Google LLC v. Sonos, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GOOGLE LLC, Case No. 20-cv-03845-EMC

8 Plaintiff, CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER 9 v. Docket No. 66 10 SONOS, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This case involves three patents that Plaintiff Google accuses Defendant Sonos of 16 infringing. On May 11, 2021, the parties appeared before the Court for a claim construction 17 hearing. Pursuant to Patent Local Rule 4-3, the parties asked the Court to construe nine (9) terms 18 that appear in various claims of the patents-in-suit. See Joint Claim Construction Brief, Appendix 19 A (Docket No. 66). The parties stipulated to a dismissal of the one of the patents-in-suit (the ’206 20 patent), and eight (8) terms remain for the Court’s construction. Docket No. 107. The Court 21 adopts the following constructions. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 A. Patents-in-Suit 24 The following three patents contain the claim terms which the parties dispute for this claim 25 construction hearing. The Court has granted the parties’ stipulation of dismissal for the claims of 26 infringement for the ’206 patent. Docket No. 107. 27 1. ’187 Patent 1 Management System with Easy and Secure Device Enrollment,” (“the ’187 patent”), which was 2 issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on March 1, 2011. Id. ¶ 21. 3 At the claim construction tutorial, the parties explained that the ’187 patent is directed to a digital 4 rights management system (“DRM system”) that oversees a domain of devices (as opposed to 5 individual devices standing alone). The parties explained that a domain is a group of devices that 6 share rights associated with a common account for use in accessing protected content. 7 The ’187 patent addresses the problem of confidentiality and security of protected digital 8 content. The background states that “[t]he ease at which valuable digital content (e.g., music, 9 games, video, pictures, and books) can be copied and shared is worrisome to content owners.” 10 ’187 patent, 1:13-15 (Docket No. 1-2, Ex. 2). There are two problems with conventional DRM 11 systems. First, “a user faces the potentially cumbersome task of registering all of his devices into 12 a domain.” ’187 Patent, 1:40-42. Second, “the security of content in a domain is potentially 13 threatened if users can remotely register devices into a domain over a long distance.” ’187 Patent, 14 1:42-45. Thus, the patent states that “a need exists for domain-based digital-rights management 15 with easy and secure device enrollment that increases the security of content.” ’187 Patent, 1:45- 16 48. In sum, the DRM system in the ’187 patent is meant to address the ease and security of the 17 new-device registration process within a domain of devices. 18 2. ’375 Patent 19 Google is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 10,140,375, titled “Personalized Network 20 Searching,” (“the ’375 patent”), which was issued by the USPTO on November 27, 2018. Compl. 21 ¶ 54. This patent is directed to methods and systems for personalized network searching, 22 synchronizing bookmarks between a client device and a server. The background of the patent 23 states the problem it wishes to solve:

24 “An Internet user often has difficulty propagating bookmarks between the various machines on which the user depends. For 25 example, many users have a computer at work and at home. Often, the bookmarks relied on in the work setting are useful at home as 26 well. In most cases, however, the user must manually synchronize the bookmark lists of the two machines. In addition, conventional 27 methods of organizing bookmarks tend to be limited at best, making 1 ’375 Patent, 1:51-60 (Docket No. 1-12). The specifications state that the search engine may 2 perform two different functions: “[t]he search engine 120 may generate the search result by 3 combining the general results and the personalized results. The search engine may instead provide 4 separate lists: one containing the general search result and a second containing the personalized 5 search result.” ’375 Patent, 6:9-13 (emphasis added). 6 3. ’586 Patent 7 Google is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 10,229,586, titled “Relaying Communications in a 8 Wireless Sensor System” (“the ’586 patent”) which was issued by the USPTO on March 12, 2019. 9 Compl. ¶ 91. The ’596 patent is directed at using devices within a wireless mesh network. The 10 patent describes a “wireless sensor unit system providing bi-directional communication between a 11 sensor (e.g., smoke sensor, fire sensor, temperature sensor, water, etc.) and a repeater or base unit 12 in a building protection system.” ’586 Patent, 1:38-42 (Docket No. 1-22, Ex. 22). At the claim 13 construction tutorial, counsel for Google explained that mesh networks are networks that include 14 at least two pathways to each node. 15 The specifications describe the process as follows:

