NO. 4-10-0445 Opinion Filed 4/18/11
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH ASSEMBLIES OF ) Appeal from GOD, ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Sangamon County v. ) No. 08MR718 THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ) and BRIAN A. HAMER, Director, ) Defendants-Appellants, ) and ) SANGAMON COUNTY, Acting Through JOHN ) Honorable SCHMIDT, State's Attorney, ) Leo J. Zappa, Jr., Defendant. ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
For the 2007 tax year, an approximately seven-acre
parcel owned by plaintiff, Grace Community Church Assemblies of
God, was reassessed from agricultural to commercial property.
Consequently, plaintiff's property-tax liability rose from $60
per year to over $15,000 per year. Plaintiff challenged the
assessment, claiming its property was exempt from taxation as it
was used exclusively for religious purposes. The Sangamon County
board of review agreed with plaintiff and determined the property
should be exempt. After review of the board's decision, defen-
dants, the Illinois Department of Revenue (Department) and its
Director, Brian A. Hamer, denied the exemption. Plaintiff
requested a formal hearing. After a hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ recommended the exemption be denied, and her determination was accepted by the Department and
its Director. On administrative review, the circuit court
reversed, finding the property was exempt.
The Department and its Director appeal, arguing the
agency determination the property was not exempt should be upheld
and the circuit court's judgment reversed. Specifically, these
defendants argue (1) plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence
its land qualified for exemption and (2) the evidence actually
submitted shows plaintiff's land is not entitled to exemption.
Plaintiff responds its land should be found exempt because either
(1) the land was actually used exclusively for religious purposes
or (2) the land was being developed toward use for religious
purposes. As the land in question was used exclusively for
religious purposes, insofar as it was at least minimally used for
religious purposes, was not used for secular purposes, and was in
the actual process of development and adaptation for religious
use in the tax year in question, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's land in question is approximately seven
acres at the intersection of Westchester Boulevard and Chatham
Road in Springfield, Illinois. In May 1996, plaintiff acquired
the parcel by quitclaim deed from the Illinois District Council
of the Assemblies of God. Until tax year 2007, the parcel was
assessed as agricultural land for property-tax purposes as
approximately four of the seven acres were farmed by a nearby
farmer. In 2005, this agricultural use ceased when plaintiff
- 2 - sold off approximately one acre of the parcel. For tax year
2007, the parcel was reassessed as commercial property. This
resulted in an increase in plaintiff's annual property-tax
liability from $60 to more than $15,000. Plaintiff's budget
could not cover the increased liability.
In May 2007, plaintiff's pastor, Danny L. Shaner, sent
a letter to taxing authorities listing plaintiff's activities on
the property in question. The activities listed are: "Services";
"Prayer Walks"; "Youth activities: Camping, launching rockets,
observing the wildlife, various sports/games";
"Picnics/Fellowship meals"; "Kid's Day (outreach into the neigh-
borhood)"; "Work day"; "School Supplies/Free Lunch outreach"; and
"Use of property (no charge) to other nonprofit groups (Sojourn
Shelter)." In June 2007, plaintiff applied for a religious
exemption for the property taxes sought to be collected with the
Sangamon County board of review. Later that month, the board of
review recommended the exemption be granted.
After the board of review made its recommendation, as a
matter of course, the Department inquired into plaintiff's use of
the land in question. Specifically, the Department requested
plaintiff (1) submit a list of all activities that took place on
the property after January 1, 2007, (2) describe where the
property was located in relation to the church, and (3) indicate
whether the property was "the location for the new church in the
floor plans submitted with the application." In September 2007,
plaintiff responded to the Department's inquiry. In response to
- 3 - the Department's first request, plaintiff stated "[t]here is only
a small shed for maintenance equipment on the property" and
listed 12 specific dates between January and September 2007 on
which the property was used other than for storage. According to
plaintiff, the property was used for eight prayer walks with
participation by Pastor Shaner and, variously, plaintiff's
"leadership," the "Capitol section leadership," and plaintiff's
congregation. The property was also used for three "leadership
meeting[s]," a "sectional meeting," three "property development
meeting[s]," and a "leadership and maintenance training." In
response to the Department's second request, plaintiff stated it
was "presently" meeting for church services at the Illinois
Retired Teacher's Association building on North Walnut Street.
