Goodwin v. Bennett County High School Ind. School District

226 N.W.2d 166, 88 S.D. 639, 1975 S.D. LEXIS 212
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 21, 1975
Docket11413
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 226 N.W.2d 166 (Goodwin v. Bennett County High School Ind. School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodwin v. Bennett County High School Ind. School District, 226 N.W.2d 166, 88 S.D. 639, 1975 S.D. LEXIS 212 (S.D. 1975).

Opinions

DOYLE, Justice.

This action was commenced by the appellant, Clark Goodwin (Goodwin), against the Bennett County High School Independent School District and all members of the school board of said School District (School District). The action sought a writ of mandamus requiring the School District to permit Goodwin to [641]*641serve as a teacher of commercial subjects, and as head basketball coach, assistant football coach and head track coach in the high school operated by the School District, and further requiring the School District to classify Goodwin as a full-time permanent certified employee of the School District and reinstate him in his position as teacher and coach for the school year 1973-74, upon the same terms and conditions as Goodwin’s employment contract with the School District for the school year 1972-73. A show cause order was issued by the court requiring the School District to offer Goodwin such an employment contract or to show cause why it had not done so. Such a contract was not offered and a hearing thereon was held by the court.

The court, after considering the issues, upon a stipulated statement of facts,1 entered its order requiring the School District to offer Goodwin a contract of employment for the 1973-74 school year containing the same terms and conditions as Goodwin’s 1972-73 contract with the School District “excepting only that the contract does not need to provide that the Petitioner (Goodwin) shall serve as head basketball coach, assistant football coach, and head track coach”. It was the court’s further holding that Goodwin’s contract was to provide, as did his 1972-73 contract, for a salary of $8,976, and that Goodwin would teach [642]*642commercial subjects and have the same incidental benefits as were provided in his previous contract. Goodwin appeals from that portion of the judgment, the effect of which was that the contract need not provide that he perform any of the coaching duties enumerated in his prior contract. The School District did not appeal from the portion of the judgment awarding Goodwin a contract of employment for the year 1973-74, stipulating that he teach commercial subjects for the same salary received during the previous year; thus, the sole question before the court on this appeal is: did Goodwin receive a contract “under the same terms and conditions as the contract for the then current year” as stipulated by SDCL 13-43-10. The focal point of Goodwin’s argument embraces what is commonly called the South Dakota Continuing Teacher Contract Law as set forth in SDCL 13-43, with particular reference to SDCL 13-43-9.1, 13-43-10 and 13-43-11.2 It was stipulated that Goodwin had been employed [643]*643for two successive years prior to the 1973-74 school year and, consequently, was a tenured teacher within the purview of SDCL 13-43-10. It was conceded that Goodwin did not receive the written notifications required by SDCL 13-43-9.1 or 13-43-10.

This court in Blood v. Spring Creek Number 12, Common School Dist., 1960, 78 S.D. 580, 105 N.W.2d 545, held, absent the notification required by the tenure act, “A contract of employment for the succeeding year arises and exists by operation of law”; consequently, Goodwin’s contract to teach was automatically renewed for the school year 1973-74.

SDCL 13-8-39 provides that school boards have the general charge, direction, and management of the schools of the district. While Goodwin was entitled to an automatic renewal of his contract to teach, he is nevertheless subject to the authority of the school board under its general powers to direct and manage the schools of the district and the employees employed therein.

A teacher, in acquiring a permanent status, does not thereby acquire a vested right to teach any certain class or in any certain school. The tenure laws do not interfere with the general power and right of school authorities to assign teachers to particular classes and to particular schools in accordance with their judgment and desire reasonably exercised. Such laws do not take from school authorities their incidental powers, originally to assign and subsequently to transfer a teacher to such classroom, such building, and such division as it may determine to be for the best interest of the school as long as the teacher is not thereby demoted in violation of the laws. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 1935, 5 Cal.App.2d 64, 42 P.2d 397; State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education of City of Duluth, 1943, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544. The power to transfer or reassign must be exercised in good faith and for the best interest of the school district, and must not be on an arbitrary and capricious basis or for the purpose of compelling a teacher’s resignation. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education of City of Duluth, supra.

[644]*644Under the facts, as stipulated in this case, no such abuse of discretion appears. Consequently, the school board had the power and authority to reassign and change the duties of Goodwin under the terms and conditions of his contract.

The judgment and order of the trial court is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur. WOLLMAN, J., dissents.

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Goodwin v. Bennett County High School Ind. School District
226 N.W.2d 166 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
226 N.W.2d 166, 88 S.D. 639, 1975 S.D. LEXIS 212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodwin-v-bennett-county-high-school-ind-school-district-sd-1975.