Steven Eric Gould, Case No.: 2:20-cv-00364-JAD-BNW Petitioner Order Granting IFP Status and v. Directing Petitioner to Show Cause Why this Action Should Not Be Dismissed Joseph Lombardo,et al., Respondents [ECF No. 1] Pro se petitioner Steven Eric Gouldpetitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241to challenge his state-court prosecution and pretrial detentionat the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). Gouldinitiated this action by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, along with his habeas corpus petition (attached to application to proceed in forma pauperis).1 The financial information provided with Gould’s application to proceed in forma pauperis indicates that he is unable to pay the filing fee for this action. So I grant his application, and he will not be required to pay the filing fee. I also take this opportunity to conduct theinitial review of Gould’s petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Based on that review, it appears that three of Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissaland his remaining claims are wholly unexhausted and barred under the abstention doctrine in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). So, I give GoulduntilMay 7, 2020, toshow cause in writing why his petition should not be dismissed. 1 ECF No. 1. A. The Petition Gould’s habeas petitionalleges four grounds for relief. First, he claims that the State violated his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)because the prosecuting attorney made a demand for custody on November 26, 2018, but refused to accept temporary custody in violation of Article V(c)of the Agreement.2 Second, he claims that the charging
documents in his case fail to state a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction and violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments tothe U.S. Constitution.3 Third, he claims that he is “a sovereign living man with foreign sovereign immunity,” which makes him exempt from the jurisdiction of the state courts of Nevada.4 Fourth, he alleges that the State of Nevada and the prosecuting attorney “conspired to commit, perjury, kidnapping and/or human trafficking” in relation to his commitment to a psychiatric hospital.5 With an additional filing entered on March 25, 2020, Gould contends that thestatetrial court ordered his right to a speedy trial waivedas punishment for initiating this federal habeas proceeding, further violating his constitutional rights.6 B. Habeas Rule 4
Under Habeas Rule 4, courts must “promptly examine” each petitionand dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 2 ECF No. 1-1 at 6–7. 3 Id. at 7. 4 Id. 5 Id.at 8. 6 ECF No. 3. not entitled to relief in the district court.”7 This rule reflects a congressional command8 that makes it “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.”9 Mere conclusory statements of federal-rights violations,unsupported by specific allegations, do not state a basis for federal habeas relief.10 And apetition may be summarily dismissed if the allegations in it are
“vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, patently frivolous or false.”11 With the exception of the claims based on the IAD and the alleged involuntary waiver of his right to a speedy trial, all of Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissal under these standards. In addition, it is almost certain that additional impediments prevent this court from adjudicating his colorable claims. For one, it does not appear that Gould has fairly presented his claims to the Nevada courts before proceeding with his federal petition. For another,the federal courts are, in most cases, not permitted to interfere withpending state criminal proceedings. C. Exhaustion A state criminal defendant seeking to restrain pending state proceedings via a federal writ
of habeas corpus first must exhaust his state-court remedies before presenting his constitutional claims to the federal courts. This exhaustion rule is grounded in principles of judicial restraint that predate and operate independently of the statutory exhaustion requirement in28 U.S.C. § 7 Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.Rule 4 applies to a petition brought under section 2241 because the court “may apply any or all of the [Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases] to a habeas petition not covered” therein. Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 8 See28 U.S.C. § 2243. 9 Rule 4, advisory committee’s notes (citing Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970)). 10 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). 11 Hendricks v. Vasquez,908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 2254.12 It insures that the state courts, as a matter of federal-state comity, will have the first opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees.13 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts completely through to the highest court available;14 and the petitioner must have referred in the state-court proceedingto the specific federal law alleged to have been violated
and statedthe facts that entitle him to relief on the federal claim.15 Here, however, it appears highly unlikelythat Gouldhas fairly presented his claims to the highest available court in Nevada. If this is true,his petitionis unexhausted. So I order Gould to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed without prejudice for complete lack of exhaustion. To successfully show such cause, he will need to demonstrate that the claims and facts on which he bases this federal petition have already been properly and fairly presented to Nevada’s highest courtby attaching documentary proof of this exhaustion. D. Younger Abstention It also appears that this court must abstain from considering Gould’s claims because his
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Steven Eric Gould, Case No.: 2:20-cv-00364-JAD-BNW Petitioner Order Granting IFP Status and v. Directing Petitioner to Show Cause Why this Action Should Not Be Dismissed Joseph Lombardo,et al., Respondents [ECF No. 1] Pro se petitioner Steven Eric Gouldpetitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241to challenge his state-court prosecution and pretrial detentionat the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC). Gouldinitiated this action by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, along with his habeas corpus petition (attached to application to proceed in forma pauperis).1 The financial information provided with Gould’s application to proceed in forma pauperis indicates that he is unable to pay the filing fee for this action. So I grant his application, and he will not be required to pay the filing fee. I also take this opportunity to conduct theinitial review of Gould’s petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Based on that review, it appears that three of Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissaland his remaining claims are wholly unexhausted and barred under the abstention doctrine in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). So, I give GoulduntilMay 7, 2020, toshow cause in writing why his petition should not be dismissed. 1 ECF No. 1. A. The Petition Gould’s habeas petitionalleges four grounds for relief. First, he claims that the State violated his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)because the prosecuting attorney made a demand for custody on November 26, 2018, but refused to accept temporary custody in violation of Article V(c)of the Agreement.2 Second, he claims that the charging