16 “When the sensor unit 102 detects an anomalous condition (e.g., smoke, fire, water, etc.) the sensor unit communicates with the 17 appropriate repeater unit 110 and provides data regarding the anomalous condition. The repeater unit 110 forwards the data to the 18 base unit 112, and the base unit 112 forwards the information to the computer 113. The computer 113 evaluates the data and takes 19 appropriate action. If the computer 113 determines that the condition is an emergency (e.g., fire, smoke, large quantities of water), then 20 the computer 113 contacts the appropriate personnel 120. If the computer 113 determines that the situation warrants reporting, but is 21 not an emergency, then the computer 113 logs the data for later reporting. In this way, the sensor system 100 can monitor the 22 conditions in and around the building 101. 23 ’586 Patent, 5:26-39. 24 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 25 A. Ordinary Meaning and Claim Construction 26 Claim construction is a question of law, although it may contain factual underpinnings. 27 Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. 1 patent claims asserted to be infringed.’” O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 2 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 3 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 4 It is a bedrock principle of patent law that “the claims of a patent define the invention.” 5 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 6 The words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and custom meaning,” which is “the 7 meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of 8 the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 9 Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[i]t is the 10 person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are 11 construed”). The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art interprets the claim term 12 “provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 13 1313. A person of ordinary skill reads the claim term “not only in the context of the particular 14 claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the 15 specification.” Id. 16 In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language, as understood by a person of skill 17 in the art, may be “readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases 18 involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood 19 words.” Id. at 1314. But other times the parties may use claim language idiosyncratically, and the 20 Court must look to “those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art 21 would have understood disputed claim language to mean,” such as “the words of the claims 22 themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence 23 concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” 24 Id. (quoting Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116). 25 Courts first look to intrinsic evidence because “the claims themselves provide substantial 26 guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Id. The context in which a claim term is 27 used can be highly instructive, as can “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and 1 meaning of particular claim terms.” Id. But claims must also be read “in view of the 2 specification,” which is always “highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” and is often 3 “dispositive.” Id. at 1315 (internal quotations omitted); see also Cont'l Circuits LLC v. Intel 4 Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the 5 claim construction analysis … [and] it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term’”) 6 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315). 7 In addition to consulting the specification, courts should consider “the patent's prosecution 8 history,” which is “of primary significance in understanding the claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 9 980. However, the Federal Circuit has cautioned that “because the prosecution history represents 10 an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that 11 negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim 12 construction purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. 13 Finally, courts may consider extrinsic evidence, which consists of “all evidence external 14 to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and 15 learned treatises.” Id. at 1317-18. However, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the 16 intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id. at 1317 17 (internal quotation omitted). 18 B. Means-Plus-Function Claim Construction Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) 19 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), a patentee may express a claim in terms of “means or step[s] for 20 performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support 21 thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (emphasis added). Such a means-plus-function limitation must be 22 “construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and 23 equivalents thereof.” Id. As the Federal Circuit has explained, § 112(f) “allow[s] patentees to 24 express a claim limitation by reciting a function to be performed rather than by reciting structure 25 for performing that function, while placing specific constraints on how such a limitation is to be 26 construed, namely, by restricting the scope of coverage to only the structure, materials, or acts 27 described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” 1 added). 2 In this analysis, the Court must first determine whether the limitation in question is a 3 means-plus-function term that is subject to § 112(f). See id. at 1348. Generally, the use of the 4 term “means” creates a presumption that § 112(f) applies. Id. at 1349. Conversely, the absence of 5 the term “means” creates the opposite presumption. Id. A party may overcome either 6 presumption by showing that the claims either recite or do not recite a “sufficiently definite 7 structure” to adequately perform the claimed function. Id. Thus, § 112(f) applies only if “the 8 challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite[] sufficiently definite structure’ or else 9 recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. at 1348 10 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 11 IV. DISCUSSION 12 A. Terms in Dispute 13 The parties ask the Court to construe eight (8) claim terms from the patents-in-suit. 14 1. Term one (1): “Domain Information” (’187 Patent Claims 1, 3, 4, and 10) 15 16 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

17 Plain and ordinary meaning. Information corresponding to Plain and ordinary meaning. 18 a group of devices that share rights associated with a 19 common account for use in accessing protected 20 digital content.

21 22 At the claim construction hearing, Google informed the Court that its construction seeks to 23 incorporate the contextual antecedent reference and eliminate confusion by clarifying that the 24 word “domain” is not generic, but instead refers to a group of devices that share a common 25 account for accessing protected digital content. 26 The Court finds that the context of the claim language already provides the specificity 27 which Google seeks. Claim 1 of the ’187 patent provides a series of steps for registering a new 1 information corresponding to the domain of devices from a device existing within the domain of 2 devices.” ’187 Patent, Claim 1, 7:65-67 (Docket No. 1-2). Thus, the claim language answers 3 Google’s concern about ambiguity, and it clarifies that the “domain information” is used in the 4 context of an existing domain of devices which can access protected digital content. 5 Thus, Google’s proposed construction merely repeats surrounding claim language and 6 would render the construction superfluous and unnecessary. See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson 7 Mobile Communs. AB, 820 F.3d 419, 429 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“‘interpretations that render some 8 portion of the claim language superfluous are disfavored’”) (quoting Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. 9 v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). For instance, substituting Google’s 10 proposed construction for “domain information” into the claim results in the following:

11 “A method for registering a new device as part of a domain of 12 devices, which share rights associated with a common account, for use in accessing protected digital content … the method 13 comprising the steps of: receiving information corresponding to a group of devices that share rights associated with a common 14 account for use in accessing protected digital content …” 15 ’187 Patent, Claim 1, 7:60-67 (Docket No. 1-2) (Google’s proposed construction emphasized). 16 Given the plain language of the claim term, and the potential for redundancy and 17 confusion, the Court adopts Sonos’s proposed construction and holds that “domain information” 18 should be construed under its plain and ordinary meaning. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 2. Term two (2): “Logic Circuitry” (’187 Patent, Claim 10) 2 3 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

4 Governed by 35 U.S.C. 112, Plain and ordinary meaning; Plain and ordinary meaning; 5 ¶ 6. Where the function is not governed by 35 U.S.C. § not governed by 35 U.S.C. § “providing the domain 112, ¶ 6. To the extent § 112, 112(f). 6 information to a key issuer ¶ 6 applies, sufficient which is separate from the corresponding structure is 7 domain of devices” and there disclosed in the intrinsic is no corresponding structure. evidence cited below. 8 At best, the corresponding 9 structure includes a processor or microprocessor, but this is 10 inadequate because there is no sufficient corresponding 11 algorithm.

