G.R. Tech. v. Brown, Olson, et al.
This text of 2008 DNH 103 (G.R. Tech. v. Brown, Olson, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
G.R. Tech. v. Brown, Olson, et a l . CV-07-421-PB 05/15/08
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
G.R. Technology, Inc.
v. Civil No. 07-cv-421-PB
Brown, Olson & Gould, P.C., f/k/a Brown, Olson & Wilson, P.C., Robert A. Olson and David Wiesner
AND
v. Civil No. 08-cv-68-PB
Brown, Olson & Gould, P.C., f/k/a Brown, Olson & Wilson, P.C., Robert A. Olson, David Wiesner OPINION NO. 2008 DNH 103 and Bryan K. Gould
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
These consolidated cases result from a failed business
relationship between G.R. Technology, Inc. ("GRT") and Casella
Waste Systems, Inc. ("Casella"). GRT entered into several
agreements with Casella and its subsidiary, FCR, Inc. ("FCR") to
commercialize GRT's intellectual property. Pursuant to these
agreements, the parties created two jointly-owned limited
liability companies to hold and exploit GRT's intellectual property. At FCR's direction. Brown, Olson, and Gould, P.C. was
retained to represent the limited liability companies.
In January 2007, several of GRT's officers accused Casella
and FCR of breaching their agreements with GRT and
misappropriating GRT's intellectual property. This prompted
Casella, FCR, and the limited liability companies to file a
declaratory judgment action against GRT and its officers in
Vermont state court.
GRT responded by filing two actions in this court against
Brown, Olson and Gould, P.C. and several of its partners. The
first is a direct action and the second is a derivative action
filed on behalf of the limited liability companies. GRT's
principal contention in both actions is that the defendants were
complicit with Casella and FCR in the misappropriation of its
intellectual property. I have consolidated both actions for
purposes of pretrial proceedings.
Defendants invoke the abstention doctrine announced in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 42 4
U.S. 800 (1976) in seeking to stay the consolidated actions until
the Vermont declaratory judgment action is resolved. For the
reasons set forth below, I deny defendants' motions to stay.
- 2 - ANALYSIS
The Colorado River abstention doctrine is an exception to
the general rule that a federal court ordinarily may not refuse
to decide a case that falls under its subject matter
jurisdiction. The doctrine potentially applies when a state
court has asserted jurisdiction over a parallel proceeding.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. "Wise judicial administration,"
rather than federalism, is the motivating force for this
particular form of abstention. Id. at 817.
The First Circuit has recognized a non-exhaustive list of
eight factors that should be considered in determining whether
Colorado River abstention is warranted in a particular case:
(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or federal law controls; (6) the adeguacy of the state forum to protect the parties' interests; (7) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim; and (8) respect for the principles underlying removal jurisdiction.
United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir.
2007). Defendants claim that abstention is reguired here to
avoid piecemeal litigation and because the consolidated cases
- 3 - turn exclusively on questions of state law.
I am unpersuaded by the defendants' arguments. First, while
it is possible that the resolution of the Vermont action could
shed light on certain issues that are also in dispute in the
consolidated actions, it is by no means clear that the resolution
of the Vermont action will eliminate the need for further
litigation in this court. The consolidated actions have
different defendants and many of the claims that are at issue
here have different elements from the claims that are at issue in
the Vermont action. Thus, it is likely that the cases will need
to be resolved on their own merits regardless of what happens to
the Vermont action. To the extent that defendants fear the
possibility of inconsistent results, I can address this concern
by coordinating the timing of dispositive motion practice with
the Vermont court.
Second, the fact that state law controls the resolution of
the consolidated cases also fails to tip the balance in favor of
a stay. This is not a case in which there is a difficult matter
of state law or policy that gives rise to one of the "rare
circumstances" in which the presence of state law issues would
justify a surrender of federal jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone
- 4 - Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
Finally, defendants have failed to consider another of the
factors enumerated by the First Circuit that weighs strongly
against abstention in this case. GRT has sued defendants in the
consolidated actions who are not named as defendants in the
Vermont action. Thus, a stay here could delay GRT from obtaining
complete relief in the consolidated actions for the harm it
claims to have suffered at the hands of the defendants. Given
the absence of other factors that favor abstention, this
circumstance, by itself, weighs heavily against granting the
defendants the relief they seek.
In short, there are no exceptional circumstances presented
by this case to justify Colorado River abstention. The Supreme
Court has stated that "[o]nly the clearest of justifications"
will suffice to trigger this type of abstention. Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 819. Defendants have failed to produce any clear
justifications for a stay in this case, other than a routine
concern for judicial efficiency that is always present when
related issues are pending in different courts. As the First
Circuit has recognized: "Dismissal is not warranted simply
because related issues otherwise would be decided by different
- 5 - courts, or even because two courts otherwise would be deciding
the same issues." Villa Marina Yacht Sales v. Hatteras Yachts,
915 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1990). Because this case presents no
exceptional circumstances to justify abstention, I must deny
defendants' motions to stay the proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion to stay
filed in the direct action. No. 07-cv-421-PB (Doc. No. 11), and
defendants' motion to stay filed in the derivative action. No.
08-cv-68-PB (Doc. No. 21), are denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro______ _ Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
May 15, 2008
cc: Barney L. Brannen, Esg. Lisa Chalidze, Esg. Alexander Rheaume, Esg. William Saturley, Esg.
- 6 -
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