In response to the Department's third request, plaintiff stated
the property in question was intended to be the site of the new
church. Specifically, plaintiff responded, "We would like
construction to begin as soon as possible, sometime late in 2008
is our best hope. We cannot begin until the tax issue is re-
solved and won't begin until we can build debt free." In October
2007, the Department denied the exemption, finding "[t]he prop-
erty is not in exempt use."
In December 2007, plaintiff requested a formal hearing
with the Department on the exemption. In May 2008, the parties
appeared at a hearing before an ALJ. On the Department's motion,
the ALJ admitted a group of documents containing plaintiff's
request for a formal hearing, the Department's denial of plain-
- 4 - tiff's application for exemption, the board of review application
and recommendation, the quitclaim deed by which plaintiff ac-
quired the property, an "Affidavit of Purpose of Plat," an
"Affidavit of Use" (plaintiff's response to the Department's
request for further information), plaintiff's constitution and
bylaws, a 2006 notification from the Department of plaintiff's
exemption from sales and use taxes, Pastor Shaner's May 2007
letter listing uses of the property, and a photograph of the
property.
In relevant part, plaintiff's constitution states
plaintiff's purpose is "[t]o conduct, in a Scriptural manner, the
work of world-wide evangelism and discipleship in obedience to
the command of the Lord Jesus." Under its constitution, plain-
tiff may "own, hold in trust, use, sell[,] convey, mortgage,
lease or otherwise dispose of any real estate or chattels as may
be necessary for the furtherance of its purposes." The constitu-
tion further sets forth procedural prerequisites to plaintiff's
mortgaging real property.
Plaintiff's case at the hearing consisted relevantly of
Pastor Shaner's testimony and a copy of blueprints for a new
church facility, dated March 2000. Pastor Shaner testified he
had worked as plaintiff's pastor since 1991. Until plaintiff
acquired sole ownership of the property in 1996 by quitclaim
deed, it was held jointly by plaintiff and the Illinois District
Council of the Assemblies of God. The land at the intersection
of Westchester Boulevard and Chatham Road was initially acquired
- 5 - by the district council for no "purpose other than to construct a
church at that corner." When Pastor Shaner began working for
plaintiff, plaintiff had in place a three-phase, $3 million
building plan for constructing a new church facility on the land
in question. After plaintiff acquired sole ownership of the
land, plaintiff scaled back its $3 million development plan to "a
lot less than $3 million." Plaintiff maintained a "building fund
that the people contribute to on a regular basis" but did not
raise funds specifically for developing the new church facility
for theological reasons. Plaintiff preferred, if possible, to
build its new facilities without incurring any debt. Pastor
Shaner testified, "It's not that we can't [borrow money for that
purpose], but we don't want to make a payment where money can be
better used somewhere else." There was no testimony to establish
how much money had accumulated in the building fund.
Eventually, plaintiff engaged an architect to develop
plans for the new church facility, which were drafted in March
2000. However, after a tornado struck plaintiff's land in 2006,
plaintiff discovered these plans were obsolete and required
revision. Pastor Shaner stated whether the architectural changes
would be pursued depended on the exemption status of plaintiff's
land. Until plaintiff could be certain of the land's status, the
reassessment had "ground [development plans] to a halt." Plain-
tiff was "not prepared to be investing more finances into updat-
ing the blueprints" until its tax liability was determined.
The only improvement ever actually built on the land
- 6 - was a shed used to store plaintiff's tractor, supplies, and
records. Occasionally, church leadership met and Pastor Shaner
did "some counseling" in the shed. This counseling was "some-
times [of] a religious nature." The shed was destroyed by the
2006 tornado, and "about everything" stored in the shed except
the tractor was lost. The shed was rebuilt within days of the
tornado.
In 2005, plaintiff sold approximately one acre of its
land to Sojourn Shelter and Services, Inc. (Sojourn), a non-
profit women's shelter for abused women and children. As a
condition of the sale and of annexing plaintiff's land to the
City of Springfield, plaintiff was required to construct a new
sewer line. The construction of the sewer line cost between
$18,000 and $20,000. In connection with the land sale and
annexation, plaintiff incurred approximately $3,000 or $3,500 in
legal fees. Thereafter the ground was not farmed and the assess-
ment was changed from "agricultural" property to "commercial"
Pastor Shaner testified to various uses of the prop-
erty. The property was used for some services and prayer walks,
"free school supplies distributions with free lunch" for neigh-
boring children, fund-raisers conducted by and for the benefit of
Sojourn, and "boy youth groups *** that shoot rockets and set up
camps and such as that." Aside from "the Sojourn activities,"
these were "activities of the church." Pastor Shaner also
testified to the "incidental" use of the land by people who
- 7 - "would stop out and, you know, meet and maybe have a lunch or
talk and pray." The property was never leased or used for profit
or with a view to profit.