12 13 The parties agree that, because the word “means” is absent from the claim term, there is a 14 presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) does not apply. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Thus, 15 Sonos bears the burden of proof in showing that the claim term “logic circuitry” fails to recite a 16 “sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for 17 performing that function.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Sonos must rebut the presumption by 18 a preponderance of the evidence. Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comput., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. 19 Cir. 2003). 20 In Apex, the Federal Circuit analyzed the district court’s construction of claim terms in 21 patents directed at “computer switching systems for connecting computer workstations to remote 22 computers.” Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comput., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). One of the 23 claims was directed toward “a programmed logic circuit coupled to the first interface that 24 transmits the keyboard and cursor control device signals.” Id. at 1368 (emphasis omitted). The 25 Federal Circuit held that “the term ‘circuit’ with an appropriate identifier such as ‘interface,’ 26 ‘programming’ and ‘logic,’ certainly identifies some structural meaning to one of ordinary skill in 27 the art.” Id. at 1373. It noted that “[t]he term ‘circuit’ is defined as ‘the combination of a number 1 some desired function.’ Dictionary of Computing, 75 (4th ed. 1996).” Id. Considering this 2 definition, even “the term ‘circuit,’ by itself connotes some structure.” Id. Similarly, in Linear 3 Tech., the Federal Circuit held that “when the structure-connoting term ‘circuit’ is coupled with a 4 description of the circuit's operation, sufficient structural meaning generally will be conveyed to 5 persons of ordinary skill in the art, and § 112 P 61 presumptively will not apply.” Linear Tech. 6 Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 7 Sonos seeks to distinguish the instant case from Apex and Linear Tech. by pointing to the 8 specifications, which explain that logic circuitry in the preferred embodiment of the invention 9 “comprises a microprocessor controller such as but not limited to a Motorola MC68328 10 DragonBall integrated microprocessor or a TI OMAPl 510 processor.” ’187 Patent, 5:61-65 11 (Docket No. 1-2) (emphasis added). According to Sonos, the specifications reveal that logic 12 circuitry is part of a class of structures that is broader than microprocessors because it 13 “comprises” (but is not limited to) the two microprocessors cited in the specifications. Sonos’s 14 Responsive Claim Construction Brief at 3 (Docket No. 70). Thus, because logic circuitry 15 includes, but is not limited to, a microprocessor, the term in this context describes a class of 16 structures that is open and unbounded. Id. at 4. At the claim construction hearing, Sonos argued 17 that one cannot discern the metes and bounds of this undefined class of “microprocessors,” and the 18 claim term at issue therefore differs from the paradigmatic example of a “circuit within a device” 19 discussed in Apex and Linear Tech. 20 However, the inquiry is not whether the term “logic circuitry” comprises a class of 21 structures that is broader than a microprocessor, but whether a person or ordinary skill in the art 22 would sufficiently understand its structure based on the context in which it is used. Cf. Linear 23 Tech., 379 F.3d at 1322 (“[t]hat the disputed term is not limited to a single structure does not 24 disqualify it as a corresponding structure, as long as the class of structures is identifiable by a 25 person of ordinary skill in the art”). See also Creo Prods. v. Presstek, Inc., 305 F.3d 1337, 1347 26 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[u]nder our case law interpreting § 112, P 6, knowledge of one skilled in the art 27 1 can be called upon to flesh out a particular structural reference in the specification for the purpose 2 of satisfying the statutory requirement of definiteness”). 3 Here, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that there is structure to a 4 “logic circuitry” that is more specific than “circuit” alone. The term “circuit” has been defined as 5 “the interconnection of a number of devices in one or more closed paths to perform a desired 6 electrical or electronic function.” Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320 (citing Rudolf F. Graf, Modern 7 Dictionary of Electronics 116 (7th ed. 1999)). The term “logic” is an “additional adjectival 8 qualification[] further identifying sufficient structure to perform the claimed functions to one of 9 ordinary skill in the art.” Apex Inc., 325 F.3d at 1374. This term “further narrows the scope of 10 those structures covered by the claim and makes the term more definite.” Personalized Media 11 Communs., L.L.C. v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The terms “circuit” and “logic” are 12 interconnected:

13 “The difference between the Linear term "circuitry" and the claim 23 term "logic" is not significant. Several dictionaries define "logic" 14 in terms of circuits. See McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 1231 (6th ed 2003) (defining "logic" as a 15 "[g]eneral term for various types of gates, flip-flops, and other on/off circuits used to perform problem-solving functions in a digital 16 computer"); IBM Dictionary of Computing, 396 (10th ed 1994) (defining "logic" as "[t]he systematized interconnection of digital 17 switching functions, circuits, or devices"). Both logic and circuit suggest some structure.” 18 19 3com Corp. v. D-Link Sys., No. C 05-00098 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114417, at *14-15 20 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2006). Thus, a “logic circuit” is a general term for a circuit (i.e., a number of 21 devices in one or more closed paths) designed to perform the problem-solving functions of modern 22 digital computers. Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320; 3com Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114417 at 23 *14-15. 24 The claim language sufficiently recites the functions to be performed by the logic circuitry 25 in the ’187 patent. It states that the logic circuitry is “for providing the domain information to a 26 key issuer, which is separate from the domain of devices.” ’187 Patent, Claim 10, 9:4-5 (Docket 27 No. 1-2). The logic circuitry “caus[es] the key issuer to issue a private key for use in accessing 1 here as in Apex and Linear Tech., discussed above. A person of ordinary skill in the art would 2 thus understand the claim term to recite a sufficiently definite class of structures for performing 3 the function of providing domain information to a key issuer and causing that key issuer to issue a 4 private key. 5 Sonos has not rebutted the presumption that § 112(f) does not apply to this claim term. 6 The term “circuitry” is structure-connoting, and when coupled with the word “logic” as a 7 descriptive identifier, a person of ordinary skill in the art can adequately ascertain its structural 8 meaning. Apex Inc., 325 F.3d at 1373. Accordingly, the Court adopts Google’s construction and 9 holds that the term “logic circuitry” is not governed by § 112(f).2 10 3. Term three (3): “Private Key” (’187 Patent, Claims 1 and 10) 11 12 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

13 A non-public key used for A non-public key that is used A non-public key that is used 14 either decrypting data or as an input to a cryptographic as an input to a cryptographic generating digital signatures. algorithm designed such that, algorithm designed such that, 15 without the key, the output of without the key, the output of

the algorithm cannot be the algorithm cannot be 16 computed. computed. 17 18 The dispute over this claim term centers on the breadth and scope of the term “private 19 key.” The ’187 patent specifications provide the following definition of public key cryptography:

20 “Prior to describing the DRM system in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention the following 21 definitions are provided to set the necessary background.