documents in his case fail to state a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction and violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments tothe U.S. Constitution.3 Third, he claims that he is “a sovereign living man with foreign sovereign immunity,” which makes him exempt from the jurisdiction of the state courts of Nevada.4 Fourth, he alleges that the State of Nevada and the prosecuting attorney “conspired to commit, perjury, kidnapping and/or human trafficking” in relation to his commitment to a psychiatric hospital.5 With an additional filing entered on March 25, 2020, Gould contends that thestatetrial court ordered his right to a speedy trial waivedas punishment for initiating this federal habeas proceeding, further violating his constitutional rights.6 B. Habeas Rule 4
Under Habeas Rule 4, courts must “promptly examine” each petitionand dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 2 ECF No. 1-1 at 6–7. 3 Id. at 7. 4 Id. 5 Id.at 8. 6 ECF No. 3. not entitled to relief in the district court.”7 This rule reflects a congressional command8 that makes it “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.”9 Mere conclusory statements of federal-rights violations,unsupported by specific allegations, do not state a basis for federal habeas relief.10 And apetition may be summarily dismissed if the allegations in it are
“vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, patently frivolous or false.”11 With the exception of the claims based on the IAD and the alleged involuntary waiver of his right to a speedy trial, all of Gould’s claims are subject to summary dismissal under these standards. In addition, it is almost certain that additional impediments prevent this court from adjudicating his colorable claims. For one, it does not appear that Gould has fairly presented his claims to the Nevada courts before proceeding with his federal petition. For another,the federal courts are, in most cases, not permitted to interfere withpending state criminal proceedings. C. Exhaustion A state criminal defendant seeking to restrain pending state proceedings via a federal writ
of habeas corpus first must exhaust his state-court remedies before presenting his constitutional claims to the federal courts. This exhaustion rule is grounded in principles of judicial restraint that predate and operate independently of the statutory exhaustion requirement in28 U.S.C. § 7 Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.Rule 4 applies to a petition brought under section 2241 because the court “may apply any or all of the [Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases] to a habeas petition not covered” therein. Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 8 See28 U.S.C. § 2243. 9 Rule 4, advisory committee’s notes (citing Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970)). 10 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). 11 Hendricks v. Vasquez,908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). 2254.12 It insures that the state courts, as a matter of federal-state comity, will have the first opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees.13 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts completely through to the highest court available;14 and the petitioner must have referred in the state-court proceedingto the specific federal law alleged to have been violated
and statedthe facts that entitle him to relief on the federal claim.15 Here, however, it appears highly unlikelythat Gouldhas fairly presented his claims to the highest available court in Nevada. If this is true,his petitionis unexhausted. So I order Gould to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed without prejudice for complete lack of exhaustion. To successfully show such cause, he will need to demonstrate that the claims and facts on which he bases this federal petition have already been properly and fairly presented to Nevada’s highest courtby attaching documentary proof of this exhaustion. D. Younger Abstention It also appears that this court must abstain from considering Gould’s claims because his
criminal proceedings are still in progress. This general rule, known as Youngerabstention, recognizes that, even when the claims in apetitionhave been fully exhausted in the state courts, 12 See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–92 (1973); Carden v. State of Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980); accord Justices of Boston Muni. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 333 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982)(exhaustion doctrine predates statutory codification); Ex parte Hawke, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944)(applies to all habeas petitions challenging state custody to avoid interference with the administration of justice in the state courts). 13 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 14 SeePeterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc); Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). 15 See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). a federal court will not entertain a habeas petition seeking intervention in a pending state criminal proceedingabsent special circumstances.16 So I also order Gouldto show cause why this petition, even if exhausted, should not be dismissed without prejudice under the Younger abstention doctrine. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 1]is GRANTED. Petitioner is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner will not be required to pay the filing fee for this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDthat the Clerk of the Court is directed toseparately FILE the petition for writ of habeas corpus [ECF No. 1-1]. IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDthat petitioner must SHOW CAUSE in writing by May 7, 2020, whythe petition should not be dismissed without prejudice for:(1)lack of exhaustion; and (2) the Younger abstention doctrine. If petitioner maintains that any claims in the petition have been exhausted, petitioner must attach with his response copies of any and all
papers that were accepted for filing in the state courts that he contends demonstrate that the claims are exhausted. All factual assertions must be specific and supported by competent evidence. If petitioner does not timely and fully respond to this orderor fails to showadequate cause as required, the entire petition will be dismissed without further advance notice. . . . 16 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). ] No extension of time will be granted to respond to this order except in the most compelling of circumstances. Nothing in either this court’s orders to date or the mere pendency of this action in any manner restrains the state courts from proceeding in a pending prosecution. Dated: April 7, 2020
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