In September 2008, the ALJ issued a written recommenda-
tion that the Department deny plaintiff's religious exemption for
2007. The ALJ noted plaintiff could demonstrate entitlement to
the exemption by showing it actually either used or adapted and
developed the property for an exempt purpose. The ALJ concluded
plaintiff failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the exemption
by clear and convincing evidence because it "did not substantiate
its oral evidence." "Although documents are not necessary to
verify every single activity that took place" on the land in
question, the ALJ stated, "some substantiation is necessary to
verify that the property was used primarily for religious pur-
poses and not used with a view to profit." The ALJ noted some
documentary evidence such as the pastor's calendar, church
newsletters, bulletins, minutes of meetings, or photographs is
necessary to verify the property was primarily used for religious
purposes. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended upholding the Depart-
ment's denial of the exemption. In September 2008, the Depart-
ment accepted the ALJ's recommendation to deny the exemption and,
in November 2008, the Department adopted the ALJ's recommendation
to deny plaintiff's October 2008 request for rehearing.
In December 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint against
the Department and Sangamon County, acting through its State's
Attorney, John Schmidt, for administrative review in the circuit
- 8 - court. In May 2010, the circuit court reversed the Department's
decision, ordering it to grant plaintiff the requested exemption.
Reaching the conclusion that the Department had erred, the court
noted, "The unrebutted record establishes that the only use of
the property in 2007 was for exempt use only. The Plaintiff
owner has made efforts at development although some time has
passed between stages of adaptation."
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendants, the Department and its Director,
argue the agency decision to deny the exemption should be upheld.
They contend the ALJ did not err in concluding plaintiff failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating its entitlement to the
exemption by clear and convincing evidence. Further, they
contend the evidence shows plaintiff is not entitled to the
exemption. In response, plaintiff maintains its only use of the
land was for exempt purposes and, alternatively, the land was
being adapted and developed for exempt purposes. We agree with
plaintiff and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, we review the Department's decision, not the
circuit court's. See Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal
Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 212, 886 N.E.2d 1011,
1019 (2008). The scope of judicial review of administrative
decisions "extend[s] to all questions of law and fact presented
by the entire record before the court." 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West
- 9 - 2008). A court may encounter three types of questions on admin-
istrative review of an agency decision: questions of fact,
questions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact. Cinkus,
228 Ill. 2d at 210, 886 N.E.2d at 1018. Because an administra-
tive agency's findings of fact are presumed true, "a reviewing
court is limited to ascertaining whether such findings of fact
are against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id.; see also
735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2008) ("The findings and conclusions of
the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to
be prima facie true and correct."). "In contrast, an agency's
decision on a question of law is not binding on a reviewing
court," and we review such a decision de novo. Cinkus, 200 Ill.
2d at 210, 886 N.E.2d at 1018.
Mixed questions of law and fact "are questions in which
the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law
is undisputed, and the issue is *** whether the rule of law as
applied to the established facts is or is not violated." (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor
Relations Board, State Panel, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577, 839 N.E.2d
479, 485 (2005). Decisions of mixed questions of law and fact
are reversible only if they are clearly erroneous. Cinkus, 228
Ill. 2d at 211, 886 N.E.2d at 1018. The clearly erroneous
standard is "significantly deferential." Provena Covenant
Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 387,
925 N.E.2d 1131, 1143 (2010); see also id. at 387 n.9, 925 N.E.2d
- 10 - at 1143 n.9 (courts accord deference to administrative decisions
"in recognition of the fact that agencies make informed judgments
on the issues based upon their experience and expertise and serve
as an informed source for ascertaining the legislature's in-
tent"). "A decision is 'clearly erroneous' when the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, 216 Ill. 2d at 577-78, 839 N.E.2d
at 485. The case before us presents a mixed question of law and
fact.