22 Public-Key Cryptography—Cryptographic technique that uses a pair of keys, a public and a private key. The private 23 key is used for either decrypting data or generating digital signatures and the public key is used for either encrypting 24 data or verifying digital signatures.” 25 2 Counsel for Sonos cites Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2000), wherein 26 the district court held “that [the term] ‘circuit’ is … so generic that by itself it conveys no sense of structure at all.” Id. at 929. However, Nilssen is non-binding and predates Apex and Linear Tech., 27 both of which hold that the term “circuitry” connotes sufficient structure even without the word 1 ’187 Patent, 2:42-49 (Docket No. 1-2). The specifications provide the following definition of a 2 digital signature:

3 “Digital signature—A digital signature (not to be confused with a digital certificate) is an electronic signature that can be used to 4 authenticate the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a document, and possibly to ensure that the original content of the 5 message or document that has been sent is unchanged.” 6 ’187 Patent, 2:59-64 (Docket No. 1-2). At the claim construction hearing, Google argued that 7 these definitions are merely meant to give context to the preferred embodiment of the invention. 8 Google argues that there are other potential embodiments of this term which do not necessarily 9 involve encryption or decryption. And, as Google notes, the term “public-key cryptography” does 10 not appear in any of the claims of the ’187 patent. 11 To that end, Google seeks a more expansive definition that encompasses private key 12 technologies which do not involve encryption or decryption. Google’s Opening Claim 13 Construction Brief at 12 (Docket No. 67). For instance, Google’s construction would include hash 14 algorithms, which are a type of cryptographic algorithm used for authentication that can employ 15 private keys, but that do not involve encryption or decryption. Id. It would also include “message 16 authentication codes, key expansion, pseudorandom number generation, and sharing of secrets,” 17 which use cryptographic algorithms but do not involve encryption or decryption. Id. Google 18 contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand a private key “to mean a 19 cryptographic key used in relation to a cryptographic algorithm (which may or may not involve 20 encryption or decryption).” Id. at 13. 21 At the claim construction hearing, Sonos countered that the ’187 patent only discusses 22 private keys in the context of public key cryptography. It argued that, based on the way the term 23 is used in the specifications, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the term 24 “private key” to include shared secrets like a password. In every instance, the term “private key” 25 is used to sign a digital signature (which is a form of encryption) or to decrypt information. This 26 differs from symmetric key cryptography, wherein the keys are known to both the sender and the 27 recipient. In effect, Sonos argues that Google has acted as its own lexicographer by defining 1 There are two exceptions to the general rule that a claim term is given its plain and 2 ordinary meaning by a person of ordinary skill in the art: (1) where a patentee acts as its own 3 lexicographer, or (2) where a patentee “disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the 4 specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 5 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A patentee may act as its own lexicographer by “‘clearly set[ting] forth a 6 definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting 7 CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). However, it is not 8 enough for a patentee “to simply disclose a single embodiment or use a word in the same manner 9 in all embodiments.” Id. Instead, the patentee must “‘clearly express an intent’” to redefine the 10 term. Id. (quoting Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 11 2008)). Here, the Court does not find that Google acted as its own lexicographer with respect to 12 the term “private key” because public key cryptography is defined merely in conjunction with a 13 preferred embodiment of the invention. Thus, Google has not manifested a clear intent to redefine 14 the term “private key.” 15 Further, the Court finds that the second exception to the rule does not apply to the instant 16 case because Google has not limited the scope of the claim term through the specifications. 17 Facially, the ’187 patent uses the term “private key” in relation to public key cryptography. For 18 instance, the specifications describe the process wherein user equipment 101 receives a DRM 19 certificate from a key issuer 105 as follows:

20 “Key issuer 105 authenticates the unit certificate (belonging to equipment 101) and then checks the domain information. If the 21 domain information indicates that equipment 101 is being added to a new domain, key issuer 105 creates a new DRM public/private key 22 pair. If equipment 101 is being added to an existing domain, key issuer 105 looks up that domain's DRM public/private key pair in a 23 database. Key issuer 105 then creates a DRM certificate that contains all necessary information (e.g., the DRM public key, serial 24 number, model number, etc.) for equipment 101 to obtain rights to digital content from rights issuer 103. Key issuer 105 then sends 25 equipment 101 the DRM certificate and the DRM private key utilized by the domain.” 26 27 ’187 Patent, 4:29-41 (emphases added). Additionally, the specifications describe the process 1 follows:

2 “When a user wishes to purchase rights to digital content from rights issuer 103, it provides rights issuer 103 with a DRM certificate. 3 Thus in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention, a DRM certificate (which contains the DRM public key) 4 must be provided to rights issuer 103 before any rights to digital content will be transferred to the user. Rights issuer 103 will verify 5 the authenticity of the DRM certificate and then generate a rights object and provide it to equipment 101. The rights object contains 6 an encrypted encryption key (content encryption key) needed to render (execute) the digital content. The content encryption key is 7 encrypted with the DRM public key so it can be decrypted only using the DRM private key.” 8 9 ’187 Patent, 4:42-56 (Docket No. 1-2) (emphases added). The specifications further provide:

10 “The DRM certificate, which is obtained via the authenticated communications with key issuer 105, is utilized by user equipment 11 101 when obtaining rights objects (i.e., licenses to digital content) from rights issuer 103. Rights issuer 103 utilizes the DRM 12 certificate to authenticate equipment 101 and pass rights objects (licenses) associated with digital content to user equipment 101. 13 Particularly, the DRM certificate comprises a DRM public key (the corresponding DRM private key is securely stored in user equipment 14 101), identification information (e.g., the unique serial number or model number belonging to the user equipment 101), and a digital 15 signature generated by key issuer 105. 16 ’187 Patent, 3:51-62 (emphases added). 17 From this language in the specifications, the Court notes that the DRM certificate consists 18 of, inter alia, a public key and a corresponding private key securely stored in the user equipment, 19 as well as a digital signature generated by a key issuer. Id. The DRM certificate enables the user 20 equipment to access licenses associated with digital content from a rights issuer. Id. The rights 21 issuer issues a content encryption key to the user equipment, which is needed to render the 22 digital content. ’187 Patent, 4:42-56. The content encryption key is encrypted with the DRM 23 public key so it can be decrypted by the user equipment using only the DRM private key. Id. 24 These passages from the specifications describe a “private key” in the context of 25 asymmetric, public key cryptography wherein both the sender and the recipient of information 26 have their own public and private keys. However, the specifications provide the following 27 disclaimer: “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that alternate methods of securing 1 techniques.” ’187 Patent, 7:54-57 (emphasis added). Thus, the specifications merely describe 2 asymmetric, public key cryptography as part of the preferred embodiment, and the specifications 3 explicitly state that the invention covers the use of a DRM system with symmetric key techniques. 4 Because the specifications state that the full scope of the claim term covers symmetric key 5 techniques, Google has not disavowed the full scope of the claim term, and the Court construes 6 “private key” to cover both asymmetric public key cryptography and symmetric key techniques. 7 Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. The ’187 patent covers embodiments which use symmetric key 8 techniques, and thus Sonos’s construction, which would limit the invention to the public key 9 cryptography context, impermissibly seeks to narrow the claim scope. 10 In sum, Google has not acted as its own lexicographer, and it has not disavowed the full 11 scope of the claim term, which covers DRM systems using symmetric key techniques. 12 Accordingly, the Court adopts Google’s construction. 13 4. Term four (4): “Combined search results set”/“The combined search results set 14 including at least two of: one or more favorite items from the set of [favorite 15 items]/[bookmarks] synchronized for the user; one or more search results from a 16 first global index; or one or more search results from a second global index” (’375 17 Patent, Claims 1-11 and 13-20) 18 19 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

