Graham v. Keene

32 N.E. 180, 143 Ill. 425
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 31, 1892
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 32 N.E. 180 (Graham v. Keene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Graham v. Keene, 32 N.E. 180, 143 Ill. 425 (Ill. 1892).

Opinion

Mr..Justice Bakek

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The appellee, George M. Keene, is the owner of a farm consisting of two quarter-sections of land, one of said quarter-sections lying north of a public highway which runs east and west, and the other lying south of said highway, and the west-line of said farm is coincident with the west lines of the two sections in which said quarter-sections are respectively located. In this highway, and about seven or eight rods west of the west line of the premises of appellee, is a pond or sag-hole, and some years ago a roadway was thrown up or “piked up”' through this pond, the principal part of the pond being to the north of the thrown-up road, and a sluice was made through the embankment to allow the water to escape to the south,, hut the sluice was at times insufficient in size to carry the-volume of accumulated water, and has been allowed to get out of repair and become obstructed.

There are in that locality two small valleys lying side by side, and separated by a narrow strip or ridge of high ground. Both valleys slope to the south or south-east, and both drain-into a ravine or swale that crosses their southern extremities. The highway crosses these two valleys from twenty-five to-thirty-five rods north of the ravine. The pond above mentioned is in the west valley, and is formed by surface water. The natural flow and drainage of the surface water from the land north of the highway and west of the north half of the-farm of appellee is into this pond, and the natural flow and drainage from the pond, and from that portion of the highway that lies west of the west line of the premises of appellee, is through the west valley, first in a southerly and then in an easterly direction, first flowing upon the tract of land immediately west of the south half of appellee’s farm, and then flowing upon appellee’s land and into the ravine or swale above mentioned. The east valley runs through the lands of appellee, and where the highway crosses it, and about twenty-five rods east of the pond, there is also a sluice-way for water.

The original and natural elevation of the ridge between the two sluice-ways was some three feet above the surface of the valleys on either side, but from time to time, for many years past, earth has been excavated on the north side of the highway for constructing the thrown-up road and for repairing the highway, and by various individuals for their own private purposes. The result is, the sluice-way at the pond being small and partially obstructed and filled up, that in times of high water, and for a number of years, the water from the pond has to some extent flowed through said excavation in the ridge, and through the east sluice-way, and upon the land of appellee. A further excavation of a foot or eighteen inches would permit the water to flow freely from the pond and from ihe western valley to the eastern valley and sluice-way, and substantially drain the pond. The commissioners of highways of the town of Victor who are plaintiffs in error herein, made arrangements to further excavate through the ridge, and make such a ditch along the north side of the highway as would conduct all the waters of the west valley, and of the pond north of the highway, through the east sluice-way, and discharge "them upon the premises of appellee. The place of the discharge of such waters would be in a plowed and cultivated field, and in a basin, where the water would have to stand on the land to a depth of twelve or fourteen inches before it would "begin to flow away. The burden of water already imposed on said field by the east sluice, and otherwise, is already so great as that it is with difficulty susceptible of cultivation, and the proposed additional discharge of water thereon would render it unavailable for the purposes of tillage. The road on each side of and through the pond or sag-hole is a good one, and there exists no necessity for the construction of the proposed ditch for the purpose of improving or repairing the highway.

The above are the substantial facts of this case, briefly stated, as they are alleged in the bill for an injunction that was filed by appellee for the purpose of restraining the highway commissioners and their employes from excavating and opening the proposed ditch or drain along the north side of the highway and through the ridge or elevation near the west line of appellee’s farm, and as they were reported by the master in chancery in his findings of fact, and as they were found, at the hearing, in the decree of the circuit court, and by the Appellate Court upon the appeal to that court; and the facts thus stated are, in our opinion, amply established by the evidence in the record.

The right to drain upon and over lower or servient lands without making compensation for such privilege, is the same-whether the dominant land is the farm of an individual owner or is a public highway. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the constitutional inhibition against taking or damaging private property for public use without making just compensation. In this State the same rule is applied to surface-water flowing in a natural and regular channel that is applied to a running stream or water-course. The public, represented here by the highway commissioners, have a right to have the-surface water falling or coming naturally upon the highway, pass off the same through the natural and usual channel or outlet upon and over the lower lands lying north and east of the pond in question, and have the right to construct ditches or drains for the purpose of conducting said surface water, and the water in the pond on said highway, into said natural and usual channel or outlet, even if the water thus carried upon said lower lands is thereby increased. (Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611.) As we have already seen, the natural outlet for the surface water from that portion of the highway that lies west of the section line and west of the elevation or ridge above mentioned, and from the land immediately adjoining it on the north, and of the surface water contained in the pond, is through the tract of land directly south of the pond, and thence in an easterly direction into a ravine or swale on the land of appellee. As between said portion of the highway and that part of the land of appellee that lies in the west valley, and through which the water naturally flows to the ravine or swale, the relation of dominant estate and servient estate exists.

But, as we understand the pleadings and the proof, the land in that portion of the south quarter-section of appellee’s farm that adjoins the highway east of the section line, and upon which his cultivated fiéld is situated, can not justly be considered as servient to the land in the highway that lies in a different section, and from which it is separated by an elevation or ridge, which, in the state of nature, was several'feet higher than the surface of the soil on either side, and over which it was impossible that water could flow. The place in the field where the water from the proposed ditch would be discharged is a sort of basin, and there is no natural outlet or channel from it, and from its location, and by means of the east sluice-way, it is already burdened with the surface water from that portion of .the highway that is east of the ridge and from seven or eight acres of land that lie north of that part of the road, and to now divert the 'surface .water west of the ridge from its.

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Bluebook (online)
32 N.E. 180, 143 Ill. 425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/graham-v-keene-ill-1892.