Gonzalez, Roberto v. Kokot, Nicholas

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: December 27, 2002
• Docket: 02-1514
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-1514 ROBERTO GONZALEZ and GLORIA HOLLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.

NICHOLAS KOKOT and DEVERICK DIXON Defendants-Appellees. ____________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. No. 01 C 304—Allen Sharp, Judge. ____________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2002—DECIDED DECEMBER 27, 2002 ____________

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges. KANNE, Circuit Judge. This appeal comes to us from a grant of summary judgment in favor of two East Chicago, Indiana police officers. A Chicago, Illinois police officer and his friend brought this § 1983 lawsuit, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated when the East Chicago officers wrongfully arrested them and used excessive force in doing so. This lawsuit by Roberto Gon- zalez and Gloria Holland faced an immediate hurdle, however, given that they had previously executed re- leases of any claims they might have had against the East Chicago officers. They nevertheless proceeded with 2 No. 02-1514

their lawsuit, on the theory that the releases they signed were invalid and unenforceable either as a matter of con- tract law or as violating public policy. Because we agree with the district court that the releases are valid and thus fully enforceable, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

I. History A. The Arrest of Gonzalez and Holland The § 1983 claims asserted by Gonzalez and Holland arose out of an April 10, 1999 incident that began when Officers Nicholas Kokot and Deverick Dixon1 were dis- patched to an address on Drummond Avenue in East Chicago, Indiana. Upon their arrival, the two officers be- gan to move pieces of wood and concrete sitting in the street onto the grassy area between the street and the sidewalk. Gonzalez, apparently unhappy with the transfer of the wood from the street to a position in front of his house, opened the door of his home and complained to the officers that the wood was damaging his lawn. The officers responded that if Gonzalez wanted the wood re- moved, he would have to speak with city officials. From this point, the precise details of the encounter are somewhat unclear, but it is undisputed that Gonzalez and the officers continued to exchange words. According to the version advanced by Gonzalez, he initially spoke to the officers in a calm, measured tone, but as the inter- change continued, Gonzalez admits to raising his voice, apparently making liberal use of profanity throughout the exchange. There is some disagreement as to the ex-

1 Deverick Dixon has since had his name legally changed to Janci Mumba. As a matter of convenience, this opinion will con- tinue to refer to him as Dixon, as did the district court. No. 02-1514 3

act warning Officer Kokot then gave Gonzalez; Kokot asserts that he told Gonzalez to lower his voice, redirect his anger, or be arrested. Gonzalez claims that Kokot said nothing about lowering his voice. Gonzalez admits that he then began to belittle Kokot, and that in doing so he was “yelling, but not ‘at the top of top of [sic] his lungs.’ ” (Appellant Br. at 8.) The interchange between Gonzalez and the officers cul- minated in Officer Kokot’s attempt to arrest Gonzalez. Gonzalez acknowledges resisting Kokot’s effort to hand- cuff him, holding back his unrestrained arm to avoid be- ing cuffed and attempting to stand up after Kokot put him on the ground. During this arrest attempt, Gonzalez’s companion Gloria Holland came out of the house and attempted to position herself between Kokot and Gon- zalez, asking the officers not to arrest him while she grabbed Gonzalez’s uncuffed arm. She refused Dixon’s re- quest to stop interfering with Gonzalez’s arrest, which led Dixon to grab her arm and arrest her as well. Holland twice withdrew her arm from his attempt to handcuff her, leading Dixon to place her on the ground to finish handcuffing her. Gonzalez was charged with disorderly conduct in viola- tion of Indiana Code § 35-45-1-3(2),2 and with forcibly re- sisting, obstructing, or interfering with a law enforcement officer in violation of Indiana Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1).3

2 Section 35-45-1-3(2) provides that “[a] person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being asked to stop . . . commits disorderly conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(2) (2002). 3 Section 35-44-3-3(a)(1) provides: “A person who knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while (continued...) 4 No. 02-1514

Holland was charged solely with resisting law enforce- ment. The charges against Gonzalez and Holland were brought in East Chicago City Court, where Gerald Kray, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Lake County, was as- signed the case. The defendants retained attorney Jeffrey Schlesinger.