20 Two or more of: [a], [b], or “combined search results set” Two or more of: [a], [b], or 21 [c] means “a search results set [c] Where [a] is “one or more that includes results from at Where [a] is “one or more 22 favorite items from the set of least one personalized favorite items from the set of favorite items”, search.” As a result of that favorite items”, 23 Where [b] is “one or more construction, the larger Where [b] is “one or more search phrase means “the combined search 24 results from a first global search results set including at results from a first global 25 index”, and least one or more favorite index”, and Where [c] is “one or more items from the set of favorite Where [c] is “one or more 26 search results from a second items synchronized for the search results from a second global index.” user and either one or more global index.” 27 search results from a first search results from a second 1 global index.” 2 3 The dispute over this claim term boils down to whether the term must include a 4 combination of results from different types of sets. Google argues that results obtained from 5 multiple “global indexes” would not be enough. Google’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 6 15 (Docket No. 67). It argues that the claims should be construed to require at least a personal 7 search (i.e., of favorites or bookmarks). Id. at 17. Accordingly, the Court should construe 8 “combined search results set” to mean “a search results set that includes results from at least one 9 personalized search.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 10 Sonos counters that the plain language of the claim term itself is clear: “the combined 11 search results set including at least two of: [A] one or more favorite items from the set of favorite 12 items synchronized for the user; [B] one or more search results from a first global index; or [C] 13 one or more search results from a second global index.” Sonos’s Responsive Claim Construction 14 Brief at 14 (emphases added by Sonos) (Docket No. 70). In other words, Sonos’s position is that 15 personalized searching is not necessarily encompassed by this claim term. 16 Sonos is correct that the plain language of the claim term encompasses search result sets 17 which are comprised solely of search results from a first and second global index. Even if this was 18 a drafting error, the Court may not correct such an error to sustain the validity of the patent. The 19 Federal Circuit has “repeatedly held that courts may not redraft claims to cure a drafting error 20 made by the patentee, whether to make them operable or to sustain their validity.” Lucent Techs., 21 Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Where the claims are susceptible to 22 only one reasonable construction, the Federal Circuit “construe[s] the claims as the patentee 23 drafted them.” Id. In Lucent Techs., for instance, the patent at issue involved a protocol and 24 methods for digitizing speech, and the claim term at issue recited “[a] method for producing a 25 speech message comprising: … iteratively forming a sequence of pulses for said time frame … 26 and each successive iteration including the steps of,” followed by steps 1-5. Id. at 1204-05. The 27 district court construed the phrase “each successive iteration including the steps of” to require that 1 excitation pulse sequence. Id. at 1213. This interpretation was contradicted by the sole 2 embodiment in the specifications, which showed that calculation of pitch redundancy (steps 1-4) 3 was performed outside the pulse-forming loop. Id. at 1214-15. Despite the contradiction between 4 the district court’s construction and the sole embodiment, the Federal Circuit upheld the 5 construction, because the claim language “expressly require[d] execution of steps 1-5 during each 6 pulse-forming iteration and the specification d[id] not redefine the claim term to have an 7 alternative meaning.”3 Id. at 1215-16. 8 The legal principle from Lucent Techs. applies to the instant case. The claim language 9 expressly includes combined search results sets that do not include personalized searches, and the 10 specifications do not contain clear and unambiguous language sufficient to overcome the plain 11 claims language so as to redefine the term only to include those combined search results which are 12 personalized. 13 Indeed, while some of the preferred embodiments in the ’375 patent include personalized 14 search results, even the specifications appear to contain flexibility. For instance, “[i]n one 15 embodiment, the search engine 120 returns the list sorted as in a conventional search engine and 16 with the personalized search results indicated in some way, such as, for example, highlighted or 17 shown with a symbol beside the personalized search result.” ’375 patent, 6:15-19. The language 18 is phrased permissively: “[e]mbodiments of the present invention may combine conventional 19 network searches with, for example, personalized searches utilizing information provided by the 20 user previously or in conjunction with the submission of the search.” ’375 patent, 8:46-50 21 (emphases added). The preferred embodiments do not clearly and unambiguously disavow search 22 results which are not personalized.4 23 3 This is to say, the preferred embodiments only authorize departure from the plain meaning of the 24 claims when they are phrased in clear and unambiguous language limiting the claims in a particular way. See Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 25 2015) (“[w]e have found disavowal or disclaimer based on clear and unmistakable statements by the patentee that limit the claims, such as ‘the present invention includes . . .’ or ‘the present 26 invention is . . .’ or ‘all embodiments of the present invention are . . . ’”).