B. Principles of Construction
Our construction and application of tax-exemption
statutes are governed by long-standing principles. In general,
all real property is subject to taxation unless exempt by statute
and by the constitution. Provena Covenant Medical Center, 236
Ill. 2d at 388, 925 N.E.2d at 1143-44; see also City of Chicago
v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 590
N.E.2d 478, 481 (1992) ("Taxation is the rule[;] tax exemption is
the exception." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) (quoting
Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 286, 290, 134
N.E.2d 292, 295 (1956)). Accordingly, statutes granting tax
exemptions are strictly construed in favor of taxation. Provena
Covenant Medical Center, 236 Ill. 2d at 388, 925 N.E.2d at 1144;
accord Board of Certified Safety Professionals of the Americas,
Inc. v. Johnson, 112 Ill. 2d 542, 547, 494 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1986)
(citing Coyne Electrical School v. Paschen, 12 Ill. 2d 387, 390,
- 11 - 146 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1957)).
A party claiming an exemption must demonstrate its
entitlement to the exemption by clear and convincing evidence.
Provena Covenant Medical Center, 236 Ill. 2d at 388, 925 N.E.2d
at 1144. That is, such a party must prove the property in
question falls within the terms of both the constitutional
authorization and the exempting statute. Id. All questions of
fact and "debatable questions" are resolved in favor of taxation.
Id. (citing Follett's Illinois Book & Supply Store, Inc. v.
Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 600, 606, 190 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1963)).
"[E]very presumption is against the intention of the state to
exempt property from taxation." Provena Convenant Medical
Center, 236 Ill. 2d at 388, 925 N.E.2d at 1144 (citing Reeser v.
Koons, 34 Ill. 2d 29, 36, 213 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1966)).
C. Religious Exemption, Generally
Exemption from taxation of property used exclusively
for religious purposes is authorized by the Illinois Constitution
of 1970. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, §6 (authorizing the
General Assembly to exempt from taxation property "used exclu-
sively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for
school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes"). "While
the General Assembly has no authority to grant exemptions beyond
those authorized by [article IX,] section 6, [of the constitu-
tion,] it 'may place restrictions, limitations, and conditions on
[property-tax] exemptions as may be proper.'" Provena Covenant
Medical Center, 236 Ill. 2d at 390, 925 N.E.2d at 1145 (quoting
- 12 - North Shore Post No. 21 of the American Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill.
2d 231, 233, 230 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1967)).
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, section
15-40(a) of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/15-40(a)
(West 2008)) exempts property used for religious purposes from
taxation. Section 15-40(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Property used exclusively for:
(1) religious purposes[] ***
* * *
qualifies for exemption as long as it is not
used with a view to profit." 35 ILCS 200/15-
40(a) (West 2008).
This case involves construction of "used exclusively" within the
meaning of the exemption statute.
Initially, we note "exclusively" in the context of
religious exemptions has consistently been interpreted to mean
"primarily." Faith Builders Church, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043, 882 N.E.2d 1256, 1262
(2008). Accordingly, "an incidental or secondary purpose, if not
for profit, will not defeat the exemption." Id.
The relevant question is "whether, in actuality or
practice, the building is used primarily for a religious pur-
pose." Provena Covenant Medical Center, 236 Ill. 2d at 409, 925
N.E.2d at 1155. This requires considering "the facts and circum-
stances regarding how the property is actually used." Id. Mere
intention to use property exclusively for religious purposes is
- 13 - insufficient to entail exemption. Id. Further, to qualify for
exemption, it is insufficient for a taxpayer to show no use for
nonexempt purposes occurred if the taxpayer does not show actual
use for exempt purposes. See Antioch Missionary Baptist Church
v. Rosewell, 119 Ill. App. 3d 981, 982, 457 N.E.2d 500, 501
(1983) (requiring "proof of actual use for [an exempt] purpose"
to demonstrate entitlement to a religious exemption under a
relevantly worded precursor statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.
120, par. 500.2) (internal quotation marks omitted)); compare 35
ILCS 200/15-40(a) (West 2008) (beginning, "Property used exclu-
sively for" religious purposes) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.
120, par. 500.2 (beginning, "All property used exclusively for
religious purposes ***"). However, neither the exemption statute
nor cases interpreting it have established a minimum required
frequency of use for religious purposes.
