ROSE, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Richard Goodman, was convicted in justice court for traveling 67 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone, in violation of § 31 — 5—301(b)(iii), W.S.1977.1 Upon finding Mr. Goodman guilty, the justice of the peace imposed a fine of $12.00 and $5.00 court costs. The statutes do not provide for a jail sentence for the violation with which Goodman was charged and for which he was convicted.
Appellant made several timely demands for a jury, all of which were denied. The justice of the peace cited two decisions of this court as his authority for refusing to grant Mr. Goodman’s jury-trial request.2
Goodman then appealed to the district court, where the decision of the justice of the peace was upheld, and he now comes here with the following issues for our consideration:
“1. Did the Justice of the Peace Court err in refusing to grant the defendant a trial by jury of the facts and evidence against him?
“2. Did the District Court err in dismissing the appeal and affirming the finding of the Justice of the Peace and specifically finding that the defendant was not entitled to a trial by jury in this case?”
[1241]*1241We will hold that Mr. Goodman is entitled to a jury trial and reverse the decision of the trial court.
Essentially, the contentions of the appellant are:
1. The applicable statute provides that this defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.3
2. If it were to be decided by the court that § 7-16-112, W.S.1977 is superseded by a court rule,4 the applicable court rule (Rule 5(c), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.)5 still contemplates that a trial by jury will be afforded the defendant.
3.It is the further contention of the appellant that the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rule-making authority granted by the state Constitution6 and implemented by statutes 7 cannot supersede or supplement a jury-trial-giving statute because the right to trial by jury given by statute [1242]*1242(§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, in this case) is a substantive right. Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980). It is the appellant’s theory that this statute cannot be superseded through the rule-making powers of this court because that authority grants procedural prerogatives only. Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978 (1979), and Lapp v. City of Worland, supra.
In response to these contentions, the State says this:
The issue is whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial in justice court for the violation of a statute defining a misdemeanor where no jail sentence was provided for by the statute.
The State argues that the statute, which formerly provided for a right to a trial by jury (§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, supra, n.3), was superseded by Rules 5(d) (supra, n.5), and 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. (supra, n.4), and there being no statute which provides for a jail sentence for a violation of § 31-5-301(b)(iii) (supra, n.l), 5(d) (supra, n.5) is, therefore, controlling and this subsection does not grant Mr. Goodman a jury trial.
It is further the contention of the State that — in these circumstances — there is no affront to any substantive right because the question of whether such a defendant as Mr. Goodman has a right to a trial by jury in the justice court on a misdemeanor charge is a question of procedure over which this court has rule-making power according to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. (Supra, nn.6 and 7.)
The State is wrong for a lot of reasons when it undertakes to support the justice and district court decisions on the ground that Rule 5(d) (supra, n.5) denies Goodman a jury trial.
In the first place, Rule 5(d) is not applicable to this case. Rule 5(d) has to do with rights to trial by jury in municipal courts —not justice of the peace courts. What is more, this court has never decided the issue of whether or not a defendant charged in municipal court with an offense which does not carry a jail sentence is entitled to a jury trial, and the question is not before us here!!!
The State would have us respond to the question which asks whether or not a rule of this court which purports to supersede a jury-trial-giving statute can, in fact and law, have that effect. To answer this we must first identify the statute and the rule that we are talking about.
Wyoming has a statute which gives to Mr. Goodman the right to a jury trial (§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, supra, n.3), and we have a statute which specifically grants to this court supervisory power, including rule-making power over the justice courts of this state (§ 5-4r-207, W.S.1977, supra, n.7). In addition, we have a rule which says that § 7-16-112, W.S.1977 is superseded by the rules pertaining to justice courts (Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C., supra, n.4). Assuming, ar-guendo, that the statute is capable of being superseded by rules adopted by this court, the only mention of jury-trial rights for justice court defendants is to be found in Rule 5(c) — not Rule 5(d). Rule 5(c) is not in conflict with Goodman’s statutory right to a jury trial. It reaffirms that right. Rule 5(c) clearly grants a justice court defendant a right to a trial by jury. Thus — even if the statute had been superseded (which it could not have been), Rule 5(c) still authorizes Goodman’s jury trial.
