Gonzalez v. Menard, Inc.

534 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 WL 199877
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 25, 2008
DocketNo. 07 C 2507
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 534 F. Supp. 2d 815 (Gonzalez v. Menard, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gonzalez v. Menard, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 WL 199877 (N.D. Ill. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MILTON I. SHADUR, Senior District Judge.

This Court has sought, over an extended series of status hearings, to get counsel for defendant Menard, Inc. (“Menard”) to face up to the special problem that is posed by its standard inclusion of a mandatory arbitration clause in its employment contracts when an employee charging employment discrimination actionable under Title VII1 seeks to raise those issues in a class action' — rather than that employee’s separate individual lawsuit — because of the widespread nature of the asserted harms. But Menard has previously proved intransigent, apparently seeking to transmute its ubiquitous TV slogan directed to its customers, “Save big money at Menard’s,” to a message to its employees: “Spend big money to sue Menard’s.”

Because this Court has expounded at length on the subject over the course of the numerous status hearings, the transcripts of those hearings would best serve to set out a comprehensive statement of the full scope of its reasoning. More recently the parties have submitted their respective drafts of an opinion reflecting this Court’s orally expressed views, and Menard’s draft (like that submitted in plaintiffs’ behalf) finally seems to have recognized the principle that this Court has been urging without success. Nonetheless it seems best, in the interest of completeness, to issue this memorandum opinion and order to provide a less discursive summary of the unreasonableness of Menard’s oft-repeated position.

This Court has long honored and enforced contractual undertakings that [817]*817have chosen the alternative dispute resolution process via arbitration in preference to in-court proceedings. Hence wherever either party to an action on this Court’s calendar invokes a contractual arbitration provision, this Court looks to the Federal Arbitration Act. There is one judicially recognized potential exception articulated by the Supreme Court in Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90, 92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000):

It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
% $ %
[W]e believe that where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.

And that has, of course, triggered examination of that policy by lower courts (at the appellate level (see, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003) and Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir.2004)).

Here Menard has responded to the employment discrimination charges advanced by Gonzalez and Stanley, both individually and as putative class representatives, by moving to refer the dispute to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), relying on the attached Employee Agreements (Exs. A and B) that those employees respectively signed (and that Menard requires of all its employees). As Paragraph 6 of that Employee Agreement reflects, such arbitration must proceed under AAA’s “current version of the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes,” which are also said to “govern the fees in this matter.” Moreover, in what appears to be a commendable effort by Menard to avoid the potential problem identified in Green Tree, the contractual provision goes on to state “that the costs of filing a demand for arbitration will not exceed the costs of filing a civil complaint in federal court.”

But a sharply different prospect appears when AAA’s Employment Arbitration Rules are examined in the context of a case such as this one. Parenthetically, even in the arbitration of individual claims where such arbitration is called for in an individual employment agreement rather than pursuant to an employer-promulgated plan, the AAA schedule of fees and expenses imposes financial burdens on the employee that are substantially above the cost of filing a federal lawsuit (see attached Ex. C, which reproduces a portion of the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules indicated by the marginal marking). But because this opinion focuses on the existence of class-based claims in this action, it is unnecessary to inquire further as to whether the AAA provision is trumped by the limitation on employee-borne expenses specified in Menard’s Employee Agreement.2

As for the critical issue for purposes of the present ruling, this Court has previ[818]*818ously pointed cut to both sides’ counsel that the AAA not only has a separate set of Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitra-tions, but that those Supplementary Rules are expressly made applicable to any dispute that arises out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to any AAA rules — indeed, those Supplementary Rules are just as expressly said to govern in the case of any inconsistency between those Rules and any other AAA rules (see the marginally marked provisions of Ex. D attached to this opinion). And in this instance, the costs that would be chargeable to Gonzalez and Stanley for pursuing their existing class claims before the AAA are staggering in relation to their financial circumstances as set out in their affidavits submitted to this Court: Those Supplementary Rules provide for a $3,250 preliminary filing fee and then a supplementary filing fee that, if the Complaint’s statement as to the amount in controversy is considered, amounts to an additional $14,000.

When that situation came to light as a result of the submissions that the parties provided in response to this Court’s inquiries, this Court sought a possible path to accommodate Menard’s desire for arbitration by asking its counsel whether his client would be prepared to treat the very modest limit on an employee’s financial exposure in the Employee Agreement as extending to the class claims here, with Menard committing itself to pick up the balance of the AAA tab. That inquiry was met with a flat-out refusal, with Menard’s counsel offering the response that a division of those very large class action expenses among the members of a certified class would not be onerous for any individual member of the class, including Gonzalez and Stanley as class representatives. But the short answer to that “generous” response is that AAA costs are incurred up front, so that Menard’s proposed “solution” would force Gonzalez and Stanley to gamble on being successful in obtaining class certification, a highly unfair risk to impose on persons of such modest means (and a risk that does not exist in any federal class action lawsuit where the class-based claim is non-frivolous).

Thus Menard’s response equates to an in terrorem effort to discourage this or any other proposed class action, an effort that runs counter to the basic principles that are implicit in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gonzalez v. Menard, Inc.
534 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Illinois, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
534 F. Supp. 2d 815, 2008 WL 199877, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gonzalez-v-menard-inc-ilnd-2008.