B. The Releases On or about February 28, 2000, while the criminal charges against Gonzalez and Holland were pending, their attorney Schlesinger served the City of East Chi- cago with a Notice of Tort Claim, asserting the claim that Officers Kokot and Dixon had arrested Gonzalez and Holland without probable cause and with the use of exces- sive force, violating their constitutional rights. Schlesinger also told prosecutor Kray of the tort claim, and Kray relayed this information to the East Chicago Law De- partment, as apparently was his practice, by calling Roy Dominguez, corporation counsel for East Chicago. Thus, Kray became aware of the civil rights claim to be filed by the defendants. According to Schlesinger, he initiated plea discussions with Kray sometime after the charges were filed. Dur- ing these discussions, Schlesinger told Kray that Gon- zalez was a Chicago police officer and that Gonzalez would face job repercussions if he were found guilty or were to plead guilty. At some point, the issue of releases was introduced into the discussions. According to Kray, it was Schlesinger who first offered signed releases of

3 (...continued) the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties as an officer . . . commits resisting law enforcement . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1) (2002). No. 02-1514 5

claims if Kray would agree to a plea arrangement that led to a dismissal of the charges against his clients. Schlesinger, on the other hand, testified that Kray indi- cated that it was the City of East Chicago that was re- quiring releases from the defendants in return for its consent to a dismissal of the charges. Kray also testified that it was his practice to obtain the consent of the ar- resting officers before dismissing any criminal charges and that Kokot and Dixon wanted releases from Gonzalez and Holland before they would provide their consent to any dismissal. In any event, the prosecutor, Schlesinger, and Kokot and Dixon reached an agreement providing for dismissal of the criminal charges in exchange for the release of any claims by Gonzalez and Holland—an arrangement known as a release-dismissal agreement. Sometime after the issue was introduced into the plea discussions, releases were prepared by the East Chicago Law Department and forwarded to Schlesinger. The releases were signed by Gonzalez and Holland, in the presence of their lawyer, on June 14, 2000. The releases provide in part: For the sole consideration of ZERO ($0.00) dollars, the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowl- edged, the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges Nicholas D. Kokot, Officer, Officer Deverick Dixon, Frank Acala, Chief of Police, Mayor Robert A. Pastrick, Office of the City Attorney, East Chicago Po- lice Department and the City of East Chicago . . . from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known or unknown, both to person and property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about the 10th day of August, 1999, at 3723 Drummond Street, East Chicago, Indi- ana . . . . 6 No. 02-1514

(Pl.’s Ex. 1 & 2.) Schlesinger delivered the executed re- leases to Kray in court on the day the criminal charges against Gonzalez and Holland were dismissed.

C. The § 1983 Lawsuit On April 19, 2001, less than one year after the dismissal of criminal charges against them, Officer Gonzalez and his friend Holland brought this § 1983 suit against Offi- cers Kokot and Dixon, raising their original Fourth Amend- ment claims. Kokot and Dixon moved for summary judg- ment, raising the executed releases as an affirmative defense to these claims. In opposing the officers’ motion for summary judg- ment, Gonzalez and Holland argued that the releases they signed were not supported by consideration and thus invalid under traditional principles of contract law. Addi- tionally, they argued that even if the releases were con- tractually valid, they were nonetheless unenforceable as against public policy. The district court held that the releases were valid and thus barred the lawsuit, noting “[t]his Court has no doubt whatsoever that these plain- tiffs executed these releases freely and voluntarily and with the advice of counsel, and that these releases are valid and enforceable.” The district court accordingly en- tered summary judgment in favor of Kokot and Dixon.

II. Analysis We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, view- ing all the facts, and drawing inferences from those facts, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Furnish v. SVI Systems, Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2001). Gonzalez and Holland argue that summary judgment in favor of the arresting officers was improper, essentially raising the same arguments presented to the district court No. 02-1514 7

in opposition to the motion: that the releases they executed were invalid and unenforceable—and therefore imposed no bar to their lawsuit. Gonzalez and Holland contend that the prosecutor in their case was aware that Kokot and Dixon did not have probable cause to arrest them, that the prosecutor should have thus simply dismissed the charges against them rather than act as the private representative of the arrest- ing officers in securing the releases, and that the releases were not subject to judicial supervision as they were not made part of the record in the criminal case when the charges were dismissed.