The State goes on to make the argument that Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. (supra, n.4), superseded § 7-16-112, W.S.1977, (supra n.3), and (since it cannot agree that Rule 5(c) grants a jury trial in and of itself), therefore, there is no rule provision for a jury trial for a justice of the peace defendant— ergo, Goodman does not have a right to a trial by jury. This calls into play the question of whether or not the right to a jury trial is a substantive or procedural matter.
The right is substantive. The Wyoming Supreme Court cannot supersede a statutory jury trial right through the exercise of its rule-making power.
In Lapp v. City of Worland, supra, we said of a statute which guaranteed a municipal court defendant a jury trial, that the right is:
[1243]*1243“a substantive right of a person reserved to the legislature by * * 4 [the statute].” 612 P.2d at 873.
See also State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court, Wyo., 567 P.2d 698 (1977), and State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 12 A.L.R.3d 1 (1965). This court has historically taken the position that our rule-making authority is restricted by legislative enactments. Section 5-2-114, W.S.1977, for example, provides that the courts may adopt general rules governing:
“pleading practice and procedure in all courts of this state * * *.”
Section 5-2-115, W.S.1977 provides in part that:
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ROSE, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Richard Goodman, was convicted in justice court for traveling 67 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone, in violation of § 31 — 5—301(b)(iii), W.S.1977.1 Upon finding Mr. Goodman guilty, the justice of the peace imposed a fine of $12.00 and $5.00 court costs. The statutes do not provide for a jail sentence for the violation with which Goodman was charged and for which he was convicted.
Appellant made several timely demands for a jury, all of which were denied. The justice of the peace cited two decisions of this court as his authority for refusing to grant Mr. Goodman’s jury-trial request.2
Goodman then appealed to the district court, where the decision of the justice of the peace was upheld, and he now comes here with the following issues for our consideration:
“1. Did the Justice of the Peace Court err in refusing to grant the defendant a trial by jury of the facts and evidence against him?
“2. Did the District Court err in dismissing the appeal and affirming the finding of the Justice of the Peace and specifically finding that the defendant was not entitled to a trial by jury in this case?”
[1241]*1241We will hold that Mr. Goodman is entitled to a jury trial and reverse the decision of the trial court.
Essentially, the contentions of the appellant are:
1. The applicable statute provides that this defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.3
2. If it were to be decided by the court that § 7-16-112, W.S.1977 is superseded by a court rule,4 the applicable court rule (Rule 5(c), W.R.Cr.P.J.C.)5 still contemplates that a trial by jury will be afforded the defendant.
3.It is the further contention of the appellant that the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rule-making authority granted by the state Constitution6 and implemented by statutes 7 cannot supersede or supplement a jury-trial-giving statute because the right to trial by jury given by statute [1242]*1242(§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, in this case) is a substantive right. Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980). It is the appellant’s theory that this statute cannot be superseded through the rule-making powers of this court because that authority grants procedural prerogatives only. Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978 (1979), and Lapp v. City of Worland, supra.
In response to these contentions, the State says this:
The issue is whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial in justice court for the violation of a statute defining a misdemeanor where no jail sentence was provided for by the statute.
The State argues that the statute, which formerly provided for a right to a trial by jury (§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, supra, n.3), was superseded by Rules 5(d) (supra, n.5), and 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. (supra, n.4), and there being no statute which provides for a jail sentence for a violation of § 31-5-301(b)(iii) (supra, n.l), 5(d) (supra, n.5) is, therefore, controlling and this subsection does not grant Mr. Goodman a jury trial.
It is further the contention of the State that — in these circumstances — there is no affront to any substantive right because the question of whether such a defendant as Mr. Goodman has a right to a trial by jury in the justice court on a misdemeanor charge is a question of procedure over which this court has rule-making power according to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. (Supra, nn.6 and 7.)
