Gould v. Lombardo

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedApril 7, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00364
StatusUnknown

This text of Gould v. Lombardo (Gould v. Lombardo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gould v. Lombardo, (D. Nev. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 Steven Eric Gould, Case No.: 2:20-cv-00364-JAD-BNW 5 Petitioner Order Granting IFP Status and 6 v. Directing Petitioner to Show Cause Why this Action Should Not Be Dismissed 7 Joseph Lombardo,et al., 8 Respondents [ECF No. 1] 9 10 Pro se petitioner Steven Eric Gouldpetitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2241to challenge his state-court prosecution and pretrial detentionat the Clark County 12 Detention Center (CCDC). Gouldinitiated this action by filing an application to proceed in 13 forma pauperis, along with his habeas corpus petition (attached to application to proceed in 14 forma pauperis).1 The financial information provided with Gould’s application to proceed in 15 forma pauperis indicates that he is unable to pay the filing fee for this action. So I grant his 16 application, and he will not be required to pay the filing fee. 17 I also take this opportunity to conduct theinitial review of Gould’s petition under Rule 4 18 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Based on that review, it appears that three of 19 Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissaland his remaining claims are wholly 20 unexhausted and barred under the abstention doctrine in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 21 So, I give GoulduntilMay 7, 2020, toshow cause in writing why his petition should not be 22 dismissed. 23 1 ECF No. 1. 1 A. The Petition 2 Gould’s habeas petitionalleges four grounds for relief. First, he claims that the State 3 violated his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)because the prosecuting 4 attorney made a demand for custody on November 26, 2018, but refused to accept temporary 5 custody in violation of Article V(c)of the Agreement.2 Second, he claims that the charging

6 documents in his case fail to state a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction and violate the Fourth 7 and Fifth Amendments tothe U.S. Constitution.3 Third, he claims that he is “a sovereign living 8 man with foreign sovereign immunity,” which makes him exempt from the jurisdiction of the 9 state courts of Nevada.4 Fourth, he alleges that the State of Nevada and the prosecuting attorney 10 “conspired to commit, perjury, kidnapping and/or human trafficking” in relation to his 11 commitment to a psychiatric hospital.5 With an additional filing entered on March 25, 2020, 12 Gould contends that thestatetrial court ordered his right to a speedy trial waivedas punishment 13 for initiating this federal habeas proceeding, further violating his constitutional rights.6 14 B. Habeas Rule 4

15 Under Habeas Rule 4, courts must “promptly examine” each petitionand dismiss a 16 petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 17 18 19 20 21 2 ECF No. 1-1 at 6–7. 3 Id. at 7. 22 4 Id. 23 5 Id.at 8. 6 ECF No. 3. 1 not entitled to relief in the district court.”7 This rule reflects a congressional command8 that 2 makes it “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that 3 would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.”9 Mere conclusory 4 statements of federal-rights violations,unsupported by specific allegations, do not state a basis 5 for federal habeas relief.10 And apetition may be summarily dismissed if the allegations in it are

6 “vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, patently frivolous or false.”11 7 With the exception of the claims based on the IAD and the alleged involuntary waiver of 8 his right to a speedy trial, all of Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissal under these 9 standards. In addition, it is almost certain that additional impediments prevent this court from 10 adjudicating his colorable claims. For one, it does not appear that Gould has fairly presented his 11 claims to the Nevada courts before proceeding with his federal petition. For another,the federal 12 courts are, in most cases, not permitted to interfere withpending state criminal proceedings. 13 C. Exhaustion 14 A state criminal defendant seeking to restrain pending state proceedings via a federal writ

15 of habeas corpus first must exhaust his state-court remedies before presenting his constitutional 16 claims to the federal courts. This exhaustion rule is grounded in principles of judicial restraint 17 that predate and operate independently of the statutory exhaustion requirement in28 U.S.C. § 18 19 7 Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.Rule 4 applies to a petition brought under section 20 2241 because the court “may apply any or all of the [Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases] to a habeas petition not covered” therein. Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 21 8 See28 U.S.C. § 2243. 22 9 Rule 4, advisory committee’s notes (citing Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970)). 10 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). 23 11 Hendricks v. Vasquez,908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 1 2254.12 It insures that the state courts, as a matter of federal-state comity, will have the first 2 opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees.13 3 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim must have been fairly presented to the 4 state courts completely through to the highest court available;14 and the petitioner must have 5 referred in the state-court proceedingto the specific federal law alleged to have been violated

6 and statedthe facts that entitle him to relief on the federal claim.15 Here, however, it appears 7 highly unlikelythat Gouldhas fairly presented his claims to the highest available court in 8 Nevada. If this is true,his petitionis unexhausted. So I order Gould to show cause why his 9 petition should not be dismissed without prejudice for complete lack of exhaustion. To 10 successfully show such cause, he will need to demonstrate that the claims and facts on which he 11 bases this federal petition have already been properly and fairly presented to Nevada’s highest 12 courtby attaching documentary proof of this exhaustion. 13 D. Younger Abstention 14 It also appears that this court must abstain from considering Gould’s claims because his

15 criminal proceedings are still in progress. This general rule, known as Youngerabstention, 16 recognizes that, even when the claims in apetitionhave been fully exhausted in the state courts, 17 18 12 See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–92 (1973); Carden v. State of Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980); accord Justices of Boston Muni. 19 Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 333 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509

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Related

Ex Parte Hawk
321 U.S. 114 (Supreme Court, 1944)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Blackledge v. Allison
431 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon
466 U.S. 294 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Coleman v. Thompson
501 U.S. 722 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Theodore R. Allen v. E. P. Perini, Superintendent
424 F.2d 134 (Sixth Circuit, 1970)
Eric Allen Peterson v. Robert Lampert
319 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Mayle v. Felix
545 U.S. 644 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Day v. Shalala
23 F.3d 1052 (Sixth Circuit, 1994)

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Gould v. Lombardo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gould-v-lombardo-nvd-2020.