A. Indiana Contract Law We first consider the appellants’ argument that the re- leases they signed are invalid under Indiana contract law. Under Indiana law, a valid release bars any subsequent lawsuit on the claims covered by the release. McWaters v. Parker, 995 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Lechner v. Reutepohler, 545 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)). It is not disputed that the language of the releases at issue here, if valid, would cover and bar the claims asserted by Gonzalez and Holland against the officers. Instead, the appellants argue that the releases are invalid. “Under Indiana law, release agreements are to ‘be interpreted in the same manner as any other contract document, with the intention of the parties regarding the purpose of the document governing.’ ” Deckard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huffman v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 588 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. 1992)). Indiana law requires that a release be supported by consideration to be valid. Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Pope v. Vajen, 22 N.E. 308 (Ind. 1889) and Gates v. Fauvre, 8 No. 02-1514

74 N.E. 155 (Ind. App. 1918)). In addition, the parol- evidence rule prohibits courts from considering evidence outside the four corners of an agreement unless the terms of that agreement are ambiguous. Deckard, 307 F.3d at 563; Thomas v. Thomas, 577 N.E.2d 216, 219 (Ind. 1991) (“When a contract is unambiguous, the intent of the par- ties should be determined by the language employed in the document.” (citations omitted)). In this case, Gonzalez and Holland argue that the language of the releases clearly indicates that they were not supported by consideration. They note that both re- leases state on their faces that “ZERO ($0.00)” was the “sole consideration” given for the release of claims, and that Indiana’s parol-evidence rule prohibits a court from tak- ing notice of any facts beyond this language. We cannot say, however, that the terms of these release agreements are clear and unambiguous. Certainly, it is not clear why Gonzalez and Holland, counseled by their attorney, would enter into an agreement that would be unenforceable from the beginning. The fact that these releases were drafted to indicate that “ZERO ($0.00)” was given as consideration—a curious statement given that “nothing” generally is not “given” as consideration—sug- gests that the term was meant to reflect something else, not that the agreements were invalid from the outset. Most likely, the “ZERO ($0.00)” consideration term was included to reflect the fact that no monetary consideration was given in exchange for the releases. But at the very least, this term creates an ambiguity in the release agreements that requires the use of parol evidence to interpret the agreements in such a way as to give full effect to the in- tentions of the parties. Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the evidence here clearly shows that the releases signed by Gonzalez and Holland were sup- No. 02-1514 9

ported by consideration. They bargained for and received dismissal of the criminal charges against them in exchange for their release of any claims they had against the arrest- ing officers or the city. Consideration need not be mone- tary; the dismissal of criminal charges was certainly some- thing of value to Gonzalez and Holland, especially in light of Gonzalez’s concern for his job as a Chicago police officer. Cf. Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 2001) (find- ing a release of § 1983 claims valid under Indiana law because although the § 1983 plaintiff “did not get cash for his settlement . . . he did receive value (avoidance of any debt that might hang over him after prison)”). The city lived up to its end of the bargain by consenting to the dismissal of the criminal charges; Gonzalez and Holland cannot now claim that they’re not bound to live up to theirs. We find that the release-dismissal agreement here was a valid contract, supported by adequate consideration, under Indiana law.

B. Federal Public Policy The appellants next argue that even if the releases are valid under Indiana contract law, this release-dismissal agreement is unenforceable as against federally declared public policy. They contend that Kokot and Dixon have failed to prove that the releases were given voluntarily, that the prosecutor acted improperly to protect the private interests of the police officers despite his knowledge of police misconduct, and that the agreement was not sub- ject to judicial supervision. The potential for the abuse of release-dismissal agree- ments has led the Supreme Court to urge the use of a critical eye when courts are asked to enforce them. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987). But despite the risk of misuse, as Gonzalez and Holland acknowledge, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a 10 No. 02-1514

rule of per se invalidity of these agreements. Id. at 392. Rather, the Court noted that while “in some cases these agreements may infringe important interests of the crimi- nal defendant and of society as a whole,” id. at 392, in general release-dismissal agreements “may further legiti- mate prosecutorial and public interests,” id. at 397 (plural- ity opinion). The Court therefore chose to follow, in Justice O’Connor’s words, “a case-by-case approach [, which] ap- propriately balances the important interests on both sides of the question of the enforceability of these agreements.” Id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring). According to Rumery, before enforcing a release-dismiss- al agreement, a court must find that the agreement was “voluntary, that there [was] no evidence of prosecuto- rial misconduct, and that enforcement of this agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.” Id. at 398. The burden of proving the validity of a release- dismissal agreement is on the party seeking to enforce the agreement. See id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]t is the burden of those relying upon such covenants to establish that the agreement is neither involuntary nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.”). Jus- tice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Rumery provides additional guidance as to the types of factors a court should examine when determining the validity of a par- ticular release-dismissal agreement: Many factors may bear on whether a release was voluntary and not the product of overreaching, some of which readily come to mind. The knowledge and experience of the criminal defendant and the circum- stances of the execution of the release, including, im- portantly, whether the defendant was counseled, are clearly relevant. The nature of the criminal charges that are pending is also important, for the greater the charge, the greater the coercive effect. The exis- tence of a legitimate criminal justice objective for ob- No. 02-1514 11

taining the release will support its validity. And, im- portantly, the possibility of abuse is clearly mitigated if the release-dismissal agreement is executed under judicial supervision. Id. at 401-02 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We now turn to an examination of these factors in this case.