In general, unused property cannot qualify for an
exemption. See, e.g., Antioch Missionary Baptist Church, 119
Ill. App. 3d at 982, 457 N.E.2d at 501 (denying religious exemp-
tion where property "was not used for any purpose but in fact was
boarded up and vacant"). However, actual use of property for
exempt purposes encompasses its adaptation and development for
exempt purposes. That is, exemptions may be allowed "where
property is in the actual process of development and adaptation
for exempt use" even if no actual use for exempt purposes is
shown. Weslin Properties, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 157
Ill. App. 3d 580, 584, 510 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1987). The relevant
- 14 - question is whether the taxpayer's activities "constituted
development and adaptation for exempt use," in which case exemp-
tion is permitted, or the taxpayer "merely intended to develop
the property for such use," in which case taxation is required.
Id.
For example, in Weslin Properties, 157 Ill. App. 3d at
586, 510 N.E.2d at 568, the Second District allowed a charitable
exemption for the site of construction of a charitable urgent-
care facility where the "plaintiff proceeded quickly through the
planning and design stages, expending large sums of money in the
process." The court noted "the complexity of the architectural
process of designing a site for a medical campus[] and of design-
ing the buildings to be located thereon" and opined "it seem[ed]
virtually impossible to begin construction immediately upon
purchase of the land." Id. The court concluded the "plaintiff's
activities in [the tax year for which the exemption was claimed]
were clearly beyond mere intention to convert the property for an
exempt use, and actually constituted development and adaptation
for such use." Id.
Under the exception to the actual-use requirement for
adaptation and development, courts evaluate the taxpayer's
activities for reasonable diligence in light of practical consid-
erations. See, e.g., id. (noting "it seem[ed] virtually impossi-
ble to begin construction immediately upon purchase of the land"
due to the complexity of the project). For example, in In re
Application of County Collector, 48 Ill. App. 3d 572, 576, 581-
- 15 - 82, 362 N.E.2d 1335, 1338, 1342 (1977), the Cook County registrar
of titles claimed a public-use exemption for tax year 1969 for
property condemned for construction of a "massive highway pro-
ject," a leg of the Dan Ryan Expressway. The land was condemned
in 1967 and was being used as a highway "at least as early as the
summer of 1973." Id. at 581, 362 N.E.2d at 1342. The First
District took notice "of the fact that the construction of a
major modern expressway, from its initial phases until comple-
tion, may require a number of years, and that in order to prop-
erly plan and carry out this construction it is necessary to
acquire the needed land some time in advance." Id. The court
noted, further, the condemned land's "eventual use as part of a
completed highway may necessarily depend on its simply being
available in an essentially dormant state for some period of
time." Id. Accordingly, the court inferred such land, although
not actually being used as a highway in 1969, "simply by virtue
of its location and public ownership [was] in a very real sense
in the actual process of development and adaptation for use by
the public." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court
found the construction of the highway and the actual use of the
land for a public purpose occurred "within a reasonable time"
after the condemnation. Id. at 581-82, 362 N.E.2d at 1342. "In
such a situation," the court concluded, "from the time the
condemnor acquired possession of the property until its full
development for highway purposes, that property was in the
natural and necessary course of development and adaptation for
- 16 - highway use." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 582,
362 N.E.2d at 1342. Accordingly, the court allowed the requested
exemption. Id.
D. Exemption of Plaintiff's Land
The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiff demon-
strated it was entitled to exemption for the land in question for
2007. This is a mixed question of law and fact as it required
the Department to determine whether the facts in this case
satisfied the statutory standard of exemption. See American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 216 Ill. 2d at
577, 839 N.E.2d at 485 (quoted above). Accordingly, we review
the Department's decision on this issue for clear error. We
conclude the Department clearly erred.
Initially, the parties both assert our analysis should
focus on plaintiff's activities vis-a-vis the land in question
that occurred in 2007. Such a limitation is advisable, particu-
larly where plaintiff never intended to claim an exemption for
religious purposes until 2007, when its annual tax liability rose
dramatically and unexpectedly from $60, which plaintiff was
willing and able to pay, to more than $15,000. As noted above,
this change resulted from the unanticipated reclassification of
plaintiff's land from "agricultural" to "commercial" property.
Plaintiff presented evidence it intended, from the time it
acquired the land, to build a church there. However, plaintiff
did not apply for a religious exemption until the 2007 tax year.
