual Plaintiffs) are proper defendants. Ex parte Young NAACP av.b Mroegraritlels the state’s immunity, or the case falls within the exception.” , 9E3x9 p Fa.r3tde Y4o7u0n, g475 (2d Cir. 2019). Under , to make “an officer of the state a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, it is plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making himE ax ppaarrttye aYso uan rgepresentative of the state, a nd thereby attempting to make the state a party.” , 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).“A particular duty to enforce the statute in question and a demonstrated wilElixn pganretses Ytoou enxgercCisoen nthecatti cduutt yA siss' nn eoef dHeeda lftohr Caa srtea Ftea coiflfiitcieesr, tIon cb. ev . aR pelrloper defendant under .” , No. 3:10CVA13. 6 PCGDo, 2v0er1n0o Wr LL a2m23o2n6t9 3, at *5 (D. Conn. June 3, 2010). Ex parte Young. Plaintiffs fail to show that Governor Lamont is a proper party under A governor’s general constitutional duty to “tEakx ep acratreeY tohuant gthSee ela, ew.gs. bKeu cfaki tvh. fDuallnya ehxeercuted,” Conn. Const. art. IV., § 12, does not implicate . , , 822 F. Supp. 2d 109, 14E2x (pDa.r Cteo Ynonu. n2g011) (“[C]ourts in the Second Circuit have not extended the exception under on the basis that a state official has a general duty to execute and enforce state laws.”). Plaintiffs point to the fact that Defendant Rovella serves at the pleasure of Governor Lamont and reports to him. (Pls.’ Opp’n [Doc. E#x 3 p4a] ratet 5Y.o) uBnugt “a generalized ob.li gSaeteio, ne .gto. ‘Gsruepaetrevri Cseh’a iust ainusquufafi cFieedn.t C froerd ipt uUrnpioosne vs. oMf atrhkes doctrine to apply” , , 600 F. Supp. 3d 405, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). As Defendants note, if “[a] general duty to enforce state law or to supervise other officials responsible for enforcing Etxh pea rcthea Ylloeunngged provision” were sufficient to demonstrate connection for purposes of , “the constitutionality of every act passed by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the governor . . . based upon the theory that [he], as theE emxoercyu tvi.v Ne eowf t Yhoer Sktate was, in a general sense, charged with the execution of all its laws . . . .” , No. 11-CV-1774 RRM RLM, 2013 WL 1881009, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013). Plaintiffs also argue that because Governor Lamont has expressed support for enhanced firearm regulation,E hxe ipsa srutfef icYieonutnlyg connected to the enforcement of the Challenged Statutes for purposes of . (Pls.’ Opp’n at 5-7.) But even if all of Plaintiffs’ representations regarding the Governor’s involvement Ewxi tpha rfitree aYromun pgolicy are accepted, they do not cao npastrittiuctuel aar dsuutfyfi ctoie ennt focrocnenection under to show that the Governor has the laws in question. Indeed, even when plaintiffs have brought actions related to “executive orders and an emergency directive” issued byE ax gpoavrteer nYooru, ntghaSt eheaRs obbeeernso fno uvn. Cdu ionmsuof,f icient to make that governor a proper pa rvtay cuantedde ra nd remanded as. mo ot Roberson v. Hoch5u2l 4 F. Supp. 3d 196, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), , , No. 21-877, 2022 WL 19224518 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2022). It is clear that Governor LamontE ixs pnaortt es uYfofiucniegntly connected to the enforcement of the Challenged Statutes to fall under the exception, and as such is not a proper defendaBn. t on tChhisi ecfa Sseta. te’s Attorney Griffin Ex parte Young Defendants further argue that CSA Griffin also is not a proper party under because “Connecticut law does not impose upon him any special duty to investigate criminal matters or initiate criminal prosecutions in the. ’f irst instance for violations of the criminal law, including a violation of § 53-202a-c.” (Defs Mem. at 6) (citing Conn. Const. Art. XXIII.) Plaintiffs argue that the CSA has a significant role in the enforcement of the Challenged Ex parte Young Statutes, and thus Defendant Griffin falls under the exception. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 3 7-9.) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-276 establishes a Division of Criminal Justice within Connecticut’s Executive Department and places it in charge of the investigation and prosecution of all criminal matters in the Superior Court. The CSA “shall administer, direct, supervise, coordinate and contrseoel thaels oo perations, activities and programs of the division.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-279(a); Conn. Const. Art. IV., § 27 (referring to the CSA as the “administrative head” of the division). Among his duties are to “establish guidelines, policies, and procedures for the internal operation and administration of the division which shall be binding on all division personnel.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-279(a)(3). The Chief State’s Attorney may also “participate on behalf of the state in all appellate, post-trial and postconviction proceedings arising out of the initiation of any criminal action,” and may “sign any warranItds,. informations, applications for grand jury investigations and applications for extradition.” § 51-277(c)-(d)(1). The CSA “may, with the prior conIsde.nt of the state's attorney for the judicial district, appear in court to represent the state.” § 51-277(d)(2). The CSA may also take over the responsibilitiIeds. of a state’s attorney for a judicial district if the CSA finds there to be a conflict of interest. § 51-277(d)(3). The Second Circuit has stated that the CSA occupies a “somewhat pecPuolwiaerr sp ov.s Citoioen” as the “administrative head” of the Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice. , 728 F.2d 97, 99 n.3 (2d Cir. 198 4) (comparing the CSA, in certain respects, to the role of an