1. Voluntariness According to the Court in Rumery, a valid release-dis- missal agreement must be the result of “an informed and voluntary decision.” Id. at 393. In that case, the Court focused on several factors in evaluating whether the agreement at issue had been entered into voluntarily. The Court noted that Rumery was a “sophisticated busi- nessman,” that he was not in jail at the time he signed the release, that he was counseled by “an experienced criminal lawyer,” and that the benefits of the agreement to Rumery were “obvious.” Id. at 394. Taken together, these factors indicated that Rumery had “voluntarily waived his right to sue under § 1983.” Id. While the decision in Rumery requires that release- dismissal agreements be the result of voluntary decisions, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court have yet ad- dressed the question as to what standard of proof is re- quired to prove the voluntariness of a release-dismissal agreement. Several circuits have previously addressed this question, coming to different conclusions as to what the standard should be. The Third Circuit has held that the voluntariness of an oral release-dismissal agreement, like the agreement at issue in this case, must be proven by clear and convinc- ing evidence. See Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Bor- ough, 91 F.3d 515, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Cir- cuit reasoned that a heightened standard of proof was nec- 12 No. 02-1514

essary because release-dismissal agreements “implicate ‘im- portant individual interests or rights’ ”—namely, the re- dressing of possible constitutional-rights violations. Id. at 535 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)). In addition, a clear and convincing standard was thought to provide “the salutary effect of reducing the overall risk of misunderstandings in the conclusion of release-dismiss- al agreements, and increasing the accuracy of juries’ decisions as to whether a release-dismissal agreement was concluded voluntarily.” Id. at 536. The Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion, holding that voluntariness need only be proven by a preponder- ance of the evidence. See Burke v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 276, 285 (6th Cir. 1999). In Burke, the court addressed the voluntariness of an oral release-dismissal agreement read into the record at a plea hearing. While the court noted that an on-the-record agreement presented less serious problems of proof than an oral agreement like the kind addressed by the Third Circuit in Livingstone, it went on to observe that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is considered sufficient for determining the vol- untariness of waivers of other constitutional rights. Id. at 284-85 (noting that a preponderance standard is used to determine the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, the voluntariness of a confession, and the involun- tariness of a guilty plea attacked in a habeas proceeding). The court then concluded that, “[i]f a preponderance of evidence standard applies when determining if there is a voluntary waiver of a criminal defendant’s constitu- tional rights, we see no reason for application of an ele- vated standard where lesser rights are implicated.” Id. at 285. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that the voluntariness of a release-dismissal agreement need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The preponderance stan- dard is sufficient to ensure that a release of claims is en- No. 02-1514 13

tered into voluntarily, just as it has proven sufficient for determining the voluntariness of waivers of constitution- al rights. In addition, the burden of proving voluntariness remains on the party seeking to invoke the agreement, further safeguarding against coerced or involuntary re- leases. Under a preponderance standard, it is apparent that the releases signed by Gonzalez and Holland were the product of voluntary and informed decisions. The record indicates that Gonzalez and Holland signed the releases as the result of a voluntary choice, with a full understand- ing of the consequences. Gonzalez, as a Chicago police of- ficer, undoubtedly had an understanding of the criminal- justice process. Both Gonzalez and Holland were repre- sented by counsel who had actively bargained with the prosecutor for a dismissal of charges, and the possibility of a release-dismissal agreement had been under discus- sion for a significant period of time, giving Gonzalez and Holland—and their attorney—ample time to consider the consequences of signing the releases. Gonzalez and Hol- land had their attorney present when they actually signed the releases. And the benefits of the release-dismissal agreement to Gonzalez especially are obvious: he avoided potential problems with his job as a Chicago police officer. Given these facts, considered in light of Rumery, the exe- cution of these releases was neither involuntary or unin- formed.