27 4 Moreover, other embodiments discuss the accessibility of bookmarks on multiple devices 1 Accordingly, the preferred embodiments cannot override the plain meaning of the claim 2 term, which encompasses search result sets which are comprised solely of search results from a 3 first and second global index.5 The Court adopts Sonos’s proposed construction. 4 5. Term five (5): “Stored [for the user] in a client-side storage of a client device” 5 (’375 Patent, Claims 1 and 17-20) 6 7 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

8 Retained in a computer- Plain and ordinary meaning. Retained in a computer- 9 readable medium of the client readable medium of the client device for later retrieval by device for later retrieval by 10 the user. Excludes transitory the user. Excludes transitory storage. storage. 11

12 13 Sonos argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand this term to 14 exclude transitory storage. Sonos’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief at 18 (Docket No. 70). 15 Sonos explains its proposed construction as follows:

16 “In contrast to storing bookmarks for later availability and access, there are situations in which data may reside in computer memory 17 only while in transit. For example, if a user uses a client device to enter a bookmark to be stored on the server, the bookmark will pass 18 through the client device in the process of being transmitted to the server. However, the user cannot later access that transitory data in 19 the client; thus, such a scenario does not constitute being “stored in a client-side storage of the client device” within the meaning of the 20 claims. See Dkt. 69-15 (Schmidt Decl.), ¶¶ 69-70. By analogy, when a person mails a letter by placing it in a mailbox, the letter is not 21 “stored” in “storage” in the mailbox; it is merely in transit.” 22 Id. at 19. 23 can then be made available to the user on all the various computers the user uses and can be 24 integrated with browser bookmarks and with the browser(e.g., via a toolbar).” ’375 patent, 5:34- 39. 25

5 As the Federal Circuit has noted, the function of patent claims is to put “competitors on notice of 26 the scope of the claimed invention.” Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993). To interpret claims differently just to cure a drafting error made by the patentee would 27 “unduly interfere” with that function. Id. The logic applies to the instant case, wherein Google 1 Google counters that Sonos seeks to exclude certain forms of physical media, such as 2 RAM6, which is contradicted by the language used in the specifications. Google’s Reply Claim 3 Construction Brief at 10-11 (citing ’375 patent, 3:23-33) (“[e]mbodiments of computer-readable 4 media include, but are not limited to, an electronic, optical, magnetic, or other storage or 5 transmission device capable of providing a processor, such as the processor 110 of client 102a, 6 with computer-readable instructions. Other examples of suitable media include, but are not limited 7 to, a floppy disk, CD-ROM, DVD, magnetic disk, memory chip, ROM, RAM, an ASIC, a 8 configured processor, all optical media, all magnetic tape or other magnetic media, or any other 9 medium from which a computer processor can read instructions”) (Docket No. 74). Google’s 10 expert objects to Sonos’s attempt to import a temporal limitation into the claim terms and argues 11 that the term at issue encompasses “any type of storage that can store the favorite items or 12 bookmarks.” Shamos Decl. ¶ 47 (Docket No. 69-6). 13 The Court adopts Sonos’s proposed construction. The specifications describe the role of 14 transitory storage, such as RAM, in the following way:

15 “The client devices l02a-n shown each includes a computer- readable medium, such as a random access memory (RAM) 108 16 coupled to a processor 110. The processor 110 executes computer- executable program instructions stored in memory 108. Such 17 processors may include a microprocessor, an ASIC, and state machines. Such processors include, or may be in communication 18 with, media, for example computer-readable media, which stores instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the 19 processor to perform the steps described herein.”

20 ’375 Patent, 3:14-23 (emphasis added). Thus, computer-readable media, such as RAM, store 21 instructions which allow the processor to perform the steps described in the invention. Such 22 storage is transitory and not designed for the user. This is different from the permanent, 23 retrievable memory designed for users to synchronize bookmarks across devices, which forms part 24 of the innovativeness of the invention. 25 Further, Sonos’s expert, Mr. Schmidt, explains that “a POSITA [a person of ordinary skill 26

27 6 “RAM” stands for random access memory, and it is a pre-installed computer memory system 1 in the art] would … understand that there is separation between the acts of (1) entering or saving 2 the information and (2) retrieving or accessing it.” Schmidt Decl. ¶ 69 (Docket No. 69-15). Or, to 3 give a counter-example:

4 “[i]f a user entered information on a device (e.g., a terminal) for storage somewhere else (e.g., on a server), the device would record 5 the input in some manner to be able to transmit it onwards. However, there is no separate instance of later retrieval. Thus, while 6 the information may be retained in memory for some brief or transitory period, it is not the kind of “storage” that a POSITA 7 would understand is encompassed by the claim language.” 8 Id. ¶ 70. 9 The Court finds that a computer-readable medium such as RAM is a type of temporary 10 data storage which exists for the computer. In contrast, the claim term speaks of retrievable, non- 11 transitory data for the user. ’375 Patent, Claim 1, 15:49-58 (claiming a computer-implemented 12 method performed by at least one processor, the computer-implemented method “comprising … in 13 response to receiving the user input: modifying the set of favorite items stored for the user in a 14 client-side storage of the client device”) (emphasis added). Given the function of the invention 15 (synchronizing lists of favorites among multiple devices for the user) and the persuasiveness of 16 Mr. Schmidt’s testimony, the claim term covers the storage of information which can be retrieved 17 or accessed by the user. The claim term does not cover transitory storage, such as RAM, wherein 18 the information is fleetingly present on a client-side device as it is pushed off to a server. 19 Thus, Sonos’s construction better comports with the language of the claim terms and 20 specifications, which describe non-transitory, retrievable information for the user. The Court 21 adopts Sonos’s proposed construction. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 6. Term six (6): Preambles of claims 1 and 15 (’586 Patent, Claims 1-5, 7-8, 15-16, 2 18, and 20) 3 4 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