The State is wrong for a lot of reasons when it undertakes to support the justice and district court decisions on the ground that Rule 5(d) (supra, n.5) denies Goodman a jury trial.
In the first place, Rule 5(d) is not applicable to this case. Rule 5(d) has to do with rights to trial by jury in municipal courts —not justice of the peace courts. What is more, this court has never decided the issue of whether or not a defendant charged in municipal court with an offense which does not carry a jail sentence is entitled to a jury trial, and the question is not before us here!!!
The State would have us respond to the question which asks whether or not a rule of this court which purports to supersede a jury-trial-giving statute can, in fact and law, have that effect. To answer this we must first identify the statute and the rule that we are talking about.
Wyoming has a statute which gives to Mr. Goodman the right to a jury trial (§ 7-16-112, W.S.1977, supra, n.3), and we have a statute which specifically grants to this court supervisory power, including rule-making power over the justice courts of this state (§ 5-4r-207, W.S.1977, supra, n.7). In addition, we have a rule which says that § 7-16-112, W.S.1977 is superseded by the rules pertaining to justice courts (Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C., supra, n.4). Assuming, ar-guendo, that the statute is capable of being superseded by rules adopted by this court, the only mention of jury-trial rights for justice court defendants is to be found in Rule 5(c) — not Rule 5(d). Rule 5(c) is not in conflict with Goodman’s statutory right to a jury trial. It reaffirms that right. Rule 5(c) clearly grants a justice court defendant a right to a trial by jury. Thus — even if the statute had been superseded (which it could not have been), Rule 5(c) still authorizes Goodman’s jury trial.
The State goes on to make the argument that Rule 29, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. (supra, n.4), superseded § 7-16-112, W.S.1977, (supra n.3), and (since it cannot agree that Rule 5(c) grants a jury trial in and of itself), therefore, there is no rule provision for a jury trial for a justice of the peace defendant— ergo, Goodman does not have a right to a trial by jury. This calls into play the question of whether or not the right to a jury trial is a substantive or procedural matter.
The right is substantive. The Wyoming Supreme Court cannot supersede a statutory jury trial right through the exercise of its rule-making power.
In Lapp v. City of Worland, supra, we said of a statute which guaranteed a municipal court defendant a jury trial, that the right is:
[1243]*1243“a substantive right of a person reserved to the legislature by * * 4 [the statute].” 612 P.2d at 873.
See also State ex rel. Weber v. Municipal Court, Wyo., 567 P.2d 698 (1977), and State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 12 A.L.R.3d 1 (1965). This court has historically taken the position that our rule-making authority is restricted by legislative enactments. Section 5-2-114, W.S.1977, for example, provides that the courts may adopt general rules governing:
“pleading practice and procedure in all courts of this state * * *.”
Section 5-2-115, W.S.1977 provides in part that:
“(b) Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any person * * (Emphasis added.)
We said in Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978 at 982:
“The Wyoming Constitution provides in Article 5, Section 2, that the supreme court ‘shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.’ It is well recognized that in this jurisdiction the courts have inherent rights to prescribe rules, being limited only by their reasonableness and conformity to constitutional and legislative enactments. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 584 (1965), and cases cited. The legislative enactments referred to include those that deal with the substantive rights of persons or the jurisdiction of a court. Matters dealing with procedure, particularly-in the minor courts, are entirely within the province of this court."
This court has therefore held that our rule-making authority cannot extend so far as to affect the substantive rights of our citizens and that these concerns will be left for the legislature.
We hold that the right to a trial by jury when guaranteed by statute is a substantive right that cannot be superseded by this court’s rules.
The provisions of § 7-16-112 grant to Mr. Goodman a right to a trial by jury — the statutes stand unassailed by any rule of this court which purports to either supersede the statute or with which the statute is said to be in conflict.
Reversed.