2. Legitimate Prosecutorial Conduct Also important to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rumery was the fact that “the prosecutor had an inde- pendent, legitimate reason to make this [release-dismissal] agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsi- bilities.” Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398. Such a legitimate rea- son ensures that the prosecutor acts consistent with his 14 No. 02-1514

duties to uniformly enforce the criminal law, rather than as the agent for the private interests of potential § 1983 defendants. In this case, we believe that the prosecutor did not engage in any improper conduct inconsistent with his role as prosecutor, nor were his efforts in securing the releases from Gonzalez and Holland the result of any prosecutorial overreaching. First, the prosecutor did not act improperly when he pursued the charges against Gonzalez and Holland. The appellants go to great lengths to argue that the pursuit of charges against them was wholly unjustified. In disput- ing the disorderly conduct charge, they admit that Gon- zalez was yelling, but argue that it was not “at the top of top of [sic] his lungs.” In challenging the charges of resist- ing law enforcement, they admit that they offered some resistance during the arrest attempt, but that their resis- tance was not “forcible.” They also point to inconsistent accounts given by Officers Kokot and Dixon in their deposi- tions as evidence of misconduct and apparent complicity by the prosecutor in ignoring the inconsistencies. But as the Sixth Circuit has noted, “the existence of discrepan- cies among the accounts of prosecution witnesses does not amount to ‘substantial evidence’ of police misconduct such that an inference of prosecutorial misconduct” arises. Burke, 167 F.3d at 286. Even accepting Gonzalez’s and Holland’s characterization of the charges, we believe that there was enough evidence to send the criminal case to the trier of fact. The charges brought against Gonzalez and Holland were certainly not “unfounded criminal charges used as bargaining chips to cover up police misconduct.” Id. (quotations omitted). Second, the prosecutor did not abandon his responsibili- ties in securing the releases from Gonzalez and Holland. Prosecutors may legitimately consider the strength of the defendants’ § 1983 claims when considering whether to enter into a release-dismissal agreement. See Rumery, 480 No. 02-1514 15

U.S. at 396 (plurality opinion) (“To the extent release- dismissal agreements protect public officials from the burdens of defending such unjust [§ 1983] claims, they further this important public interest.”); id. at 399 (O’Con- nor, J., concurring) (“[T]here are substantial policy rea- sons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of pub- lic officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable.”). We cannot say that it would have been inappropriate for Prosecutor Kray (as well as Gonzalez and Holland themselves) to have considered the strength of the § 1983 case in deciding whether or not to enter into a release- dismissal agreement. In addition, the plurality opinion in Rumery noted that “[p]rosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple.” Id. at 396 (plurality opinion). Prosecutors must consider the strength and importance of a particular case, government enforcement priorities, and the appropriate allocation of scarce prosecutorial resources. Id. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Rumery notes that “[s]paring the local community the expense of litigation associated with some minor crimes for which there is little or no public interest in prosecution may be a legitimate objective of a release-dismissal agreement.” Id. at 399-400 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In this case, prosecutor Kray testified in his deposition that “[t]his was a very minor case that got out of hand.” (Kray Dep. at 10.) Avoid- ing a potentially costly and lengthy trial over relatively minor matters, with a settlement that was acceptable to both sides, was certainly a legitimate goal related to Kray’s duties as a prosecutor.

3. The Public Interest Finally, we cannot say that enforcement of the releases in this instance will be to the detriment of any public 16 No. 02-1514

interest. The plurality opinion in Rumery noted that re- lease-dismissal agreements might “tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to a . . . civil rights claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave unremedied deprivations of constitutional rights.” Id. at 394 (quotation omitted) (plurality opinion). These agree- ments thus raise the potential of harm to the public’s interests in the proper and uniform enforcement of crim- inal laws and in seeing episodes of police misconduct adequately addressed. We see no evidence of harm to either of these public interests by the enforcement of the releases signed by Gonzalez and Holland. As discussed above, the charges against them were not trumped up in response to their § 1983 suit; the record indicates that there were colorable cases against each. Nor does the record indicate that Gonzalez and Holland will be left with any significant constitutional violations unredressed. They did, after all, receive something of value in exchange for the dismissal of their § 1983 claims: the dismissal of the criminal charges against them and the avoidance of the time and expense of a criminal trial. The lack of judicial supervision is also not fatal to this agreement’s enforceability. The Rumery Court acknowl- edged that while “it would be helpful to conclude release- dismissal agreements under judicial supervision . . . . such supervision is not essential to the validity of an other- wise proper agreement.” Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398 n.10. Because we find that the release-dismissal agreement at issue in this case was entered into voluntarily, with- out evidence of prosecutorial overreaching, we do not believe that the lack of judicial supervision by itself ren- ders these releases unenforceable. Rather, we believe Kokot and Dixon have adequately demonstrated that the agreement comports with public policy. No. 02-1514 17

III. Conclusion The releases signed in this case were part of a contractu- ally valid release-dismissal agreement, fully consistent with considerations of public policy. Because we find them valid and enforceable, the releases must serve to bar this § 1983 suit. The grant of summary judgment in favor of Officers Kokot and Dixon is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy: Teste:

________________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—12-27-02