Goudchaux/Maison Blanche v. Broussard

590 So. 2d 1159, 1991 WL 255887
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 2, 1991
Docket91-C-0716
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 590 So. 2d 1159 (Goudchaux/Maison Blanche v. Broussard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goudchaux/Maison Blanche v. Broussard, 590 So. 2d 1159, 1991 WL 255887 (La. 1991).

Opinion

590 So.2d 1159 (1991)

GOUDCHAUX/MAISON BLANCHE, INC.
v.
Arnold A. BROUSSARD, Secretary, Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana.

No. 91-C-0716.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

December 2, 1991.
Rehearing Denied January 9, 1992.

Marlon V. Harrison, Baton Rouge, Marlin N. Gusman, New Orleans, for applicant.

David R. Cassidy, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, for respondent.

MARCUS, Justice.

Goudchaux/Maison Blanche, Inc. (MB) is a Louisiana corporation engaged in retail sales, which files corporate income and franchise tax returns. By notice dated June 22, 1988, the Department of Revenue and Taxation, State of Louisiana (Department) assessed MB with additional corporate franchise taxes totalling $127,400.71 *1160 for the years 1985, 1986 and 1987.[1] MB filed a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals (Board), alleging that the Department's assessment erroneously included in the franchise tax base "certain federal tax accruals" which should be excluded from the taxable capital of the company under La.R.S. 47:603. After a hearing, the Board rendered judgment in favor of MB and dismissed the assessment.[2] The Department filed a petition for review in the district court, which affirmed the decision of the Board. The Department appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed.[3] Upon the Department's application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision.[4]

The sole issue before us is whether MB's deferred federal income taxes are excluded from the franchise tax base.

The franchise tax is imposed on corporations doing business in this state. La.R.S. 47:601. The tax is computed based on the corporation's issued and outstanding capital stock, surplus, undivided profits and borrowed capital. La.R.S. 47:602. Borrowed capital is defined in La.R.S. 47:603, which provides in pertinent part:

§ 603. Borrowed capital
As used in this Chapter, "borrowed capital" means all indebtedness of a corporation, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, maturing more than one year from the date incurred, or which is not paid within one year from the date incurred regardless of maturity date....
The following indebtedness shall be excluded:
(1) Federal, state and local tax accruals or taxes due and not delinquent more than thirty days. [Emphasis added].
. . . .

Surplus and undivided profits are defined in La.R.S. 47:605(A), which provides in pertinent part:

§ 605. Surplus and undivided profits
A. Determination of value. For the purpose of ascertaining the tax imposed in this Chapter, surplus and undivided profits shall be deemed to have such value as is reflected on the books of the corporation, subject to examination and revision by the collector from the information contained in the report filed by the corporation as hereinafter provided and from any other information obtained by the collector....
....[P]rovided further that in computing surplus and undivided profits there shall be included all reserves other than those for definitely fixed liabilities, ... such reserves in all cases to be made under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the collector. [Emphasis added].
. . . .

Regulation L.A.C. 61:I.305(A), promulgated by the Department, also addresses surplus and undivided profits:

There must be included in the franchise taxable base determined in the manner heretofore described, all reserves other than those for:
(1) definitely fixed liabilities;
. . . .
No deduction from surplus and undivided profits shall be made with respect to any reserve for contingency of any nature, without regard to whether the reserve is partially or fully funded. Reserves for future liability for income taxes shall *1161 not be excluded from the tax base. Deferred Federal Income Tax accounts may be netted in determining the amount of reserve to be included in the taxable base. Reserve for fixed liabilities shall be included in the taxable base to the extent that they constitute borrowed capital under the provisions of R.S. 47:603 and the regulations issued thereunder. [Emphasis added].

In interpreting the statutes, we begin from the well-settled premise that taxing statutes must be strictly construed against the taxing authority. Collector of Revenue v. Wells Fargo Leasing Corp., 393 So.2d 1244 (La.1981). Where a tax statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction favorable to the taxpayer is adopted. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Cocreham, 317 So.2d 605 (La.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 1427, 47 L.Ed.2d 359 (1976). However, exemptions from taxation are strictly construed and must be clearly, unequivocally and affirmatively established. Vulcan Foundry, Inc. v. McNamara, 414 So.2d 1193 (La.1981) (on rehearing); Roberts v. City of Baton Rouge, 236 La. 521, 108 So.2d 111 (1958) (on rehearing).

MB contends it is on the accrual basis of accounting, and, as a result, its "accrued federal taxes" are excluded from the definition of borrowed capital under La.R.S. 47:603. The main purpose of the accrual method of accounting is to bring income and deduction items into position with the proper year of economic activity to which the income and deductions relate.[5] The technique by which this is accomplished is to require the accrual and reporting of income items in the year in which the right to receipt arises, and of deductions and credits in the year in which the obligation to pay arises. J. Chommie, The Law of Federal Income Taxation 166 (1968). Under the accrual method of accounting, it is the right to receive an amount and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income. When the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184, 54 S.Ct. 644, 645, 78 L.Ed. 1200 (1933). Ordinarily, actual receipt and payment is irrelevant to the determination of tax liability. The test is whether all the events have occurred in that year which fix the amount and the fact of the taxpayer's liability. Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 64 S.Ct. 364, 88 L.Ed. 270 (1944); United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 46 S.Ct. 131, 70 L.Ed. 347 (1926).

In contrast to the accrual method is the installment sales method under Internal Revenue Code section 453. That section "was enacted to relieve taxpayers who adopted [the installment basis of reporting] from having to pay an income tax in the year of the sale based on the full amount of anticipated profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small amount of the sales price." Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co, 333 U.S. 496, 503, 68 S.Ct. 695, 699, 92 L.Ed. 831 (1948). Section 453 "enables a taxpayer to defer paying the tax on gain from a sale made on the installment basis until the year in which he

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Bluebook (online)
590 So. 2d 1159, 1991 WL 255887, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goudchauxmaison-blanche-v-broussard-la-1991.