The plaintiff is not required to show either actual use of its
- 17 - land for religious purposes or development and adaptation for
such use in years for which it chose not to claim a religious
exemption.
As a result of this limitation on our focus, we will
not consider plaintiff's pre- or post-2007 activities. On one
hand, this means our analysis is not affected by the circum-
stances of plaintiff's acquisition of the land, sale of a portion
thereof to Sojourn, annexation of the land to Springfield, or
extension of gas and sewer lines to the land. Further, plain-
tiff's obtaining blueprints for its prospective church building
in 2000 is relevant to our analysis only insofar as its posses-
sion of those plans in 2007 affects the amount of work yet
required to carry out the development and adaptation of the land
for religious use as plaintiff intended in 2007. On the other
hand, we will not hold the lapse of time between 1996, when
plaintiff acquired sole ownership of the land, and 2007, when the
intended church facility had yet to be constructed, against
plaintiff as evidence of its mere intention to establish a
religious use of the land.
Having defined the scope of our inquiry, we note the
evidence presented in the record on appeal is remarkably scant.
For instance, there is no evidence of the amount of money in
plaintiff's building fund or the amount raised for that fund in
2007. Nor is there evidence of plaintiff's budget for the
proposed construction. Further, the evidence regarding plain-
tiff's activities in 2007 lacks specific potentially relevant
- 18 - details, including the frequency of Pastor Shaner's religious
counseling, the attendance figures and particular subject matters
of the prayer walks and various meetings, and the discrete
accomplishments of the property-development meetings. Neverthe-
less, sufficient evidence informs our conclusion plaintiff is
entitled to a property-tax exemption for the land in question for
the year 2007.
In 2007, plaintiff's property was actually used primar-
ily for religious purposes. The evidence demonstrates plaintiff
made some use of its land for religious purposes, which is
sufficient to satisfy the actual-use requirement. Namely,
plaintiff conducted church activities on the land on at least 12
specific occasions identified by Pastor Shaner. Further, the use
by Sojourn, which Pastor Shaner distinguished from the "activi-
ties of the church," appears to have been less frequent and,
thus, does not affect our conclusion the land was used primarily
for religious purposes for two reasons. First, given the fellow-
ship plaintiff developed with Sojourn, Sojourn's use arguably
advanced plaintiff's religious purpose. Second, regardless of
its religious or secular character, any such use was secondary to
plaintiff's own use for religious purposes. Neither plaintiff
nor any other organization used plaintiff's land for profit.
Further, plaintiff's land was in the actual process of
development and adaptation for religious use within the meaning
of that doctrine. Under Application of County Collector, a
reasonable amount of time is allowed for development and adapta-
- 19 - tion for exempt uses during which land may qualify for exemption
even if vacant and dormant. What is reasonable is determined
with respect to the particular circumstances of each case. In
this case, in 2007, plaintiff's plan to construct a church
facility on its land rose above a mere intention to develop.
Plaintiff held three property-development meetings in
2007. Although the specific substance of those meetings is not
revealed by the record, we find this activity amounts to develop-
ment and adaptation in light of plaintiff's financial situation
and in consideration of the suddenness of its perceived need to
qualify for a religious-use exemption in 2007. While the amount
of money actually held by plaintiff for development is unknown,
plaintiff presented evidence it did not have sufficient funds to
cover its $15,000-plus property-tax liability for 2007 and it
continued, in 2007, to segregate some of the monetary donations
it received into a building fund. From this evidence, we infer
plaintiff was financially unable at the time to undertake steps
beyond mere planning and development meetings. Further, plain-
tiff's demand for a religious exemption was unforeseen. Under
these circumstances, it was reasonable for plaintiff to proceed
with the initial phases of development in the manner it employed.
Our conclusion depends on all of the specific circum-
stances of this case. We note these circumstances may change
over time, even with respect to these same parties and this same
parcel of land. The timing of plaintiff's activities in relation
to its application for the religious exemption is essential to
- 20 - our determination its development activities were reasonable.
Further, our conclusion plaintiff is entitled to exemption for
its land does not result solely from our consideration of either
plaintiff's actual use or the steps it took toward development
and adaptation. Rather, this conclusion is based on our consid-
eration of the totality of the circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's
judgment reversing the Department's decision to deny the exemp-
tion.
Affirmed.
- 21 -