Gorman v. Miller

27 Pa. Super. 62, 1905 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 17, 1905
DocketAppeal, No. 18
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 27 Pa. Super. 62 (Gorman v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gorman v. Miller, 27 Pa. Super. 62, 1905 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3 (Pa. Ct. App. 1905).

Opinion

Opinion by

Beaver, J.,

In a lease made by defendant with the plaintiffs occurs this clause: “ That the said party of the first part does hereby lease, demise and ]et unto the said parties of the second part, a brick barn to be built on the rear of his lot on the southerly side of Spruce street, in the city of Scranton, county of Lackawanna and state of Pennsylvania, between Breck and Forest courts, together with the ground upon which the same is to be erected. The said barn to contain three stories and basement and to be 100 feet long on the said courts, and forty feet wide, and to be [64]*64completed and ready for occupancy, in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by Norman Rutherford, on the first day of January, 1899.”

Among the specifications referred to, under the head of “ Floors,” is the following: “ The floor of the basement will be laid of two-inch old plank and stalls to be double planked. The floors of first and second stories will be of No. 1 southern pine two inches thick, surfaced and grooved for a hard wood tongue of i by 1 inch oak, and both grooves and tongues to be well painted with white lead and linseed oil before being nailed, then all tobe well nailed. These floors must be watertight. The stalls and box stalls to be double planked with old two-inch plank, as directed.

“ At the rear of all stalls on second floor will run a gutter— (No. 262-P) with trap (No. 266-P) and all to be made watertight.”

In the course of the erection of the building, as clearly appears from the testimony, the plan of the second floor was changed by direction of the city building inspector, by which the center of the said floor was raised by what is called by one of the witnesses a center crown, so that the drop of the floor, instead of being toward the center, was changed so as to be toward the sides. The heads of the horses, as they stood in the stable, were toward the sides and their hinder parts toward the center. This change in the plan of the floor necessitated a complete change as to the gutter.

The subcontractor for the woodwork, during the course of the construction of this floor, called the attention of the defendant to it and advised him that it would not be water-tight but that he could so construct it, without any additional cost to the defendant, as to make it water-tight. His testimony upon this subject is very clear and explicit. In the cross-examination of the defendant it is admitted that Moyer, the subcontractor, had suggested the change and the reasons for not permitting it are given. Among other things, he said :

“ Q. So the reason you didn’t let Frank Moyer make the change when he suggested it, so as to make it water-tight under the plans and specifications — the reason you didn’t permit him to make that was because you thought he was going to make some money out of it ? A. The reason was I only [65]*65had his story for it, and we had the contractor and the architect and everybody else on the other side. The main reason was that he couldn’t get the yellow pine at the time, and we was delayed a month on account of his not getting the yellow pine, stopped the whole building; and to remedy that he wanted to change the floor from a four-inch floor with tongue and grooves and painted and put in a two-inch floor. He wanted to change it from four inches to two inches, and he said that would, be water-tight. In the first place, he said the other would be water-tight and, when he couldn’t get the lumber, he said this would be water-tight and I didn’t believe anything he said, and I told him I wanted to have it done according to the contract, and I wouldn’t permit any changes.”
Afterwards, on having his attention called to the thickness of the floor, as required by the specifications, the defendant said: “ It should be two inches instead of a four-inch floor; I am mistaken about that; it is two-inch instead of four-inch floor; I am mistaken in the thickness of the floor.”

The importance of having a water-tight floor was due to the fact that the ground floor, which was immediately under the floor in question, was to be occupied by carriages and other vehicles which it was necessary to protect from any droppings from above. The evidence shows clearly that the second floor, used as a horse stable, was not water-tight, and that it began to leak the day following its occupancy. The attention of the defendant was called to it and he undertook to remedy it at different times and in different ways which he details in his testimony. It would seem from the testimony that the plaintiffs relied entirely upon their agreement with the defendant and upon the defendant’s efforts to remedy the defect which became apparent as soon as the stable was occupied. They paid their rent regularly and brought this action to recover damages for the failure of the defendant to make good the stipulation in the specifications referred to in the lease, that the floor must be water-tight.

It is not necessary to stop to discuss the question as to whether or not the stipulation for a water-tight floor is part of the plans and specifications referred to in the lease. The specifications as to materials to be used and the manner in which the floor was to be laid seem to have been carried out, but the [66]*66plan was changed in its most essential part, that is, the floor instead of draining toward the center was changed in such a way, under the direction of the building inspector of the city, that the drainage was in an opposite direction. It was, therefore, practically impossible, as ought to have been apparent, to properly drain the floor without suspending the natural law of gravitation. The effect of this change was communicated by the subcontractor for the woodwork to the defendant, but he testifies that he did not communicate it to the plaintiffs and there does not seem to be evidence that the attention of the plaintiffs was called to it.

The testimony in regard to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs is voluminous, full and clear and was fairly submitted to the jury.

Two principal questions are raised by the specifications of error: Was the measure of damages correctly laid down by the court? Was the testimony in regard to the plaintiffs having given notice to the defendant that they were satisfied with the building, so as to induce the defendant to pay the contractor, of such a character as to warrant the court in taking the case from the jury.

The first eight assignments of error are to the answers of the court to the points for charge, as presented by the defendant. In view of the facts, as we have stated them, gathered from a very careful reading of the evidence, it is clear that a number of the points were based upon a one-sided statement of the facts which could not be accepted by the court, in view of which we are unable to discover any error whatever in the disposition of the points, as made by the court below.

The ninth assignment alleges error in regard to a portion of the charge of the court, which is as follows: “ If, after considering all these things, you find that this barn was not put in the condition in which Mr. Miller agreed to put it, and that Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
27 Pa. Super. 62, 1905 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gorman-v-miller-pasuperct-1905.