Gorman Anderson Corp. v. United States

34 Cust. Ct. 35
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJanuary 27, 1955
DocketC. D. 1674
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 34 Cust. Ct. 35 (Gorman Anderson Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gorman Anderson Corp. v. United States, 34 Cust. Ct. 35 (cusc 1955).

Opinion

Lawrence, Judge:.

Merchandise described in the record as Mordax horseshoe studs was classified by the collector of customs as articles of metal, not specially provided for, and duty was imposed thereon at the rate of 22K per centum ad valorem pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 397 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 397), as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (82 Treas. Dec. 305, T. D. 51802).

It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the commodity should be classified in the provision for “* * * studs, * * * lathed, machined, or brightened,” and dutiable accordingly at the rate of 15 per centum [36]*36ad valorem as provided in paragraph 332 of said act (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 332), as modified by said general agreement.

The pertinent text of the competing statutes is here set forth— Paragraph 397 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra:

Articles or wares not specially provided for, whether partly or wholly manufactured:
* Hi * * * ‡ sfc
Composed wholly or in chief value of iron, steel, lead, copper, brass, nickel, pewter, zinc, aluminum, or other metal (not including platinum, gold, or silver), but not plated with platinum, gold, or silver, or colored with gold lacquer:
* * * * * *
Other (except slide fasteners and parts thereof)_22%% ad val.

Paragraph 332 of said act, as modified, supra:

Rivets, studs, and steel points, lathed, machined, or brightened, and rivets or studs for nonskidding automobile tires_15% ad val.

The only witness in the case was Rolf L. Germann, who, since 1949, had been vice president, general manager, and treasurer of the Sintered Carbide Corp., and his testimony remains uncontradicted.

Germann testified, in substance, that be was familiar with the imported merchandise which is traded under the name of “Mordax” horseshoe studs and representative samples were received in evidence as follows: Exhibit 1 — type VH horseshoe studs; exhibit 2 — type R; exhibit 3 — type N; exhibit 4 — -type C. In evidence as exhibit 5 is a folder which was received to illustrate in graphic form the use of studs on horseshoes as applied by blacksmiths. It was pointed out that type NHW is like exhibits 3 and 4 differing only in size. The witness stated that the studs are used mostly in northern sections of the country, mentioning Minnesota and Michigan, where weather conditions “necessitate the application of these horseshoe studs to the shoes of the horses”; that they can be used all year round, but are more frequently used during the winter time “to prevent the horse from sliding or having an unsafe feeling on the ground.” Germann stated that exhibits 1 through 4 had been machined and that “stud” was the only name applied to them.

As to the first three exhibits, the witness stated — “There is a lathed operation involved and a milling operation and a boring operation.” An examination of exhibits 1 through 4 indicates that all have been bored at one end.

When interrogated by the court, the witness explained that the studs were made primarily for the safety of the horse to prevent it from slipping on ice or icy surfaces. “This little tip that you see in the center is a carbide tip and that tip, due to the weight of the horse digs into the ice sufficiently to prevent it from slipping.” Their use [37]*37on race torses, to quote the witness, “is primarily to save the life of the horseshoe, so that the horse doesn’t have to be re-shoed [sic] too often.”

Germann, who was educated in Switzerland where he received a degree as mechanical engineer at the Swiss College of Engineering in Zurich, stated that these studs originated in Switzerland — “The Swiss cavalry apparently originated this type of stud for their horses.”

It is not disputed that the subject merchandise is an article wholly or in chief value of metal; consequently, the controversy resolves itself into a question of law, namely, whether or not the articles properly fall within the provision for “* * * studs, * * * lathed, machined, or brightened.” In other words, are the imported articles commonly or commercially known as studs, as that term is used in said paragraph 332. It is elementary, of course, that the common and commercial meaning of a statutory provision is presumptively the same in the absence of convincing proof or other circumstances to the contrary. American Felsol Co. et al. v. United States, 25 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 367, T. D. 49454, and cases cited therein.

To establish a commercial meaning different from the common meaning, satisfactory proof must be introduced to the effect that a given term has a meaning throughout the trade and commerce of the United States which is uniform, definite, and general, and not personal, partial, or local. We are clearly of the opinion that the testimony of the only witness in the case, which is summarized above, is insufficient to establish within the rule above announced a trade meaning of the term “studs” different from its ordinary or common meaning.

In the case of United States v. Wakem & McLaughlin, 6 Ct. Cust. Appls. 385, T. D. 35923, the question before the court was whether grenadine is a “fruit sirup.” A single witness testified that “we’’— evidently meaning the firm which he represented — “consider it among the fruit sirups.” Commenting upon this the court said—

Without going to the length of holding that under no circumstances could commercial designation be shown by a single witness, we have no difficulty in saying that this testimony falls far short of establishing a knowledge of the trade usage which entitled the witness to testify to the fact of general and uniform usage such as is required.

Our appellate court in United States v. Oberle, 1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 527, T. D. 31545, had before it the question whether very small mirrors should be classified as toys or as mirrors. It was there stated —

* * * But one witness testified, an employee of the importers, that these articles were commercially known as toys. One witness is insufficient for the purpose of establishing commercial designation when the testimony is no other than that included in this record.

Plaintiffs contend that the testimony of the sole witness, Germann, conclusively establishes that “stud” is the only name which has been [38]*38applied to the articles represented by exhibits 1 through 4; that their sole use is in conjunction with horseshoes, and, hence, are within the eo nomine provision for studs contained in paragraph 332, as modified, supra.

Plaintiffs further contend that an eo nomine designation, such as that for “studs,” without limitation beyond the requirement that they be “lathed, machined, or brightened,” brings into operation the recognized principle that an eo nomine

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Bluebook (online)
34 Cust. Ct. 35, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gorman-anderson-corp-v-united-states-cusc-1955.