5 Preambles are not limiting. Preambles are limiting. Preambles are limiting. 6 7 8 The preamble of claim 1 recites: “[a]n audio-enabled wireless device configured for 9 bidirectional wireless communication in a wireless mesh network, the wireless device comprising: 10 …” ’586 Patent, Claim 1, 17:21-24. Claim 2 is dependent upon the “audio-enabled wireless 11 device of claim 1.” ’586 Patent, Claim 2, 17:47-53. Claim 3 is dependent upon the “audio- 12 enabled wireless device of claim 2,” and Claim 4 is dependent upon the “audio-enabled wireless 13 device of claim 3.” ’586 Patent, Claims 3 and 4, 17:54-61. Claim 5 is dependent upon the “audio- 14 enabled wireless device of claim 1.” ’586 Patent, Claim 5, 17:62-67. 15 The preamble of claim 15 recites: “[a] wireless mesh network system, comprising …” ’586 16 Patent, Claim 15, 18:58. Claims 16, 18, and 20 are dependent upon the “wireless mesh network 17 system of claim 15.” ’586 Patent, Claims 16, 18, 20, 19:12-16, 20:1-10, 20:18-24. 18 A preamble limits the invention “if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is 19 ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.’” Catalina Mktg. Int'l v. 20 Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett- 21 Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Conversely, a preamble “is not limiting 22 ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the 23 preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Id. (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 24 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In determining whether the preamble recitations are 25 structural limitations or mere statements of purpose, the Court may rely on several principles 26 established by the Federal Circuit. The following factors indicate that the claim scope is limited 27 by the preamble: (1) the use of a disputed term in the preamble provides an “antecedent basis” for 1 limitations or terms in the claim body”; (3) the preamble “recit[es] additional structure or steps 2 underscored as important by the specification”; and (4) “clear reliance on the preamble during 3 prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.” Id. at 808-09. 4 Here, the preambles provide a network topology that recites structure and steps 5 underscored as important by the specifications. Namely, the preambles of claims 1 and 15 6 describe a “wireless mesh network,” and the parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art 7 would understand this term to mean a network with the capability to connect network nodes via 8 multiple wireless paths. See Min Dec. ¶ 37 (Docket No. 69-7); Wicker Decl. ¶¶ 136-37 (Docket 9 No. 69-12). Wireless mesh networks provide the functionality which characterizes the 10 innovativeness of the ’586 patent. These networks provide a degree of redundancy by ensuring 11 that, when one or more paths between nodes becomes unavailable, “an alternative path can be 12 accessed to ensure continued network connectivity.” Min Decl. ¶ 37. See also Wicker Decl. ¶ 132 13 (noting that a wireless mesh network is advantageous because it consists of “a series of nodes that 14 are configured to communicate with one another, where each node functions as both a router 15 and repeater”) (emphasis in original). This is precisely what the specifications claim as a key 16 purpose of the invention: “[t]he present invention … provid[es] a relatively low cost, robust, 17 wireless sensor system that provides an extended period of operability without maintenance.” 18 ’586 Patent, 2:6-10 (emphasis added). In other words, the preambles of claims 1 and 15 recite a 19 structure (a wireless mesh network) which is underscored as critical to the invention in the 20 preamble, and this is a strong indication that the preambles are limiting. Cf. SIMO Holdings, Inc. 21 v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech., Ltd., 983 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding the 22 preamble limiting because “the body simply describes the actions taken by the invention … [and] 23 [i]t is the preamble that supplies the necessary structure”). 24 Further, the preamble of claim 1 provides an antecedent basis for the term “audio-enabled 25 wireless device.” Later limitations in, inter alia, claims 1 and 15 recite “a table of identifiers 26 stored in the audio-enabled wireless device,” referring back to the wireless devices cited in the 27 preambles. ’586 Patent, 17:37-38, 19:2-3 (emphasis added). As noted supra, when the use of a 1 claim elements, that is a factor which indicates that the preamble is limiting. Catalina Mktg. Int'l, 2 289 F.3d at 808-09. 3 Finally, the audio-enabled wireless device cited in the preamble is essential to 4 understanding the structural limitations described in the claims. For instance, claim 1 speaks of 5 the controller receiving the communication packet and “relay[ing] the communication packet to 6 another audio-enabled wireless device,” and the preamble is important for understanding what this 7 means to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See ’586 Patent, 17:32-44. The preamble clarifies 8 that the act of relaying communication packets must be understood in the context of the 9 “bidirectional wireless communication” that is typical of wireless mesh networks, wherein each 10 node functions as both a router and repeater. ’586 Patent, 17:23-25. See Wicker Decl. ¶ 37. The 11 preamble thus provides critical context for understanding the terms and limitations in the claim 12 body, and this is another factor indicating that the preamble is limited. Catalina Mktg. Int'l, 289 13 F.3d at 808-09. Cf. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 14 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“use of preamble terms to define positive limitations in the body of claims 15 can evince an inventor’s intent that the preamble limit the scope of the claim”). 16 Accordingly, the Court adopts Google’s construction and finds that the preambles are 17 limiting. 18 7. Term seven (7): “Reset element” (’586 Patent, Claims 1-5, 7-12, 14-16, 18, and 20) 19

20 Sonos’s Original Google’s Original Court’s Construction 21 Construction Construction

22 Hardware and/or software An element for resetting the Hardware that places the that functions to return a configuration of the controller in a prescribed 23 device to a prescribed state. controller. state. 24 25 In an attempt to foster compromise at the claim construction hearing, the Court asked if the 26 parties would stipulate to the following construction: “hardware and/or software that functions to 27 return a controller to a prescribed state.” The parties could not agree on this construction, and the 1 to a revised construction of the claim term. Minute Order (Docket No. 98). Although the parties 2 || were unable to agree on a construction, they have revised their constructions as follows: 3 4 Google Revised Construction Sonos Revised Construction An element, including hardware, for causing | An element that functions to place the 5 the controller to place the audio-enabled controller in a prescribed state. 6 wireless device into a prescribed state. 4 8 Letter from Google and Sonos Regarding Claim 8 (Reset Element) (Docket No. 103). 9 At the claim construction hearing, Google argued that the controller 202 is included in its 10 || construction because the reset element is operatively coupled to the controller. Indeed, Figure 2 of 11 the specifications show that the reset element 208 is coupled with the controller 202: 12

13 14 fap pose a aa aa a a a A 15 ! 1 Bae 16 ~ 1 ESET arty | REESE at □ 17 l oO i é 1 8 | «ete f rie ak SENSOR = CONTROLLER . TRANSCEIVER : 19 secon | 1 i 1 i □ 20 4 sr | : 21 208 ees é geet POWER | TAMPER ain Od i 22 SOURCE | | sewage | AUDI pt ! he a ea ae a aa a 23 24 SENSOR UN 25 , . . 586 Patent, Figure 2, (Docket No. 1-22, Ex. 22). Google also explained that, where the 26 . . . . . . . . specifications state, in reference to Figure 2, that “[a] reset device (e.g., a switch) 208 is [provided] 27 gy . to the controller 202,” the term “reset device” is synonymous with reset element. ’586 Patent, 28