3 Plaintiffs make much of the fact that in Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiffs’ TeSmeep orary Restraining Order, Defendants cite to statements by CSA Griffin as representative of the position of the Division of Criminal Justice on matters of firearm enforcement. ( Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Emergency TRO [Doc. # 36]E xa t p3a.)r tBe uYt otuhne gfact that CSA Griffin is a supervisor with policy-Sseeett sinupg raauthority over individual State’s Attorneys, without more, does not make him subject to suit under the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section III(A). attorney general). Plaintiffs argue that the CSA’s role, including his authority to set agency policy, involves him sufficiently in enforcement to render him a proper party (Pls.’ Opp’n at 8.) Defendants argue that CSA Griffin is an improper defendant for substantially the same reason as Governor Lamont, and that Plaintiffs’ argument collapses into the same argEuxm peanrttes Yaboouuntg supervisory authority and policy-making that are insufficient to trigger the exception in the gubernatorial context. The Court finds that, like Governor Lamont, CSA Griffin lacks a particularized duty to enforce the Challenged Statutes, and instead functions in a supervisory role over those that do have Sseuec hIn ak edlu vty. C, io.en.n, tehceti icnudtividual state’s 4 attorneys for each of Connecticut’s judicial districts. , No. 3:14-CV- 01303 MPS, 2015 WL 4067038, at *5 (D. Conn. July 2, 2015) (“[The] Chief State's Attorney . . . is responsible for administering the State Division of Criminal Justice, but, with exceptions not relevant here, he is not responsible for prosecuting individual cases within the various judicial districts. It is the local State's Attorney for each judicial district that bears the latter responsibility.”). The Court co ncludes that Chief State’s Attorney Griffin is not a proper defendaCn. t to PSlatainteti’fsf sA’ tctlaoirmnse.ys Kelley, Applegate, Corradino, Shannon, Gailor, Ferencek, Gedansky, Watson, Platt, and Mahoney Plaintiffs have failed to show that State’s Attorneys Kelley, Applegate, Corradino, Shannon, Gailor, Ferencek, Gedansky, Watson, Platt, and Mahoney have the necessary connection to the enforcement of the Challenged Statutes against Plaintiffs. Individual Plaintiffs Grant, Hamilton, and Stiefel reside in Meriden, Enfield, and Montville, Connecticut,

4 “Each state’s attorney, assistant state’s attorney and deputy assistant state’s attorney shall diligently inquire after and make appropriate presentment and complaint to the Superior Court of all crimes and other criminal matters within the jurisdiction of the court or in which the court may proceed, whether committed before or after his appointment to office.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-286a(a). respectively. (SAC ¶¶ 8, 18, 24.) The State’s Attorneys for these districts are Defendants Doyle, Walcott, and Narducci, responsible for the judicial districts of New Haven, Hartford, and New London respectively, and Defendants maintain that this action canSeneo tE lblieo tbtr vo.u Cgihtyt aogf aHinasrtt faonrdy State’s Attorneys other than those three. (Defs.’ Mem. at 9-11.) , No. 3:09CV00948(AWT), 2013 WL 12402403, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Each of the thirteen judicial districts in Connescetiecualts oisC loendn beyct iac ustt'ast Jeu'sd iactiatol rDniestyr, icwtsh oa nids aStpaptoei'sn tAetdt obryn ethyes Criminal Justice Commission”); , CT.gov, https://portal.ct.gov/DCJ/About-Us/About-Us/Judicial-Districts- and-States-Attorneys, (last accessed on February 2, 2023), (identifying thirteen judicial districts and corresponding State’s Attorneys). Plaintiffs respond that “it does not take leaps of logic to infer” that any of the State’s Attorneys could still enforce the Challenged Statutes against Plaintiffs if Plaintiffs were to travel to districts other than where they reside. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants fail to address the representative capacity claims of CCDL and SAF, and their 41,000 members dispersed throughout Connecticut, because “CCDL could safelyI dp.roduce members who live in every judicial district in Connecticut if called upon to do so.” ( at 10.) “The Second Circuit has repeatedly observed that, in contrast to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, ‘when the question to be considered is one involving the jurisdiction of a federal court, jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is Rnoodt rmigaudeez b vy. dWrianwskinig from the pleadings inferences favorable to the Sphaiprtpyi nags sFeinrt. iSnegr vi.t .C’”o rp. v. Drakos , 444 F. Supp. 3d 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting , 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs do not plead that any of the Individual Plaintiffs wish to travel with prohibited firearms to judicial districts other than those in which they reside, nor do they provide any details regarding hypothetical CCDL or SAF members from other judicial districts that wish to engage in prohibited conduct. Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to demonstrate that State’s Attorneys Kelley, Applegate, Corradino, Shannon, Gailor, Ferencek, Watson, Gedansky, Platt, and Mahoney have theE xn peacretses aYroyu ncgonnection to enforcement of the Challenged Statutes against Plaintiffs under and thus are iImV.p ropCeor ndcelfuesnidoann ts in this action.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims against Defendants Lamont, Griffin, Kelley, Applegate, Corradino, Shannon, Gailor, Ferencek, Watson, Gedansky, Platt, and Mahoney. The case will proceed against Defendants Rovella, Doyle, Walcott, and Narducci.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________/s/________________________

Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J. Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 23rd day of August, 2023