Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst

99 S.E.2d 475, 96 Ga. App. 48, 1957 Ga. App. LEXIS 502

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 20, 1957
• Docket: 36672
• Status: Published

Opinions

Gardner, P. J.

1. We will discuss the contentions of the defendant first. While the letter of the defendant to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is set out as an exhibit to the petition and quoted hereinabove, the record shows no answer to that letter from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to the defendant. In the brief of counsel for the defendant this admission was made regarding the answer of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, counsel stating that the letter was dated April 27, 1956:

“Gentlemen:

We have notified the above named employee of his account with you. He has been asked to make arrangements with you immediately to satisfy the account.

We request that any further correspondence be directed to this employee at his home address on file at your office.

"Very truly yours,

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation

Georgia Division.

/s/ W. Van Elmendorf

Employee Service.

By: W. L. H.”

Counsel for the defendant calls our attention to Davis v. General Finance &c. Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708 (57 S. E. 2d 225). The facts in that case are so dissimilar to those in the instant case that they are not comparable at all. In that case the creditor sent a telegram directly to the debtor stating that unless the account was paid legal action would be taken. In that case the creditor did not communicate with the employer as was done in the instant case. Our attention is called to Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. R. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561). Counsel for the defendant, regarding that case has this to say: “Since this decision many States have followed the principles laid down in Justice Cobb’s well considered opinion which has been a landmark in the general recognition of the right of privacy.”

Counsel for the defendant call our attention to Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358 (78 N. E. 2d 789) to the effect that in order to be actionable, communications of the creditor concerning private matters must be given to the general public. We do not understand this to be the law of Georgia, as discussed hereinafter.

Counsel for the defendant call our attention to Estes v. Sterchi Brothers Stores, 50 Ga. App. 619 (179 S. E. 222). This suit was brought for libel, and the court held that the statement made was not libelous per se and further that no special damages were alleged. One or the other must be shown in order to recover in a suit for libel.

2. Counsel for the plaintiff cites McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92 (2 S. E. 2d 810) wherein it was held that there is nothing in the decided cases of this State which indicates that publication or commercialization of information obtained is necessary in order to' make an action maintainable for invasion of privacy. We might state in this connection, since we have cited decisions from other States on behalf of the defendant, that the courts of the State of Louisiana are in accord with the courts of Georgia regarding invasion of the privacy of an individual. See Quina v. Roberts (La. App.) 16 So. 2d 558. In conclusion of this subdivision of this opinion we again refer to Pavesich v. New England Life Ins Co., 122 Ga. 190, supra. In that case the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Cobb, set forth the law for restricting invasion of the privacy of another. We quote from pp. 195 and 196 of that opinion as follows: “When the law guarantees to one the right to the enjoyment of his life, it gives to him something more than the mere right to breathe and exist. While of course the most flagrant violation of this right would be deprivation of life, yet life itself may be spared and the enjoyment of life entirely destroyed. An individual has a right to enjoy life in any way that may be most agreeable and pleasant to him, according to his temperament and nature, provided that in such enjoyment he does not invade the rights of his neighbor or violate public law or policy. The right of personal security is not fully accorded by allowing an individual to go through life in possession of all of his members and his body unmarred; nor is his right to personal liberty fully accorded by merely allowing him to remain out of jail or free from other physical restraints. The liberty which he derives from natural law, and which is recognized by municipal law, embraces far more than freedom from physical restraint. The term liberty is not to be so dwarfed, ‘but is deemed to embrace the right of a man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood in this country, means the right, not only of freedom from servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.’ See Brannon on Fourteenth Amendment, 111. Liberty includes the right to live as one will, so long as that will does not interfere with the rights of another or of the public. One may desire to live a life of seclusion; another may desire to live a life of publicity; still another may wish to live a life of privacy as to certain matters and of publicity as to others. One may wish to live a life of toil where his work is of a nature that keeps him constantly before the public gaze; while another may wish to live a life of research and contemplation, only moving before the public at such times and under such circumstances as may be necessary to his actual existence. Each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to his manner of life, and neither an individual nor the public has a right to arbitrarily take away from him his liberty.”

Closing this subparagraph it is our opinion that the act of the defendant in writing the employer to assist in collecting a debt which the employee allegedly owed, and to force her to pay a debt which she claims she did not owe and for which the defendant had no judgment against the plaintiff and had entered no suit against the plaintiff, was an invasion of the employee’s privacy.

Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the petition sets out a cause of action on the theory that damages accrued under Code § 105-103. That Code section reads: “When the law requires one to do an act for the benefit of another, or to forbear the doing of that which may injure another, though no action be given in express terms, upon the accrual of damage the injured party may recover.” See in this connection Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662 (184 S. E. 452).

In view of the facts alleged in the petition in the instant case, and the authorities which we have set out hereinabove, the court properly overruled the defendant’s demurrers, ■ both general and special.

Judgment affirmed.

Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur. On rehearing Carlisle, J., concurs. Townsend, J., concurs specially.