Goodman v. Henry L. Doherty & Co.

255 N.W. 667, 218 Iowa 529

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: June 23, 1934
• Docket: No. 42214.
• Status: Published

Opinions

Evans, J.

Respective counsel for the contending parties unite in the statement that the case of Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, is determinative of the case at bar unless it be overruled herein. The cited case was an action by Davidson against the same defendant herein, and was predicated upon a cause of action identical in its issues with that herein. The arguments of counsel in both cases are substantially identical. The material facts were stipulated in each case. That the defendant was never personally within the state of Iowa is conceded by the plaintiff.. It is likewise conceded that the defendant personally established his office in Iowa and caused his name to be placed upon the office door and caused all business to be transacted in his name and not otherwise. The question raised is whether it is legally possible by force of any statute of Iowa, for the courts of Iowa to acquire personal jurisdiction of a nonresident who is doing business within the state of Iowa, if such nonresident has never in fact brought his person within the borders of the state. The argument of appellant herein is the fair equivalent of a petition for rehearing in the Davidson case. The legal questions now raised herein were all presented in the Davidson case, and were very fully considered therein. Decision was attained by a divided court. The majority opinion necessarily prevailed. The reasons pro and con for the respective opinions are fully stated therein. That the questions thus considered are debatable and close may be readily conceded. They have been so regarded by the judiciary of the country for many years. The ultimate question has been often approached, but never quite decided. A citation of the Davidson case as a precedent is an all-sufficient argument for the decision of this case. The only door of argument open to the appellant is to seek the overruling of the opinion in the Davidson case. The fact that the decision was close and doubtful is urged by the appellant as a reason for its overruling. Such reason is not adequate. We were under the same duty of original decision whether the case were close and doubtful or otherwise. There are strong practical reasons why we should not be swift or willing to overrule a decision which has been arrived at after full consideration and without inadvertence or misunderstanding. As a precedent it has become a practical verity; and no less such because it is doubtful, or deemed so. It became at once a beacon to trial judges and a rule for the decision of other cases. To treat a question thus settled as still open is to convert the beacon into a will-o’-the-wisp and to destroy, quite, the force and effect of the law of precedent as a guide to the rights of litigants. And this is no less true even though the decision shall have been rendered by a divided court. Divided opinion in arriving at a decision is not uncommon or inappropriate. But after decision the court ceases to be divided thereon and becomes unanimously obedient to the precedent. If the judicial rule'were otherwise it would subject all precedents'to a re-discussion and reconsideration with every change in the personnel of the court. Such a course would be quite intolerable. Since the decision of the Davidson case, there has been a substantial change of personnel in this court. If we were called upon to realign our membership in the reconsideration of previous cases supposedly doubtful, it would necessarily result in putting the stamp of uncertainty upon every precedent. If a majority of us were disposed to overrule the Davidson case, and should vote accordingly, we would, or might, still be a divided court and be still confronted with as many reasons for a later realignment to the contrary, as confront us now. Precedents are the stepping stones of the law in its goings. Once placed, they should not be lightly displaced. Such, broadly, is the reason why an appellate court consents to the overruling of a prior decision only in a very exceptional case. It will be soon enough to overrule this precedent, if and when superior authority so rules.

Obedient thereto, the judgment appealed from is accordingly affirmed. — Affirmed.

Claussen, C. J., and Stevens, Albert, Anderson, Kintzinger, and Donegan, JJ., concur.