Grant v. 115th Precinct

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELIZABETH GRANT, Plaintiff, 25-CV-2058 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER 115TH PRECINCT, ET AL., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Rose M. Singer Center on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her federal constitutional rights in East Elmhurst, Queens County, New York. Named as Defendants are the 115th Precinct of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); several NYPD officers who work at the 115th Precinct in Jackson Heights, Queens County, New York, and the Association for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“ASPCA”). For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights when she was arrested at her residence in Queens County, and in the course of her criminal proceedings, which are taking place at the Queens County Criminal Court. Queens County falls within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Plaintiff does not plead the residence of the individual

defendants, but she alleges that the ASPCA resides in this District, and the City of New York, which is the proper defendant for claims against the NYPD’s 115th Precinct, can be considered to reside in both this District and the Eastern District of New York. Even if the Court did assume that all defendants reside in the State of New York, and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens County, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the

convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Queens County, where the individual defendants are employed, and where Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are taking place. It is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Queens County. The Eastern District of New York

appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court.1 A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this case in this court. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: March 14, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed the complaint without an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a prisoner authorization.