1 9:40-41. Thus, Google states that the term “reset element” can mean a switch or a button, but in 2 general it is referring to a button on the audio enabled device that activates the controller to place 3 the transceiver in the receiving mode, so that the transceiver can receive its identification code in 4 order for the device to join the network. In other words, Google contends that this is an 5 initialization function. Google took issue with Sonos’s use of the word “return” in its proposed 6 construction. 7 The parties’ revised constructions are not far apart. The parties now agree on the use of the 8 word “place,” and Sonos has dropped the use of the word “return.” The Court finds that the term 9 “audio-enabled wireless device,” in Google’s revised construction, is already apparent from the 10 context of the claim term. The Court therefore adopts the following construction: “Hardware that 11 places the controller in a prescribed state.” 12 8. Term eight (8): “Preamble portion” (’586 Patent, Claims 1-5, 7-12, 14-16, 18, and 13 20) 14 15 Sonos’s Construction Google’s Construction Court’s Construction

16 A series of bits that is used to Plain and ordinary meaning. Plain and ordinary meaning. 17 initiate and synchronize the receiving device. 18

19 20 Sonos argues that, while a “preamble” may be a term familiar to a layperson (e.g., the 21 preamble to the U.S. Constitution), a person of skill in the art would have a particularized meaning 22 for this term. Sonos’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief at 24 (Docket No. 70). Namely, they 23 would construe the claimed data packet as ““a series of bits that is used to initiate and synchronize 24 the receiving device.” Id. Sonos provides the following extrinsic evidence in support of its 25 construction:

26 • “Newton’s Telecom Dictionary (2004): Preamble is “[a] synchronization mechanism used in Ethernet LANs (Local 27 area Networks), the preamble is a set of eight octets (8-bit attached device to the fact that a data frame is traveling 1 across the circuit. Once alerted to this fact, the preamble is used by all attached devices to synchronize on the rate of 2 transmission of the data bits across the circuit.” Dkt. 69-17 at 654 (emphasis added). 3 • The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 4 Seventh Edition (2000): Preamble is: (1) “In networking, a sequence of bits at the start of each new transmission to 5 allow synchronization of clocks and other physical layer circuitry at other stations;” and (2) “A sequence of bits 6 recorded at the beginning of each block on a magnetic tape for the purpose of synchronization.” Ex. I at 857. 7 8 Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added by Sonos). 9 At the claim construction hearing, Google defined the plain and ordinary meaning of this 10 term as the portion of the communication packet which precedes the other enumerated portions. 11 Google counters that the extrinsic evidence provided by Sonos does not persuasively define a 12 “preamble” in all network contexts, and that Sonos does not support its construction with any 13 intrinsic evidence. Google’s Reply Claim Construction Brief at 15 (Docket No. 74). For instance, 14 Google stated, at the claim construction hearing, that a preamble in some cases has training bits, 15 and it can alert a receiving device that data is coming without initiating a synchronization process. 16 The Court adopts Google’s construction. First, the extrinsic evidence which Sonos offers 17 is disputed. Google’s expert, Dr. Min, states that a preamble portion, as understood by a person of 18 ordinary skill in the art, can take many different forms. For instance: “a ‘preamble’ portion may 19 take the form of a simple flag or start frame bit, that signifies the beginning of a packet.” Min 20 Decl. ¶ 57 (Docket No. 69-7). In other embodiments, a preamble “may include additional timing, 21 identification, or authentication information.” Id. Dr. Min states persuasively that there is nothing 22 in the intrinsic evidence, or in the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, which 23 supports the conclusion that a preamble portion “must necessarily perform a synchronization and 24 initiation function of the receiving device, as the construction proposed by Sonos suggests.” Id. ¶ 25 59. 26 Second, extrinsic evidence plays a limited role in the claim construction analysis. As the 27 Federal Circuit has explained, “extrinsic evidence in general, and expert testimony in particular, 1 used to vary or contradict the claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 2 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Here, Sonos seeks to use extrinsic evidence to vary the claim language, 3 impermissibly importing a limitation which requires the preamble portion to serve a 4 synchronization and initiation function. Sonos’s extrinsic evidence is disputed, and is insufficient 5 to impose a limitation on the meaning of a claim term where, as here, it is unsupported by any 6 intrinsic evidence. 7 Sonos has not met the burden of showing that the preamble portion can only refer to a 8 series of bits that is used to initiate and synchronize the receiving device. Accordingly, the Court 9 adopts Google’s proposed construction, and finds that “preamble portion” should be given its 10 plain and ordinary meaning. 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court construes the contested claim terms as follows: 13 • Term one (1): “domain information” has its plain and ordinary meaning without the need 14 for further construction. 15 • Term two (2): “logic circuitry” has its plain and ordinary meaning without the need for 16 further construction, and it is not governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). 17 • Term three (3): “private key” means “a non-public key that is used as an input to a 18 cryptographic algorithm designed such that, without the key, the output of the algorithm 19 cannot be computed.” 20 • Term four (4): “combined search results set”/“the combined search results set including at 21 least two of: one or more favorite items from the set of [favorite items]/[bookmarks] 22 synchronized for the user; one or more search results from a first global index; or one or 23 more search results from a second global index” means “two or more of: [a], [b], or [c] 24 where [a] is ‘one or more favorite items from the set of favorite items’, where [b] is ‘one or 25 more search results from a first global index’, and where [c] is ‘one or more search results 26 from a second global index.’” 27 • Term five (5): “stored [for the user] in a client-side storage of a client device” means 1 Excludes transitory storage.” 2 • Term six (6): preambles of claims 1 and 15 are limiting. 3 • Term seven (7): “reset element” means “hardware that places the controller in a prescribed 4 state.” 5 • Term eight (8): “preamble portion” has its plain and ordinary meaning without the need for 6 further construction. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: June 7, 2021 11 12 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27