Goswick v. City of Durham

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Goswick v. City of Durham

191 S.E. 728, 211 N.C. 687, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 179

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJune 9, 1937

StatusPublished

Cited by23 cases

This text of 191 S.E. 728 (Goswick v. City of Durham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Goswick v. City of Durham, 191 S.E. 728, 211 N.C. 687, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 179 (N.C. 1937).

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Opinion

Devin, J.

The plaintiffs contend that it sufficiently appears from the figures and mathematical calculations contained in the exhibits offered, evidencing the fiscal affairs of the city of Durham as of 30 June, 1936, upon which the findings of fact and the judgment of the court were based, thai the funds used for the purchase of land for the municipal airport were derived in whole or in part from ad valorem taxes, and that therefore the purchase should be held invalid and the property required to be sold and the proceeds converted back into the city treasury for the benefit of the taxpayers in the reduction of prospective tax rate.

But we cannot hold that the purchase of the land was invalid or decree its sale. If it be conceded that a portion of the funds from which $40,000 was paid for the property was derived from ad valorem taxes, this was an executed contract for the purchase of property, for an admittedly public purpose (chapter 87, Public Laws 1929). The acquisition of the land from surplus funds was not beyond the power of the city and it in no way offended the provisions of Article VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution. Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232; Nash v. Monroe, 198 N. C., 306.

The exception to the finding of fact that there was a net available amount of $4,923 of surplus revenue in the treasury of the city derived from sources other than taxes and sale of cemetery lots, and the adjudication that this amount was now available for expenditures in the construction and equipment of a municipal airport, must be sustained, as we are of opinion that the figures and calculations shown in the evidence adduced do not support the conclusions of the court below on this point.

No exception was noted by either side to that portion of the judgment restraining the city of Durham from expending money obtained from taxes for the purposes of a municipal airport, unless authorized to do so by a vote of the people, and the judgment in that respect must be affirmed.

The good faith of the officials of the city of Durham in the exercise of judgment in fixing its budgets and in the handling of public funds is in no way questioned.

While there is no contention that the construction, equipment, and maintenance of an airport and landing field is a necessary municipal *690 expense within the meaning of Article VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution (Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C., 269), yet it may not he improper to say that man's constantly advancing progress in the conquest of the air as a medium for the transportation of commerce and for public and private use indicates the practical advantage and possible future necessity of adequate landing facilities for the use of the “argosies of magic sails . . . dropping down with costly bales” to the same extent that paved streets and roads are now regarded for the purposes of communication and transportation on land. Hargrave v. Commissioners, 168 N. C., 626; Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo., 514. As was said by Brogden, J., speaking for the Court in Walker v. Faison, 202 N. C., 694, “The law is an expanding science, designed to march with the advancing battalions of life and progress and to safeguard and interpret the changing needs of a commonwealth or community.”

The judgment of the court below, except as herein modified, is

Affirmed.

Stacy, C. J., concurs in result.

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Devin, J.

The plaintiffs contend that it sufficiently appears from the figures and mathematical calculations contained in the exhibits offered, evidencing the fiscal affairs of the city of Durham as of 30 June, 1936, upon which the findings of fact and the judgment of the court were based, thai the funds used for the purchase of land for the municipal airport were derived in whole or in part from ad valorem taxes, and that therefore the purchase should be held invalid and the property required to be sold and the proceeds converted back into the city treasury for the benefit of the taxpayers in the reduction of prospective tax rate.

But we cannot hold that the purchase of the land was invalid or decree its sale. If it be conceded that a portion of the funds from which $40,000 was paid for the property was derived from ad valorem taxes, this was an executed contract for the purchase of property, for an admittedly public purpose (chapter 87, Public Laws 1929). The acquisition of the land from surplus funds was not beyond the power of the city and it in no way offended the provisions of Article VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution. Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C., 232; Nash v. Monroe, 198 N. C., 306.

The exception to the finding of fact that there was a net available amount of $4,923 of surplus revenue in the treasury of the city derived from sources other than taxes and sale of cemetery lots, and the adjudication that this amount was now available for expenditures in the construction and equipment of a municipal airport, must be sustained, as we are of opinion that the figures and calculations shown in the evidence adduced do not support the conclusions of the court below on this point.

No exception was noted by either side to that portion of the judgment restraining the city of Durham from expending money obtained from taxes for the purposes of a municipal airport, unless authorized to do so by a vote of the people, and the judgment in that respect must be affirmed.

The good faith of the officials of the city of Durham in the exercise of judgment in fixing its budgets and in the handling of public funds is in no way questioned.

While there is no contention that the construction, equipment, and maintenance of an airport and landing field is a necessary municipal *690 expense within the meaning of Article VII, sec. 7, of the Constitution (Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C., 269), yet it may not he improper to say that man's constantly advancing progress in the conquest of the air as a medium for the transportation of commerce and for public and private use indicates the practical advantage and possible future necessity of adequate landing facilities for the use of the “argosies of magic sails . . . dropping down with costly bales” to the same extent that paved streets and roads are now regarded for the purposes of communication and transportation on land. Hargrave v. Commissioners, 168 N. C., 626; Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo., 514. As was said by Brogden, J., speaking for the Court in Walker v. Faison, 202 N. C., 694, “The law is an expanding science, designed to march with the advancing battalions of life and progress and to safeguard and interpret the changing needs of a commonwealth or community.”

The judgment of the court below, except as herein modified, is

Affirmed.

Stacy, C. J., concurs in result.

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191 S.E. 728, 211 N.C. 687, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goswick-v-city-of-durham-nc-1937.

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